tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-85295595938698603142024-02-08T11:22:10.434+05:30The Long RangerThe Sri Lankan theatre of conflict through the eyes of a Long Ranger...Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.comBlogger24125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-57708899102356261642009-08-31T07:05:00.001+05:302009-08-31T07:05:55.915+05:30Kopp-Etchells Effect<p>Hello All,</p> <p>Sincere apologies for the long lay off. Just a small post to keep the wheels of thought of my avid readers spinning with regards to a mysterious phenomenon I came across through a fellow military blogger currently based in Afghanistan. I am hoping for some interesting feedback.</p> <p>Apparently this phenomenon occurs on some nights when a helo browns-out during landing or take-off due to static electricity generated by friction of dust and other debris brushing past rotor blades. However, it is still a mystery as to what governs the intensity of the halos and why it occurs only in some nights.</p> <p>Quite interestingly British or American pilots had no fitting name to this breathtaking halo effect until MilBlogger <a href="http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-kopp-etchells-effect.htm">Michael Yon</a> who was embedded with the British Afghan forces quite recently came up with a handle after two soldiers who had laid their lives in Helmand province; Corporal Benjamin Kopp (American Ranger) and Corporal Joseph Etchells (British).</p> <p>More images can be found <a href="http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-kopp-etchells-effect.htm">here</a>.</p> <p> </p> <p><img style="border-right-width: 0px; display: inline; border-top-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px" title="1" border="0" alt="1" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg21FdjUBttVVYrJ3H-FWlOS0Hxmtj5UHHreY9hW51_VhZVdvXJe6HqoYBO5SBMNOzw8Vq0lF16UkfF40MZev8NwFjN4ZUOrPcM3-vZ-vp85E8d1vEVI1buSRpe-Z7q-X7S308MhwPGMPnZ/?imgmax=800" width="632" height="471" /> </p> <p><img style="border-right-width: 0px; display: inline; border-top-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px" title="2" border="0" alt="2" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhv9zbErS19TBl20s3m_rNYK7aehCgBag0pR-oxTFzfgYMFX7GSbmxBi7ZwAtFL2WbgLowbZQQR4ILVBAVMh5XytN8Q27pzperL9aT-tytbJFj0MQwiMgyMV7FzrE8lWgs_OHnSX9y2nnre/?imgmax=800" width="634" height="414" /> </p> <p><img style="border-right-width: 0px; display: inline; border-top-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px" title="3" border="0" alt="3" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi3psMVF0QYM3IDXWfN7pU0WaR-BVMTee9TZEg8fu1J9I5qDlVh8l7a8xXqbz9-q-NUSRkFIdQyVay98S8Y0rLpxo8GAPEXpxwFrD2_gFIEbJkcHnDvF2t-gFaNIfcm_5-jTXjEdh587UOV/?imgmax=800" width="636" height="433" /> </p> <p><img style="border-right-width: 0px; display: inline; border-top-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px" title="4" border="0" alt="4" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjTpjmVTghBIb-4hsrIeX-zF1subbH-jN2rD1UjrPmwgisxgeo6PkzLy5Wc336ikKIS0EZ56Db7W7mnmx24MNV1NazQxVyupeTSxDtAeZZJ1IVNUkMAU42z_nAM9wH5CmdAkCtip7FKI3Gf/?imgmax=800" width="637" height="430" /></p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com23tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-82884608615792654832009-05-08T05:29:00.000+05:302009-05-18T03:59:31.725+05:30Decoding media’s war against a Military<p><img style="border-bottom: 0px; border-left: 0px; display: inline; border-top: 0px; border-right: 0px" title="bieger-and-farah" border="0" alt="bieger-and-farah" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi65bEp0GzsNpKIJ3M7VjP21bVzNU8TfxP7QnMvEEvmzkoXYeL0ewDetHVScQABPTffPkRL35C2YHjMc6-bNucL3Olc8-pPmqx9vTMjbhoSiROwGlriUlvCrbsnwYX_DGZ1wE6OhCto-rnr/?imgmax=800" width="669" height="445" /> </p> <p><em><strong><font size="4">Unreported face of war:</font> Major Mark Bieger found this little girl after the car bomb that attacked our guys while kids were crowding around. The soldiers here have been angry and sad for two days. They are angry because the terrorists could just as easily have waited a block or two and attacked the patrol away from the kids. Instead, the suicide bomber drove his car and hit the Stryker when about twenty children were jumping up and down and waving at the soldiers. Major Bieger rushed this little girl to our hospital. He wanted her to have American surgeons and not to go to the Iraqi hospital. She didn’t make it. I snapped this picture when Major Bieger ran to take her away. He kept stopping to talk with her and hug her. </strong></em></p> <p><strong><em>-</em></strong><a href="http://www.michaelyon-online.com/little-girl.htm">Michael Yon</a> a former Green Beret.</p> <p> </p> <p><font size="4"><strong>F</strong></font>ourth Generation warfare (4GW) in the 21st century in simplest of terms is warfare between a legitimate armed force and a non-state violent actor. The essence of 4GW is its protracted nature of violence, use of asymmetry attempting to attain parity politically as well as psychologically. Since the first bullets fired in 1981 in Jaffna the Tigers fought a protracted 4GW campaign against the Sri Lankan Government Military morally, mentally as well as physically to carve out a mono-ethnic separatist state. With unconventional tactics; physically they withstood the Government forces, Psychologically they played a mental game with the Southern polity, that whatever their goals of eliminating the Tiger’s writ over their perceived Tamil Eelam was a distant dream and morally they justified their cause using past alleged grievances and allegations of discrimination. Their limitations to fight symmetrically in conventional military operations meant terrorism was an integral part of their doctrine. It didn’t matter how many they managed to kill, what mattered was how much of an influence they made with each indiscriminate terrorism strikes. It was their version of a force multiplier aimed at the will and resilience of the Southern polity. In short goals of 4GW for the LTTE were clear; survive the military onslaught, avoid defeat thereby postpone any decisive action, expand support and grind the Southerners economically as well as politically to alter the power balance in their favour. </p> <p>The tendency of the non-state violent actor to seek its own resources in its conflict is another characteristic of 4GW. This is particularly important in the absence of any overt state sponsors or alliances for the insurgents. It is in this context the insurgents or the non-state violent actors may seek International Non Governmental Organisations (INGO) and the International Media to its advantage. Because unlike a legitimate Government, a non-state violent actor does not have any obligations to its populace. If the Maoists had its obligations to its people the Tigers had its obligations towards its Diaspora to show that its donations were well spent in destruction of the ‘Sinhalese’ regime. For the local Tamil population under its writ, it had no obligation for its welfare. They were more focussed on violence and coercion of its own people.</p> <p>It is because of this obligation and legitimate responsibility of the Government over its population the insurgents will choose to manipulate the media as part of its 4GW doctrine. By bringing about much publicity as possible to a conflict, pressure is brought about to cease hostilities. Because the international community has more leverage and access over a legitimate State over an insurgent, pressure does not fall equally on the two belligerent factions. Democratically elected states are expected to hold high ethical standards hence are more susceptible to international pressure than its adversary. As mentioned above a characteristic of 4GW is that a non-state actor does not have any international alliances or overt support of a particular state. It does not have ethical or legal constraints. Hence no country holds any leverage against the insurgents as it does against the Government. No Government can survive with little or no outside support. Media coverage allows the insurgents to reach out to the world in far distant lands to achieve this objective to hold the Government to higher ethical standards and thereby force it to practice restraint which almost always is advantageous to the insurgent. It is also an indispensable tool for its terrorism. The number it kills is not it goal, but the number its terrorism has affected is its ultimate goal. Only the media can propagate the terrorism to a wider audience and multiply the influence.</p> <p>Furthermore, media coverage gives this illegitimate non-state actors a state of legitimacy by according them a ‘victim’ status. Insurgents thrive with a victim tag attached to them. It brings them level pegging with the Government because the International audience to which the media plays loves the ‘victim’. The audience will be more willing to listen to the ‘victim’, it will be more willing to help the ‘victim’.</p> <p>The insurgents in Iraq as well as the Tigers over the years have been experts in using this non-lethal form of information warfare exceptionally well in its asymmetric war with legitimate states. In the Middle East the insurgents have coerced the media to drive hostility towards the US Government. For example the Al-Zawarra television channel owned by a Sunni using Nilesat (based in Egypt) was carrying out Sunni insurgent propaganda including footage of IEDs and suicide strikes against US military convoys and installations leading a steady volley of disinformation campaign against the Iraqi and US Governments.</p> <p>The role played by Al-Zawarra as well as the popular Qatar based Al-Jazeera Network was well documented in the <a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=790">'Rethinking Insurgency’</a> paper released by the US Government in June 2007;</p> <blockquote> <p><em>In Iraq, for instance, Al Zawaraa television, which is owned by a Sunni member of Iraq’s Parliament living in Damascus and distributed by Nilesat, an Egyptian government- owned company, is considered the semiofficial voice of the Sunni insurgents, broadcasting propaganda videos they produce, including those showing bloody attacks.105 It has signed a distribution deal with several European companies to broadcast it there and in the United States. The wildly popular Qatar based news network Al Jazeera, while less overtly linked to the insurgents than Al Zawaraa, contributed to the rebel information campaign through a steady barrage of criticism of the United States and the Iraqi government (at least until expelled in 2004). <strong>Whether one believes that Al Jazeera offered a “balanced” perspective (as it claimed) or supported the insurgents, it complicated counterinsurgent information operations and provided the insurgents publicity (and hence legitimacy) they would not otherwise have had</strong>. This also helped them adjust and refine their operations.</em></p> </blockquote> <p>Hand-in-hand with the media, willing to help the ‘victim’ will be the INGOs. With Governments under pressure due to unprecedented media exposure (verified or unverified) it will be forced at some point to let in International Aid agencies (INGOs) to alleviate the suffering of the people under insurgent control. Like the media which legitimised the insurgents by making it the ‘victim’ the INGOs will consider the insurgent to be in the same level pegging field to gain access to areas not under Government writ and to carry out its humanitarian operations. By signing treaties with the non-state actor as well as the Government it will give them a legitimate status which the insurgents will use in their media campaign as they did during the tsunami catastrophe in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Furthermore the humanitarian operations will be used by the insurgents to ‘win’ their own people by claiming credit to what the INGOs have undertook. In addition as witnessed by the hoard of equipment captured from the fleeing Tigers, the INGOs have been an invaluable source of heavy equipment and other contraband such as fuel, cement, steel, fertiliser etc. Any control over INGOs are deemed unethical and adds more pressure on the warring parties, however as above the leverage holds the Government more responsible than the insurgents giving the insurgents a culture of impunity.</p> <p>The same US Government paper highlights the role of INGOs in insurgency:</p> <blockquote> <p><em>Humanitarian organizations are almost always critical of military operations, whether by rebels or the government. The British relief group, Oxfam, for instance, often demands that the government of Uganda cease military operations against the brutal “Lord’s Resistance Army.” Some observers even claim that humanitarian assistance organizations prolong conflicts once such groups develop a vested organizational interest in them. <strong>Without humanitarian crises, humanitarian relief organizations would have no raison d'etre</strong>. Equally, the provision of humanitarian assistance relieves insurgents from the burden of caring for the population in areas they control and provides lootable or taxable income flows.</em></p> </blockquote> <p>Such INGOs will also play an integral part as informants for the media. Like the insurgents the INGOs too thrive in publicity. More exposure they get through the media more publicity they get and the more gets to know who they are internationally which equates to more funding. The media and the INGOs may use selective stories, partial facts, narrow sources of experts perhaps even just one sole source to ram home its story of the ‘victimised’ insurgents facing a ‘demonised’ Government.</p> <p>The actions of the INGOs also means it will vehemently oppose conflict thus protracting the conflict. This is one of the main goals of a non-state actor waging 4GW. Protracted conflict is equally threatening as an insurgent victory. Because the conflict itself becomes the insurgents’ main source of income in addition to the sense of identification it brings forth to its cadre. Before the insurgency as in the case of the Tigers, they were either tuition masters, barbers or desk clerks in foreign missions. But with the insurgency, the power of the gun made that no one into someone. It provided them with a livelihood at the expense of the majority.</p> <p>It is in this context that one should decode the International media’s role in the Sri Lankan conflict. Information is the currency of victory. And it is a currency that is worth all the trouble for. It is the last straw the drowning Tigers will ever clutch at <strong><em>any</em></strong> cost.</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com22tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-71644252060782843792009-03-24T06:03:00.001+05:302009-03-24T06:29:47.876+05:30The key to MOUT: Speed not Haste<p><img title="Fallujah copy" style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; display: inline; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="343" alt="Fallujah copy" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhfSKIxxPBSZAuHiamoeUzYNLwHLdRJZ-O1meYZaCjbFDswbZT1h1SgxTnS-mLVq5I-mkTQZ1jCtwuyDkepVvbuBdiLfsnM4QOW9e9PF5CXNx9ACQQOBKTRKHKIV7h2hgBaVPbTwOwF-vj/?imgmax=800" width="729" border="0" /> </p> <p><font size="4"><strong><em>Maj Gen Richard Natonski briefing Task Force 2-2 prior to Operation Al-Fajr of the Second Battle of Fallujah</em></strong></font></p> <p><strong><font size="5">M</font></strong>ilitary Operations in Urbanised Terrain (MOUT) is defined by US DOD as all operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on or against objectives within, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction or the density of non-combatants are the dominant feature. These operations are conducted to defeat an enemy that is almost always mixed in with civilians. Therefore, the rules of engagement (ROE) and use of combat force are heavily restrictive than in other conditions of combat.</p> <p>As briefed <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2009/01/fallacy-of-stalingrad-example.html">earlier</a>, in spite of a great build up of force, MOUT is always a very difficult sort of operation to achieve success in. Urban warfare is still the most vicious form of warfare. It takes the soldier back to the most primitive type of warfare demanding great tenacity, great precision, great courage and above all to conduct operations with little support fire in the most dangerous of situations. Therefore battle planners must be absolutely clear on why they are getting locked into this particularly risky type of operation and how the target fits to the overall battleplan. The risks involved with MOUT was also well versed by Sun Tszu in 500BC when he said that the worst policy (operation) was to attack cities. </p> <p>Before the second World War most of the main theatres of battle were fought in open fields where the belligerents were lined up in formation. Because of this, fighting in cities or built up areas did not receive much attention until battles broke out in major cities like STALINGRAD or BERLIN towards the middle/end of World War II hence not until 1944 soldiers saw the first doctrines and guidance on how MOUT was conducted. But still soldiers came unstuck and found themselves in unfavourable terrain particularly in HUE during the 1968 TET offensive where the Marines had great experience in jungle but not in urban terrain. Hence it was not until 1979 after the Vietnam war the US Army published a separate Field Manual (90-10) for such operations; Military Operations in Urban Terrain.</p> <p>With the continuous urbanisation of territory with increasing population and particularly due to 4th Generation warfare it is inevitable that any modern armed force will not encounter confrontations in urbanised terrain one way or another. I have chosen the Battle of FALLUJAH of 2004 because it is considered to be a turning point in modern military evolution due to the new technologies and tactics of the information era and the involvement of 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) characterised by a stateless entity fighting a state.</p> <p>FALLUJAH located some 40 miles West of Baghdad spans 30 Sq Kms with a population of roughly 300000. It is a city comprising of over 2000 blocks of civilian property, hospitals, industrial sectors and its own 6 lane highway. Due to the 90 odd mosques in the city it was also known as the city of a hundred mosques. However, it was also reputed as the city of the Sunnis with an exclusive culture that instilled hatred against Shiites and Americans. When the coalition forced the Baath party and Saddam out of Iraq the Sunnis particularly of the Al-ANBAR province which made up the Sunni triangle did not accept the end of Saddam because since 1959 the Sunni minority had controlled the political power of Iraq and FALLUJAH was a main source of Baath party supporters.</p> <p>The presence of Coalition forces, loss of political power, hatred instilled by default towards Americans, backed by the highly urbanised, highly populous terrain made FALLUJAH an excellent recipe for a well dug in insurgency.</p> <p>After the unsuccessful first battle of FALLUJAH code named Vigilant Resolve which was conducted in response to the death of the 4 Blackwater operatives, it was decided to launch the second battle of FALLUJAH code named Operation Al-FAJR (originally named Phantom Fury). The first operation ended with the Marines striking an agreement with local Fallujahn leaders to handover weaponry of the insurgents to the FALLUJAH Brigade (FB) which was composed of former members of the Iraqi army and Saddam's special security forces. However, the FB failed in its mission and in some instances were part of insurgent activity by surrendering its weapons and vehicles to the insurgents. By September 2004 the FB was disbanded and Operation Al-FAJR (New Dawn) was launched.</p> <p>Phase I of the operation involved Psy ops to release deceiving information to mislead the insurgents and to drive away as much as civilians as possible to reduce civilian casualties. HUMINT teams specialising in Arabic and interrogation during this phase obtained vital intelligence on insurgent positions. Phase II with a barrage of electronic, aerial, artillery attacks on specific targets determined by Phase I was launched on 7th November 04. The initial strike was meant to soften up enemy pillboxes and exhaust them physically and mentally. As an diversion to mask the actual assault from the North, a Southern thrust initiated the ground assault with the two bridges running across the Euphrates and the hospital captured cutting off the town from the peninsula. This was phase II.</p> <p>Phase III involved the actual thrust of Al-FAJR which was initiated from the Northern limits while the blackjacks had sealed off the city from the South and the East. Using eight of 2000 pound bombs and bulldozers the Marines blew the railroad berm and captured the railway station that provided a vital foothold (explained below) that provided covering fire for engineers to clear minefields and the rail tracks. In urban warfare it is paramount the force maintain its momentum, not allowing the defender a respite to regroup and position predesigned kill zones, pill boxes and strong points. The original time frame for the Marines to enter the centre of the city was 72 to 96 hours. However the troops managed to achieve their objective within 43 hours and by the 11th of November they had reached the Southern limits of the city and had begun the search and attack stage of the operation which involved house to house clearing operations.</p> <p>Small units of Marines using tactics similar to the German storm troopers of 1918 spearheaded the assault paving the way for the main assault by infiltrating enemy defences. M1 tanks protected with TUSK and Stryker fighting vehicles provided vital direct fire support with its 120mm HEAT rounds with the support of Combined Anti-Armour teams (CAAT). Even though it may be thought that armour are invincible in MOUT as the battles of Grozny of 1994 between Russia and Chechnya highlights, lack of coordination between armour and dismounted infantry bears the potential to disable or destroy armour. Hence it is important to ensure proper coordination between infantry and armour. </p> <p>As the Marine armour rolled through the streets of FALLUJAH, infantry cleared adjacent buildings. Snipers and FOs directed tanks to their targets. At times tracer bullets and M203 grenades were used to guide tanks to their targets. Without such guidance tanks as with any supporting fire always pose the risk of engaging wrong targets. Despite the overall good coordination between CAAT and armour there were incidents where Bradleys were penetrated by ATGMs and MBTs flipping over craters. Despite the odd mishap the troops continued to pummel the insurgents.</p> <p>CAS was provided mainly by rotary wing assets and AC130 gunships both day and night. AC130 gunships proved its value since its various canon choices provided weaponry with smaller blast radii and did not require a FAC unlike other fixed wing platforms. In CAS where close quarter battles are the norm, fixed wing aircraft find it harder to distinguish enemy and friendly positions.</p> <p>Under the cover of supporting fire Marine squads minimised exposure on FALLUJAH streets and ran from house to house in a stack with some dispersion applying <strong>three dimensional security</strong>. Infantry squads armed with Shoulder launched multipurpose assault weapons (SMAW), M-16s, M203 grenade launchers and M4 carbines cleared building to building, room to room either using <strong>top-down</strong> or <strong>bottom-up</strong> clearing techniques. As MOUT doctrine dictates there is no standard assault method. Squad leader bears the responsibility to assess advantages and disadvantages of each method, to assess the target structure quickly and make a decision to maximise the advantages while minimising the disadvantages. Traditional MOUT training also involves non-standard entry methods to add the lost elements of tactical surprise in MOUT. In either method speed (not haste) exercising tactical patience is the key. On average marines were involved in clearing at least 60 structures a day and entry through blown up walls or windows takes time hence the great majority of entry still involved existing doors. Using their experience squad leaders upon contact with the enemy in a house was to either break contact or flood the house holding onto the foothold. Footholds are strongpoints from which the squad will fight or reinforce. All this requires extensive training physical as well as verbal. However, the most effective form of training in a combat environment is for the squad leader to sit down and talk with his squad and discuss various combat scenarios.</p> <p>Two different classes of defending insurgents were observed. One group’s main objective was to eliminate as many Marines as possible after engaging on a terrain of their choosing and evade employing guerrilla warfare. The second group were martyrs who unlike the first group would fight till death. They would wait in fortified positions armed with no egress routes. They would have machine gun positions facing each entry point of buildings with IEDs. The guerrilla’s had preplanned, well rehearsed egress routes with minimum exposure in the streets. To reduce exposure to snipers they would always withdraw parallel to the Marine lines (FLOT). </p> <p>Even before phase III ended, by December 2004, Phase IV was initiated in the sectors that were cleared which involved the humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Civil-Military coordination centres, civilian relief distribution sites were formed for returning residents. Vehicles and civilians were only allowed into the city after a thorough security check to prevent infiltrations. Priority was given to employ Fallujahns for the reconstruction effort which helped to reduce the unemployment rate of the Al-ANBAR province. By December 23rd the city was declared open by the coalition. The Army’s withdrawal from Fallujah did not however, end the fighting. The Marines continued to filter out and kill the few remaining die-hard insurgents for weeks after.</p> <p> <img title="PTK copy" style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; display: inline; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="354" alt="PTK copy" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjnxtviAW2a5ido2FOPf5RN0SpzCmtgln7HIJPRanjgX0FDVyZSkqabcHTWaAEzd9Xi6XJXitXH6s4pLwfrUBR6Rzugr5kizZt6uf_92q_NQl4jmiIyfM-V4OYexKWsUYgEAeblpM341EZX/?imgmax=800" width="783" border="0" /> </p> <p>As mentioned above tactical doctrine stresses that MOUT be conducted only when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than locked in a costly, time-consuming operation. Well aware of the Tigers’ ability to resist tooth and nail particularly in defending the largest built-up area in Wanni; KILINOCHCHI, the battleplanners as briefed <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2009/01/fallacy-of-stalingrad-example.html">earlier</a> made the entire KILINOCHCHI built-up area into a massive salient and avoided a protracted close quarter battles under monsoon skies. The intention of the Tigers were well seen in clearing operations of the town when prepared strongpoints, high volume of IEDs facing pre-determined kill zones particularly around public institutions such as the hospital, school in an attempt to re-enact the stand off at the DZERZHINSKY tractor factory in STALINGRAD. However, thanks to the far sighted battleplanners of the Sri Lankan forces it was not to be. The 1995 battles of JAFFNA and modern military strategy had taught them well.</p> <p>As 59 moved North from WELIOYA conducting its battles mainly in jungle terrain and smaller built up areas such as MULLIYAWALI, it came across the PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU (PTK) town limits. There were no flanks available to exploit except the thin coastal isthmus North of MULLATIVU but the risks involved in forging ahead of a Division sized column along a narrow frontage did not allow this.</p> <p>The PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU (PTK) built-up roughly spans 5Km West to East and runs towards the Northern edge of the NANTHIKADAL lagoon. This hampered the 593's initial plan of circumventing the MULLATIVU town altogether and cutting the A35 thereby isolating the entire MULLATIVU coastal strip from the North of the lagoon. A similar strategy was successfully employed in capturing NACHCHIKUDA, Devil's point and ALAMPIL. The difference this time was the built-up. Despite psy-ops to drive civilians out of the way towards the new safe zone still a number of civilians were found among the PTK buildings and in shrub jungles adjoining the built-up areas.</p> <p>Adherence to the precepts of avoiding urbanised combat at all costs, though valid, was becoming increasingly difficult for the battleplanners in this situation for the following reasons.</p> <ol> <li>The limited land space available severely restricted the manoeuvre capabilities of the forces, thus to flood away the Tiger defences as done in KILINOCHCHI was impossible </li> <li>The available flank to circumvent the PTK town limits from the Eastern edge presented a narrow, open frontage sandwiched between the Safety zone and the built-up and complimented with salty marsh lands. A narrow frontage with limitations in mobility is inherently risky. </li> <li>The psy-ops conducted by SLA signals and SLAF meant the majority of civilians had moved to the safety zone which was roughly 4-5km away from the FLOT of SLA thus any escaping civilians had to cross roughly 4-5 Kms to reach to safety. Such a distance through a landmass containing a high concentration of IEDs and anti-personnel mines seriously affects the wherewithal of any civilian willing to cross over to Government territory. </li> <li>If not for the concerns of civilian safety the SLA can roll over the remaining tiger strongholds in a matter of days. Therefore the strategy involved on taking the FLOT as close as possible to the boundaries of the safety zone where in a small matter of 5-10 minute trip across the lagoon will guarantee a cross over for the civilians and reduce the number of civilians within the safety zone dramatically. To achieve this the SLA were required to take on the PTK built-up. </li> </ol> <p>Therefore battleplanners set to work in attempt to isolate the PTK built-up area as much as possible to disrupt the Tiger supply and medevac lines by moving the three prongs of 58 from the North towards PTK thus disrupting the Tiger supplies from the PUTHUMATTALAN safety zone running through IRANAPALAI junction. 58’s Southern movement also augmented the Southern push of 55 Division as mentioned in my <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2009/02/beginnings-of-end-game.html">previous brief</a> since the risks involved in forging ahead along a narrow frontage comprising of land features that severely restricts logistical movement. Meanwhile 682 brigade concentrated on disrupting the A35 that was connecting PTK from the safety zone just North of MULLATIVU by moving towards the Northern edge of the NANTHIKADAL lagoon. This movement has been slow due to the open paddy fields and the possible infiltrations from the flank facing the lagoon as occurred before. Towards inland 681 has been spearheading along with 583 and 582 brigades in MOUT operations while 53 Divisional elements have been concentrating on clearing the built-up area combing house to house. This is the supporting role in MOUT.</p> <p>Unlike on previous occasions where the strategy involved eliminating as much as Tiger cadres from the battlefield before claiming and consolidating real estate, speed and momentum were given prominence during the battles for PTK. Speed and momentum are vital elements of any MOUT operations because the last thing a commander needs is time consuming confrontations in this risky, highly demanding type of operations. Furthermore it presents the potential for taking considerable amount of casualties due to restrictions in manoeuvrability, force employment and expenditure of critical resources in the process.</p> <p>The shrinking territory also meant for the first time in the conflict the ground commanders were enjoying a full consistent 24 hour coverage of the target areas with SLAF’s recon assets, which earlier during the conflict were overstretched. This coverage formerly known as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is now called in modern parlance as C4ISR with the addition of the 4Cs; Command, Control, Communications and Computer. Even though its at its infancy in the Sri Lankan conflict it provided rich data for commanders to assess the ground situation on a 24/7 basis. It was such a luxury and the advantages were telling. Such data are crucial enablers for mobility and firepower. It is important to have detailed data of the terrain you are engaging the enemy in especially in urban terrain since observation and fields of fire are usually restricted to the paths and alleys between building blocks and is further obscured due to smoke, debris and dust due to fighting. Observation and fields of fire are also restricted according to the type and height of the building structures hence taller buildings are of value to both parties as observation posts (OPs).</p> <p>Urban terrain provided excellent cover and concealment for both the SLA and the Tigers. The effectiveness of cover depended on the type structure i.e density of walls and type of construction. However, the defender; the Tigers had in some cases turned some houses into rubble and rigged some with IEDs that were likely to be used by the SLA for cover and concealment. Trenches ran through roads to hinder the movement of armour. Rubble created by IEDs, mortars and CAS were also a contributing factor for restricted movement. Tactical surprise most of the time in MOUT is non-existent hence to offset this soldiers at times employed nonstandard entry points into houses through walls or windows. Squad leaders also varied type of entry to mask their movement using deception to confuse the enemy and use imagination to vary entry tactics.</p> <p>Using carefully selected OPs strengthened with five zero posts, good reconnaissance, town maps (not 100% accurate due to constant change of man made structures) and building architect drawings if available (mainly of Government property i.e hospitals) the SLA mapped out the terrain and marked out <strong>decisive terrain</strong> and <strong>critical public areas</strong> such as schools and hospitals. Decisive terrain involves critical town areas that could provide a strategic advantage (e.g. PTK junction,IRANAPALAI junction) to either side and critical public areas such as hospitals were important to be secured since it provided the Tigers an on field dressing station. Further it was paramount to secure it to minimise the damage in accordance with laws of war. Zones were set up and assigned for each platoon commander. Once the area was mapped the next step was to map out avenues of approach and securing suitable footholds for each objective. By default the avenues are along alleys and roads of the town, however these are open ground and may be predesigned kill zones with snipers, MGs or IEDs. Hence the best avenue of all was to approach through existing buildings wherever possible obscuring enemy OPs with smoke. A <strong>foothold</strong> is a point where the attacker can continue the assault while rapidly building up a force at that point to achieve the objective. It could be a block of houses or one single room. Multiple footholds may be used depending on the objective and may isolate the objective and prevent the enemy from reinforcing the objective area, cut off lines of communication and suppress enemy fire positions. This sort of systematic clearing were the only option for field commanders if enemy defences were dense and if no critical objectives or decisive terrain were in sight.</p> <p>In some cases depending on the criticality of a certain objective for example decisive terrain and if the area in question is spread out or lightly defended, commanders may decide to bypass certain strong points and conduct a rapid advance bypassing/suppressing enemy pillboxes within houses and gain control over the decisive terrain and force the bypassed enemy locations to flood away as the rapidly advancing force automatically isolates enemy positions along the way. This method allowed the SLA to reach its critical objectives quicker. Command and control, unit coordination, security of cleared buildings and above all a clear understanding of the Clausewitz’s culmination point was the key. Long, overstretched communication and supply lines running through unsecure terrain was avoided.</p> <p>Another consideration that was made by the commanders was how to integrate combined arms tactics into the planning. Due to the limits in visibility, on average, MOUT confrontations take place at hugging distance i.e 50m or less. In such a scenario using heavy firepower is limited with minimum arming ranges, back blast of RPGs/LAWs and splash damage radii in mind. Also because of the close nature of combat and broken nature of the urban terrain the time available to engage targets is short. Commanders must also account for dead space created by elevation or depression limits of weapons. Unlike artillery, mortars are the preferred weapons in MOUT as these particularly the 60s and the 81s can be carried to the very edge of the Forward Line of own Troops (FLOT) and can be operated by the squads themselves enabling a firing solution in less than a minute. These are also high trajectory weapons hence dead space where the enemy can take cover is a minimum. Further the splash damage radii is low negating hugging tactics of the defender. Tomba guns are another favourite of MOUT troops. 40mm grenade launchers are ideal for close quarter battles particularly in confined spaces as it causes minimal damage to the structure itself but cause maximum damage to the enemy within a structure. A further advantage is its ability to bounce off walls hence allowing the infantry to fire around corners. Because of the trajectory of the round it can also be delivered behind walls, piles of rubbles or buildings. </p> <p>MPMGs/GPMGs are the primary direct fire weapons used to suppress designated targets, to establish kill zones or to isolate enemy targets. The cumbersome nature of these weapons makes them inappropriate for clearing houses hence are primarily used for above uses. Open areas along roads and alleys in urban environments meant these weapons were able to achieve grazing fires that are seldom achieved in other terrain. Its rounds will penetrate most urban walls with continued concentrated fire. Tripod mounted 0.50 calibre weapons are capable of producing significant amounts of damage to structures and will penetrate walls with ease. However what limits the capability of MGs is the the limited availability of long fields of fire in urban terrain.</p> <p>Some of the enemy pillboxes within houses were reinforced with logs and steel with heavy overhead protection. In such a scenario if a direct safe LOS is available RPGs/LAWs were the weapons of choice. Back blast particularly in narrow alleys or rooms, debris that will be kicked off the blast and minimum arming distances are considerations before using such weapons in MOUT. If not infantry were ready to call in the support of armour with devastating effect.</p> <p>As in FALLUJAH armour played an integral role in PTK MOUT operations. Mounted T55 MBTs and BMP/BTR/dismounted Mech infantry mix proved invaluable. Mech assets were used extensively to break barricades, isolate objectives, deliver squads over to key areas in rapid time bypassing potential kill zones and suppress enemy positions with direct fire support. Wherever troops encountered fortified enemy pillboxes MBTs were called in for a direct fire support role with devastating effect. The secondary weapons of these and thermal NVG sights of certain assets also proved a handful to the defender. Armour also proved to be mobile road blocks. However due to the broken nature of the terrain with obscured fields of fire and limited manoeuvrability at times allows the enemy to close in on armoured vehicles. Therefore it is paramount armour and infantry coordinate to prevent an episode of Grozny in 1994. It is always risky for a single armoured asset to operate on its own hence at least two armoured assets are needed to cover for each other and to rescue a disabled vehicle if required. Good coordination with infantry is essential for mutual survival in MOUT. It is the responsibility of the infantry to clear out and secure any buildings adjacent to the armoured vehicles.</p> <p>If fixed wing CAS was a hallmark in jungle terrain it was not so in the PTK battles. As mentioned earlier most of the engagements were in close quarter hence it fails to meet the minimum safe distance requirement. Fixed wing CAS has great effects on the ground and a major problem is the amount of time to get the payload on the intended target. Rotary wing CAS are more suited in MOUT especially in the deeper battle space while the immediate theatre requirement of support fire was sufficiently provided by armour. MBTs and supporting troops were the ideal fire support element in MOUT as it provided a firing solution on enemy contact in a matter of minutes.</p> <p>Despite the era dominated by technology and heavier fire power, MOUT still requires the individual soldier to fight street to street, house to house and even down to room to room. It still demands great courage from individual soldiers to do the most dangerous of jobs in the most dangerous of situations. All these risks and danger were involved due to the great concerns the battleplanners have displayed towards the civilian safety and to leave collateral damage to a bear minimum. </p> <p>Civilian casualties bring nothing but negative effects to any war machine and is a stepping stone to potential disaster on the media front. Further civilian casualties bears the potential to create hostility among the civilians regardless of how noble the intentions are. This clearly demonstrates the current consensus within the Sri Lankan military machine that battlefield victories alone are worthless if the army fails to muster a victory over the population’s hearts and minds. That is the purpose of the unbelievable bravery and heroism displayed 24/7 by our men.</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com24tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-9962337657568910702009-03-17T07:24:00.001+05:302009-03-17T07:24:19.542+05:30Await: a brief on MOUT<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="474" alt="Fallujah" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjaxLJ-a2LPmYPGbuDc5U1qdA7KbOcupzh6cM0JNuGkdfnQY_tLKVIiTBlw9oTRrMoNpy3VyVuK04xEiujWLOLZ1qoOcHVCjOZK8FqLRiOpYqgTxfJqZgMcaoE5xlkYH6-bKV81-KUetJyZ/?imgmax=800" width="627" border="0" /> </p> <p>Military Operations in Urbanised Terrain (MOUT) is defined by US DOD as all operations planned and......</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-57434433310726213532009-02-10T02:34:00.001+05:302009-02-19T05:27:26.422+05:30The Beginnings of the End Game<p> <img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="585" alt="Vishwamadu" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgG-Z8NG9YAWfcejq5KZ-TI26Mab1PN_88OCPd33TSUd9QqkTEIapIh20VdVYGQZF2eVx15vqSt3AhEQvLbPKuRc1WRsBdAQCPR_woq_JUD34bfAtHExVQEWHFer9RjEEnK6XPeGbBFXtDH/?imgmax=800" width="674" border="0" /> </p> <p><font size="5"><strong>A</strong></font>t the beginning of the year 591 was positioned along the MULLATIVU coast at CHILAWATTA held back by two earth bunds connecting the sea front from the East to the lagoon at the West. Unlike the massive ditch cum bunds 57 and 58 has to contend with at AKKARAYANKULAM or PARANTHAN-IRANAMADU areas, these bunds were not so formidable. Primary reason can be attributed to the soft sandy soil of the area. Another reason is the disruptions to the fortifications caused by the forward exploitation forces of 59.</p> <p>593 meanwhile had overcome the defensive earth bunds north of MULLIYAWALI and TANNIYUTTU and have positioned themselves in the woodlands just South of PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU buildup area. To their flank west 592 and TFIV are stationed.</p> <p>The PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU buildup roughly spans 5Km West to East and runs towards the Northern edge of the NANTHIKADAL lagoon. This hampered the 593's initial plan of circumventing the MULLATIVU town altogether and cutting the A35 thereby isolating the entire MULLATIVU coastal strip from the North of the lagoon. A similar strategy was successfully employed in capturing NACHCHIKUDA, Devil's point and ALAMPIL. The difference this time was the civilian buildup. As briefed <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2009/01/fallacy-of-stalingrad-example.html" target="_blank">earlier</a>, in spite of a great build up of force it is always a very difficult sort of operation to achieve success in an urban or semi urban environment particularly when many civilians are present in the vicinity. Urban warfare is still the most vicious form of warfare. It demands great tenacity, great precision, great courage and above all demands that <strong>individual</strong> soldiers to conduct operations with little support fire in the most dangerous of situations. Therefore battle planners must be absolutely clear on why they are getting locked into this particularly risky type of operation and how the target fits to the overall battleplan. It is therefore important to the commander who is considering putting his troops into a city to have a clear idea what he is trying to accomplish.</p> <p>With 593 unable to cut off the A35 from the North, battleplanners set to work. Emulating <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/03/move-on-pooneryn-assault-from-sea.html" target="_blank">Operation Trudy Jackson</a> led by Lieutenant Eugene Clark that relayed detailed intelligence on enemy defences, sea tide ranges, whether the beach could hold assault vehicles back to General Douglas Mcarthur during the Battle of Incheon, amphibious reconnaissance teams were dispatched particularly to map out the lagoon for a successful penetration corridor and for advanced surveillance of the MULLATIVU town defences. Such reconnaissance missions were carried out extensively for roughly a week before D-day. The reason being unlike the UPPARU lagoon at VAHARAI, the NANTHIKADAL lagoon is much deeper in some areas and the target length to cross was much wider. Further vital intelligence were gathered with SLAF's recon aircraft. Thanks to shrinking territory the recon assets of the SLAF have been able to keep tabs on most locations on a consistent basis when larger swathes of territory during the initial stages somewhat overstretched the SLAF's recon capability. With these scouting the battleplanners were creating a flank. <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/04/flank-attack-hit-enemy-where-it-least.html" target="_blank">Flank attack</a> is ideal since it allows the commander to appear where the enemy least expects you to. The idea is not to hit the enemy head on but hit him in the side where he might be weak. If a formation comes from the front towards 100 men, all 100 can shoot at it, but if it comes from the side and if the defence line is only 3 deep, then only 3 can engage the incoming formation. Hence it can literally roll down the flank and crush the defender 3 at a time. </p> <p>On D-day as planned exploitation forces were poured into the MULLATIVU town bypassing the two sand bunds that lay South of the town and cut off the A35 and A34 from some points while 591 made a head on assault on the bunds. By 25th January the town had fallen.</p> <p>Another reason for this manoeuvre was the narrow frontage of 2Km that was available for 591 to exploit. Further that hampered any forward advance was the open land that provided scant cover and concealment for attacking squads and their buddy teams. The multiple bunds also meant that any Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) that ferried squads across open land were not able to provide any more close support beyond the first defence line which was again open ground which is easily visible for the defenders' forward observers.</p> <p>A similar predicament was faced by the 553 brigade that was inching South towards the Sea Tiger base CHALAI from CHUNDIKULAM. The thin isthmus of land meant this brigade too had to conduct its assault on a narrow frontage with a width of roughly 1Km. Further was the fact heavily mined beachfronts and four sand bunds that lay ahead. In some instances engineers reported to have cleared a deadly gourmet of nearly 800 anti-personnel and anti-tank mines within a 200m stretch. Knowing the tough route ahead 55 commanders decided to induct 552 brigade later towards the assault. Securing their flank from further inland was 581 brigade. This augmented the security of the 55 divisional thrust because moving ahead on a 1km corridor presents inherent risks of being easily cutoff since any Tiger counterattacks either from the seafront via boats or from inland requires a penetration of a mere 1km to cutoff forward operating units of 55.</p> <p>The inherent disadvantages of a narrow frontage are manifold. One particular operation during World War II highlights the disadvantages of a narrow frontage. After the D-day landing on June 6th 1944 Allied Commander Bernard Montgomery conceived two major operations; Goodwood and Cobra to breach the German defences and initiate a swift breakout of the <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/03/move-on-pooneryn-assault-from-sea.html" target="_blank">lodgement</a> phase of the assault beach landing. The first of the two operations, Goodwood was to be commanded by Lt. Gen. Miles Dempsey with the objective to drive the Germans from the banks of the river Orne and Southern Caen. Despite an overall frontage of over 15Kms to exploit, Monty and Dempsey had planned the primary thrust using a narrow frontage of only 2km. Hence the three tank divisions of Miles Dempsey's allied forces were concentrated on this very narrow 2Km stretch of an overall front which spanned over 15Kms. This way Montgomery intended to provide maximum preponderance with a high local Force to Force Ratio (FFR) head on at this point to achieve a breakthrough while rest of the frontage was expected to conduct supporting attacks with a lesser numerical edge.</p> <p>Because the frontage was narrow the resulting traffic congestion delayed the 8th corps to mobilise all 3 tank divisions into action on the first day as planned. Even during second day of battle the 7th armoured core saw little combat. Due to this immobility the actual initial local FFR at the point of attack was a much lower figure than what Monty calculated to be at the planning phase. Even though Monty had his reserves they are usually excluded  from local FFR calculations precisely because their mobility makes it possible for them to fight in many possible places rather than on any particular frontage. The Germans however had anticipated and were preparing for a British offensive in the vicinity of Caen and had placed their reserves nearby to facilitate rapid commitment should such an offensive occur.</p> <p>In theory this narrow frontage may have ensured a high local FFR but in exchange it posed a number of important problems. The front was so narrow that enfilading fire from German positions on either flank had the ability to sweep the entire penetration corridor thus interfering with British resupply and reducing the freedom to manoeuvre. The narrow frontage forced the British to form the three divisions one behind the other rather than bringing all three into action simultaneously. Perhaps more important, it created serious congestion in the British rear where assembly areas and approach routes were located. This made combined arms integration much harder since it is common practice to position artillery to the rear. In principle combined arms fire and movement should have been employed to maintain suppression while the attackers made first contact with the enemy. However it was not to be.  The attack by then had moved beyond the reach of the British batteries and the congestion in the march columns had kept the artillery from moving forward into supporting range to sustain the creeping barrage. With no artillery support forthcoming an attempt was made for a second saturation bombing later during the day, but the massive air effort earlier during the day had left the air forces unable to respond quickly to a new mission. Despite small scale CAS type sorties the failure of a breakthrough was inevitable because sustained suppressive fires of the kind needed to screen an extended advance in massed formations over open ground were unavailable.</p> <p>Moving forward through a narrow penetrative corridor means that there are fewer smaller routes of access for supplies. Fewer smaller routes of supplies means the troops that poured in through will move slower with slower commitment hence the forces can only sustain a smaller exploitation force. Further such a narrow frontage increases the vulnerability of a potential counterattack for, the counterattacking Tigers require only to advance a short distance to cut the supply route. Therefore movement along a narrow penetrative corridor is always inherently risky. For this reason it can be expected that 552/553 will not move further South of CHALAI without the flanking support of the 58 Division moving parallel to them. What the parallel coordinated movement of these two divisions does is, it expands the frontage.</p> <p>Even though MULLATIVU was captured it did not make the NANTHIKADAL lagoon any safer. The Northern and North Eastern segment of the lagoon still lay in Tiger hands giving them the opportunity to outflank the 59 division via the lagoon in anyway they want. Outboard motors of sea tiger boats also meant the outflanking could be achieved in one swift stroke either to the East to cut off MULLATIVU or to the West to cut off PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU South. The lagoon stretching 10Km further South towards MULLIYAWALI and TANNIYUTTU also meant they could reach this area via boats in a small matter of 10 to 15 minutes. A similar situation was faced by troops operating at the KILALY FDLs before hence as 53 Division had done MBTs were positioned overlooking the lagoon. Tanks are direct fire weapons hence can provide a firing solution quicker than artillery which lacks a direct LOS. Time in instances like these is the key since in a small matter of minutes the Sea Tigers are capable of reaching a secure shore and disembark.</p> <p>Exploiting the geographical advantage of the lagoon which they had used to train for decades, sea tigers infiltrated under the cover of darkness on the 1st of February. Their primary infiltration points were muddy/soggy stretches of the lagoon where MBTs/IFVs have limited mobility. These areas helped the boats to beach further inland. Once the boats were beached a hail of artillery fire began to land on or around the vicinity of ammo dumps, MBTs, known troop concentrations, brigade HQ etc to disrupt the rear support of the 59 Division. The intelligence the Tigers had at hand raises the question if the Tigers too had carried out a Trudy Jackson type recon operation days before the attack. Amidst the chaos more boats had begun beaching with some infiltrating even further South of the VATTAPPALAI Amman kovil. Radar plots were providing vital intelligence of the locations of the Tiger support fire batteries. Not surprisingly the sustained fire of 130mm/122mm/152mm were plotted to be originating from the Civilian Safety Zone. The CFFZ being located within a densely populated area made the commanders to act with restraint with regards to long range artillery and instead had to resort mainly to heavy mortar fire that pose less potential for collateral damage from 58/57 Division that was operating closest to the CFFZ.</p> <p>Using fluid defence tactics described in detail later in this brief, commanders inducted the available reserves while withdrawing frontline troops that risked being isolated by the flanking Tiger manoeuvres. This move also meant the flank the Tigers had planned to exploit was minimised. In order to do this commanders must have the defence in depth factor. Depth is an invaluable tradeoff for any defender. Deeper the defence the lower the risk of breakthrough. However, deeper the defence, lighter the defence becomes at the front and thus more ground an attacker can gain before being halted by counterconcentrating reserves. Further was the fact of the superior training of the squad leaders. At training level they are trained to observe vital indicators such as number of enemy automatic weapons, presence of any vehicles, the number of vehicles and the concentration of indirect fires that might give away the extent of the attack they are facing. Depending on the extent of the attack they are trained to either react to contact or to break contact with the enemy.</p> <p>The Tamil Tiger offensive to recapture lost territory is quite similar to General Võ Nguyên Giáp’s Tet Offensive in 1968 since it was conducted days before the Sri Lankan 61<sup>st</sup> Independence day celebrations. The celebratory event at Colombo had mustered many foreign media personnel and any territorial gain by the Tigers no matter how temporarily it is, would have raised serious question marks over Colombo’s military offensive against the Tigers. It is in this light one must consider General Giap’s objectives in his 1968 Tet Offensive. With his South Vietnamese Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces losing militarily due to aggressive tactics of General William Westmooreland, General Giap's only hope was to win a political rather than a military victory. In the US anti war demonstrators were already marching on the streets and Giap was aware of it. Giap hoped his new plan will deal enough of a defeat to the Americans to put pressure on President Lyndon Johnson to end the war or withdraw his troops. Up to 1968 Giap's campaign centred around small to medium sized attacks and daily small skirmishes to harass his American and South Vietnamese enemies. General Giap decided to change his tactics totally and to use his forces to attack urban targets including Saigon and 36 other provincial capitals and towns which were perceived to be safe from the VC. In Saigon his forces were to target six primary objectives; the HQ of the South Vietnamese joint chief of staff, The independence palace where South Vietnamese President has his office, Tan Son Nhat airbase, Vietnamese Navy HQ and the national broadcasting station. His sixth target had no military value whatsoever but was key in terms of his political objective - the American embassy in Saigon. Despite the VC unable to break into the embassy itself, the initial press reports suggested that the embassy compound was under siege which made immediate headlines in the US. At first light the US killed the surviving VC. General Westmooreland gave a press conference from the newly secured compound to exude confidence and explained the embassy itself was never penetrated. But what Americans saw on TV was a scene of carnage. Dead VC were broadcast on TV but <strong>within</strong> the embassy compound grounds. With this General Giap was achieving his political objective. In almost every VC attack during the offensive American forces retook the targets as easily as the VC seized them. The VC suffered a decisive military defeat with massive losses with some 45000 dead and nearly 7000 captured. Even if failed miserably to tilt the military balance, it tilted the political pressure in favour of the Giap.</p> <p>Previously the Tamil Tigers conducted their counterattacks/offensives in a limited manner with the main objective of recapturing their lost strongpoints and bunkers along the earthbunds. They very well knew their limitations in such scenarios since any ambitious counterattack plans runs the risk of overstretching itself and running a long line of communications and supplies. With an overstretched supply lines they also risk a counterstrike by the Sri Lankan armed forces themselves, for during the current theatre of operations the far sighted battleplanners have made sure the forces have employed the <strong>fluid defence</strong> tactics in addition to the defence in depth factor with the swathes of territory already under armed forces control.</p> <p>Fluid defence is a defence that comprises depth and reserves. Depth compels the attacker to penetrate many kilometres before achieving a breakthrough but the density of the forward defence the attacker will face at any point is light. Hence it is quite common for the attacker to gain ground initially. As attacking formations dig deeper through the defence, formations begin to break down, attacking units begin to enter unscouted terrain and begin to face obstacles unknown to pre-battle reconnaissance. Hence a further an attack travels, progressively the power of the attack erodes. This entropic effect of depth, thus sets up the SLA reserves' ability for a successful counterattack. The fluidity to the defence is added by defensive reserves positioned well to the rear which the attacker finds hard to pin down into one position hence are readily available to counterconcentrate at any point where it is needed. The increased manpower of the Sri Lankan armed forces has allowed the battleplanners to allow certain brigades and at times entire divisions to be kept on reserve such as the 571 attached to 57 Division or the entire 53 Division. The presence of the Air Mobile Brigade in this division also makes it an ideal reserve force since it allows the battleplanners to deploy the reserves on short notice. In a nutshell depth of a defence provides time for the defence to muster its defensive reserves at the rear to counterconcentrate against the attacker and counterattack. This is fluid defence or elasticity of defence.</p> <p>With these factors in mind, it is highly questionable if the Tamil Tigers were indeed capable of holding the grounds of MULLATIVU/MULLIYAWALI/TANNIYUTTU upto ODDUSUDAN they recaptured if they really had succeeded. According to tactical intelligence reports it was the very reserves that was meant to conduct limited counterattacks to augment their own fluid defence manoeuvres, the Tigers had used in this failed offensive. This was clearly evident when 552/553 broke through four sand bunds along the thin isthmus of land North of CHALAI and move into the base on 5th of February. Usually once a defence line falls it was quite normal for the Tigers to conduct a limited counterattack attempting to regain the lost defensive positions. However on this occasion it was not to be. In other words the commanders were extremely clever and shrewd to exploit the already mobilised reserves. This is something the Tigers did not anticipate.</p> <p>As mentioned in an <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/12/crumbling-of-muhamale.html">earlier brief</a> if the Tigers are to conduct a counterstrike it has to do so in a sustainable manner where it can replenish its lost cadre as well as the ammunition. If it opted for a region in the Wanni as it did recently and launches a counterstrike with all its reserves to regain a region of the Wanni it may succeed temporarily. However, whether it will be the Gordian knot for its woes is the million dollar question. MULLATIVU area holds no population base hence the Tamil Tigers will not be in a position to recruit its lost cadre. It may manage to replenish a small fraction of its supplies across the oceans barring naval interception but still it will fail to meet the requirement since annihilating 59 Division alone will not mean the Tigers have seen the back of the Sri Lankan armed forces. By having mobilised its entire reserve cadre to regain land means it would have lost whatever it had barring MULLATIVU and will be staring down the barrel of the rest of the offensive divisions.</p> <p>Therefore if the Tigers are to launch a successful counterattack, it has to be a region that holds a sizeable population base for new recruits and an area that is close enough to smuggle in vital supplies. Out of the entire Northern theatre of operations <strong>only</strong> the Jaffna peninsula brings forth such rich dividends. Jaffna peninsula holds a population base of over 650000 compared to the sparsely populated Wanni which estimates are thought to hold less than 100000. And it is in close proximity to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu where many Tamil Tiger safe houses are known to exist. With the entire peninsula under its control it will have plenty of coastal belts to continue its smuggling operations with impunity. But since 53/55 Divisions have been mobilised it completely negates the Tamil Tigers' ability to launch ANY counterstrike to get a foothold on the Jaffna peninsula - the cultural centre of the Eelam ethos. This is why earlier I <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/10/tamil-tigers-defensive-gamble.html">briefed</a> my avid readers that any counterstrike by the Tamil Tigers after 53/55 have been mobilised may come too little too late.</p> <p>The failure of this counterattack to retake MULLATIVU and its suburbs even before it began and the timing of the offensive to coincide with the 61st Independence day celebrations which was attracting national and international media attention allows it to be compared to 1968's Tet offensive which was again doomed to fail in a military perspective. Unlike Giap's VC which held towns like HUE for a month before being annihilated, the Tiger offensive was grounded to a halt in a matter of days without achieving any of its objectives. Unrealistic military objectives, cadres initiating burial of its assets and over 10000 civilians crossing over to Government territory over the last week, signals the end game for the Tigers. From here on the politicians of the Government as well as the opposition will have to shoot out of the blocks for it is not long before the baton will exchange hands from the military.</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com25tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-84481961316953270752009-01-15T06:32:00.001+05:302009-01-15T06:32:46.058+05:30The Fallacy of the Stalingrad example<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="435" alt="South Iranamadu" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6YIQEDkzU5z6GNQhB97jkGpAg3S6ALIgxFTrTbo_5B6be6PulR94gwAo0ulA_OgoDtWCDunU3cMUL439SCZ1UBX792xDh9xaOKqTXWUZapPRrLZ8pEOes6qliXCEiIpE_Ayma04_xgXkg/?imgmax=800" width="689" border="0" /> </p> <p><font size="5"><strong><font size="4"><em>The Stalingrad-esque earth bund at Southern KILINOCHCH</em>I. Source- SLA media.</font></strong></font></p> <p><font size="5"><strong>T</strong></font>he Summer of 1942 Hitler's forces occupy western Europe. The previous year Hitler had turned his attention east and launched operation Barbarossa against the Soviets. Initially it sweeps everything before it before the Soviet winter grinds it to a halt when Stalin counter attacked. After stabilising his FDLs and re-equipping his men after the set back at the battle of Moscow, Hitler decides to move South towards the Caucasus to capture the vital Russian oil fields. Friedrich Paulus the commander of the German 6th army was handed the operation to capture the Caucasus. The operation was code named Blue.  </p> <p>In Paulus's original campaign to take the Caucasus Hitler had not ordered him to consider the Soviet city of Stalingrad to be important. But after the initial success of Blue during the summer Hitler turns his eyes towards Stalingrad. Despite the city not being in initial German plans, Stalingrad with its population of 500000 was a key rail and transport centre on the West bank of the Volga river. </p> <p>Stalingrad was however not an easy target. It straddles along 20 miles along the precipitous West banks of the Volga. On the North stands the industrial sites of the DZERZHINSKY tractor factory which was now turning out quarter of the red army's tanks and other vehicles, the BARRIKADY arms plant, the Red October steels plant and the LAZUR chemicals plant. All these provided excellent opportunities for the defenders to dig in or to turn them into formidable defensive fortresses. Further South was the city centre. All these make up a lethal labyrinth in which attackers may get pinned down in pre-planned kill zones. Geographically there was another key hurdle Paulus had to face. The Tsaritsa river runs through the city in a 200 foot deep gauge to the Volga river. There are no bridges across the Volga so supplies and people have to be ferried across which should be a major disadvantage for the defenders. But this also meant that unless Paulus's men can cross the Volga they will run the gauntlet of the Soviet guns on the Eastern bank. </p> <p>In striking a key hub of the enemy such as STALINGRAD the battle planners must be absolutely clear on why they are getting locked into this particularly risky type of operation and how the target fits to the overall battleplan. It is therefore important to the commander who is considering putting his troops into a city to have a clear idea what he is trying to accomplish. In 1942 Stalingrad was not in Hitler's original plan for the Southern area of the Soviet union and his drive to seize the oil fields of the Caucasus. The initial thrust of Operation Blue goes well for Hitler. This apparent success; apparent because the soviets have actually withdrawn to avoid mass loses leads a now confident Hitler to change his plan. He did not want to simply head for the oil fields, instead he wanted to take the whole Caucasus. And to prevent a buildup of Soviet forces there he wanted to take and destroy Stalingrad. But only when the Summer 1942 campaign appears to go well Hitler changed his mind and decided to take the city. This decision proved a serious lack of clarity in Hitler's strategic thinking in 1942. Battle of Stalingrad was really fought as an afterthought at the end of that year. At the beginning of the Summer Hitler really wanted push to the South to the Caucasian mountains and open the gateway to the Middle East and importantly to gain the oil. But there was another reason for Hitler's decision to strike Stalingrad and it was personal. Stalingrad was Stalin's city. He had commanded the city for 4 months during the civil war of 1919-1921. In the summer of 1942 when Soviet resistance to the German advance collapses, Stalin decreed that Stalingrad would be a fortress from which there would be no retreat. And Hitler ordered that the city must fall. So Hitler's decision to strike Stalingrad was partly a personal tussle; dictator against dictator. </p> <p>At Stalingrad surprise was less important since when Soviet resistance at the German advance collapsed that summer Stalin expected an attack on the city. For General Paulus therefore the vital element was speed and momentum of the attack before Stalingrad's defences can be strengthened. On August 23rd 1942 Paulus launched his attack. But his plans were already in danger due to Hitler's indecision. A month earlier confident that Stalingrad will fall easily Hitler transferred the 4th Panzer brigade South fatally weakening the assault force for Stalingrad. The tank units attacking the Southern part of the city were severely understrength with their crews exhausted. Soviet artillery on the eastern bank of the Volga continued to bombard the German positions. German tanks were bogged down by heaps of rubble and barricades. Where they were able to move forward, they came under Soviet antitank fire from wrecked buildings.They were hemmed in by ravines that criss-crossed the area thus losing the all important impetus and momentum. Only on the last day of August do they breakthrough the outer Soviet defences and advance towards the heart of the city. Paulus's infantry struck between the two German armoured thrusts to push the Soviets into the Volga. But German advances in the South meant that a large Soviet force was left untouched to the North. And Paulus is only too aware of the danger of attacks to his flank and rear by these. This makes him to delay his final push. Its not until September 13th, 21 days after the first advance that he pushes forward reluctantly. But the delay has cost him the essential requirement of speed and given the Soviet defenders vital time. This time allowed the Soviets to deploy the Elite 13th Division in sufficient strength that developed the concept of Kill Zones along heavily mined areas through which on they knew the way to face Paulus's 200000 men. MG posts protruding through windows and anti-tank weapons littered the streets. Snipers also successfully inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans. Notable among them was Vasily Zaytsev. The Soviet Hugging tactics also meant that the Germans had to fight close quarter battles with the Soviets. The Germans used to leave swastika flags spread on the ground to mark ground controlled by them for the Stuka dive bombers but the Soviet tactics meant the Germans had to fight on their own or risk casualties from their own support fire.</p> <p>In the first days of October Paulus launched what he hopes will be his final offensives against the 3 remaining Soviet strong points. The tractor factory, Red October steel works and the BARRIKADY arms plant. In 10 days half of the Red October plant and most of the BARRIKADY complex have fallen. By early November Paulus had reduced the Soviet held area to two small enclaves, one 8 miles long 1 mile deep and the other even smaller. Paulus appeared to have regained momentum. He seemed to be on the verge of victory. But the winter arrived.</p> <p>As the winter begins to bite the Soviets continue to cling onto the two small enclaves. Factory workers were repairing damaged Soviet tanks, vehicles and weapons on the battlefield itself. Some volunteered to man tank gun positions. They were holding out and most crucially resupplying over the frozen parts of the Volga and via flotillas of small boats over non-frozen parts.  Protected by gun boats these make over 35000 runs over the Volga bringing supplies and crucially men into Stalingrad. Many were killed as they waited to board the ferries by the Luftwaffe which had complete control of the skies before the winter struck. But still 120000 made it ashore. The Luftwaffe continued their air superiority into early November and Soviet aerial resistance during the day was nonexistent. But due to the heavy volume of 20000 sorties the number of serviceable aircraft of the Luftwaffe fell to 40%. The <i>Kampfwaffe</i> bomber force was hardest hit with almost 50% assets out of service. This was further compounded by  the removal of substantial number of aerial assets for combat in North Africa hence the Germans found their air-arm to be spread thin across Europe and struggled to maintain its strength in the Soviet-German front. This meant the only hindrance to Soviet reinforcements and artillery across the Volga was out of the equation. Meanwhile factory workers repaired damaged Soviet tanks and other weapons close to the battlefield, sometimes on the battlefield itself. These civilians also volunteered as tank crews to replace the dead and wounded, though they had no experience or training in operating tanks during combat</p> <p>Paulus on the other hand was facing serious resupply problems. His communication line stretched over 800 miles. Bomb damage made it difficult for him to get his supplies through the city. Attrition and the atrocious weather meant the Luftwaffe struggled to maintain the air bridge. But Paulus's real problems haven't even begun. At Stalingrad with his forces locked in battle in the city, Paulus is aware that the Soviets are building up their forces. Jo Stalin as ruthless as ever had turned Stalingrad into a trap. Stalin and his Generals were prepared to sacrifice the men defending the city to annihilate the German army there. He moved troops and equipment into the area secretly. He had moved his reserves from Moscow to the Southern Volga and strengthened the Soviet air arm, the Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS) at the Stalingrad region with platforms from the entire country. By mid November he had more than a million men, 13500 heavy guns, 900 tanks and 1100 aircraft in position. One Soviet offensive was to strike South East while the Second towards North West and trap the German armies in a lethal pincer movement. Stalin knew this was the best way to trap Paulus and his 6th army since most of the troops locked into Stalingrad were German. But the rest of the front including their all important rear and the flanks where the pincers will move in are held by poorly equipped allies; Romanians, Hungarians and Italians. The Soviets struck in the early morning of November 19th. After 4 days of fighting at the German flanks the two arms of the Red army pincers met. A quarter of a million Germans were now trapped to the East of Stalingrad.</p> <p>To General Paulus at Stalingrad his exit strategy was clear. He signals Hitler to withdraw his troops from Stalingrad. Instead Hitler accepts Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goring's commitment that his planes can fly in enough supplies and fly out the wounded until Paulus's forces can be relieved and Stalingrad captured. Goring assures Hitler that he can drop 60 tonnes of resupplies everyday. A similar plan had been used successfully a year earlier at the Demyansk Pocket, albeit on a much smaller scale. Also, Soviet fighter forces had improved considerably in both quality and quantity in the intervening year. But the mention of the successful Demyansk air supply operation reinforced Hitler's own views, and was endorsed by Hermann Goring several days later. Despite the bravery of his pilots and crews it was a vain offer. Only one or two days does the Germans receive more than 5 tonnes. As a result there was a massive deficit and one can only wonder where the Germans found the wherewithal to continue the fight. Despite the obvious, Hitler refuses to accept that Paulus and his men faced disaster. He orders Field Marshall Erich Von Manstein to batter the Soviets to a standstill so that Paulus can hold till spring to mount a counter offensive. But in reality all Manstein was able do was to provide Paulus and his besieged men a last chance to save themselves. German panzers seeked to carve a corridor through the Russian lines to give Paulus the way to breakout. They got to just 30 miles of the besieged men before they are halted. But this still gave Paulus a chance of a breakout. Paulus knew his losses would have been massive but he needed authorisation from Hitler for his exit strategy. Manstein also asked for Hitler's permission to authorise the breakout. But Hitler does not even dare to reply. Paulus and his men are forced to fight on. Their situation increasingly became desperate. On Christmas day alone 1280 Germans die of frost bite, Typhus and starvation. To survive they ate their horses, dogs, even the frozen corpses of their dead comrades. Paulus finally surrenders on January 31st. In the 5 months of the Stalingrad campaign 750000 Germans and their allies had lost their lives. Soviets lose the same number including many civilians. In the end 108000 Germans are taken prisoner. Only 5000 returned to see Germany again. </p> <p> <strong><font size="5"><em>The Sri Lankan theatre:</em></font></strong></p> <p><strong><em><font size="5"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="501" alt="5741" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrJmFbWtnKDqBv5wI_Hmgr-li45cCWXrxY-srUMGDSQBa-pM2Go9FtTsFB2RyW2tliP10f2P7Xi5BjN7aVcBnhYaFOc0cGv6HvOoJi7SQcFP8ILDQFLMcYCfi1sNpAOoFGSVfh0mJCTw_b/?imgmax=800" width="677" border="0" /> </font></em></strong></p> <p><font size="4"><strong><em>The Chinese Parliament: Maj Gen Jagath Dias discussing the second assault on the bund from Southern KILINOCHCHI with 574 brigade. Such discussions meant that unit leaders on the scene were making their own decisions, seizing fleeting opportunities and exploiting any weakness of the enemy. Source- SLA media</em></strong></font></p> <p>Just like Stalin had said that there will be no retreat from Stalingrad  the ever elusive Tamil Tiger leader too made a similar decree that the fall of the KILINOCHCHI town was merely a day dream of the Sri Lankan Commander in Chief. But unlike Hitler who lacked a clarity in his overall theatre wide ambitions, the Sri Lankan Commanders knew exactly what their overall objectives were and what the exact strike points were to have a domino effect on Tamil Tiger defensive positions.</p> <p>The vital PARANTHAN junction situated North of KILINOCHCHI proved to be the grounds of utmost tactical importance to the Sri Lankan forces since the fall of this vital junction opens the gateway; the A35 to the dense jungles of MULLATIVU, opens up the rear of the impregnable Tamil Tiger National Front via the A9 North and most importantly for the KILINOCHCHI objective - makes the KILINOCHCHI town a massive salient. A salient in military parlance is a vulnerability that any commander cannot ignore. Any troops or assets positioned in a salient must be evacuated because it is surrounded by 3 sides and risks being 'pinched out'. </p> <p>With this important potential exploit in mind the battle planners set to work.</p> <p>First among the objectives was to secure a stable MSR close as much as to the theatre of operations. This objective fell on 574 which secured the TERUMURIKANDY Kovil junction on December 10th while the other two arms 571 and 572 kept on the pressure on the Tamil Tiger earth bund from the West and South West. This ensured the A9 was available for supplies and casualty evacuation since the available jungle routes were in dire straits due to the incessant rains. </p> <p>One of the prime requirements of an assault on a highly defended town/city as explained above is to have surprise, speed and to maintain that speed and momentum not giving the defender sufficient time to further strengthen the defence. With 57 Division completely breaching the earth bund at AKKARAYANKULAM in September 08, it was no surprise for the Tamil Tigers as to where its next objective lay and hence even before the AKKARAYANKULAM bund was breached heavy earth moving equipment and civilians were brought into construct the L bund running all the way from the JAFFNA lagoon to the IRANAMADU tank. Having breached the AKKARAYANKULAM bund the 571/572 and 574 began its advanced scouting and mapping of the Tamil Tiger defences along with their own crumbling type operations to master their opening game as part of their war gaming process. This was while 58 Division made speedy progress to capture the POONERYN sector and reach the Earth bund that stood between them and PARANTHAN across the B69. In addition to the bund, a massive stream of water lay in front of them. Most of these waters came from the overflowing IRANAMADU tank which the Tamil Tigers had opened the sluice gates to the full. Tactical it may sound, however the heavy rains wouldn't have allowed the Tamil Tigers any other option but to open the sluice even if 58 troops were not stationed on the B69.</p> <p>Once 57 had laid the groundwork for a final assault it was not allowed to breach the L bund on its own before 58 reached it from the Northern end for several reasons. </p> <ol> <li>If 57 had initiated an assault on the L bund on its own the Tamil Tigers may have opted to withdraw from the bund as well as from the KILINOCHCHI town itself thus allowing 57 to expose their Northern flank and position itself as a salient. Armed with a fresh consignment of artillery and mortar shells the Tamil Tigers could have made light work of 57 troops and trapped them within KILINOCHCHI pretty much the same way the German 6th army was trapped in Stalingrad in 1942. </li> <li>If 57 had engaged KILINOCHCHI on its own, the Tamil Tigers would still have had easy access for reinforcements/supplies along the A9 North. Prior to the battle it was very well known that the Tamil Tigers were using the same reserve forces in defending KILINOCHCHI as well as the National Front. Harsh weather had made most of the routes impassable. Therefore the A9 was invaluable particularly through the marshy lagoon at EPS to re-induct reserve cadre to each battlezone depending on the need. Hence it was paramount to disable the Tamil Tigers ability to use the A9 connecting two theatres. </li> <li>The battle planners knew that 58 Division's pressure and capture of PARANTHAN would make the KILINOCHCHI town limits a salient to the Tamil Tiger positions. Any stringent defences or kill zones the Tamil Tigers may have had in store for the Sri Lankan forces within the town limits were forced to dissolve with 58's move further North. One may argue that the Sri Lankan forces should have engaged the enemy without letting it flee, however it must be emphasised that battle in urban environments is the most vicious form of warfare. The commanders must be clear on why they are committing their troops to this very risky and dangerous form of warfare where fighting may rage street by street, house by house even down to room by room. Therefore it was important to minimise confrontation within the town limits as much as possible. </li> </ol> <p>On the 16th of December 08 despite the adverse weather the well coordinated assault on the L bund commenced. The assault in the midst of the heavy monsoons added the element of surprise to the Sri Lankan battleplanners. During the battle of Cambrai in the early morning of November 20th 1917 Hindenberg did not expect the Allied Commander Haig to launch an assault for the approaching winter usually signaled an end to the campaigning season until the spring next year. A similar surprise element was added by the Tamil Tigers during their failed JAFFNA offensive of August 2006 during the low tide season in an attempt to outflank the KILALY FDL by conducting a beach landing.</p> <p>The element of surprise was further enhanced by a hurricane barrage on Tamil Tiger strongpoints. The hallmark of Indirect fire support throughout history has been its inaccuracy and the requirement of enormous amounts of time and ammunition thereby giving away the attacker's objective and allowing the defender to counterconcentrate. The Hurricane barrages are not intended to destroy the enemy objective but suppress it enough while small units work their way forward. Such suppression must be maintained until the target objective is overrun and lifted to extend the coverage and to allow the assault team to reach the objective without taking casualties from friendly fire. This is in addition to the SLAF's role in providing excellent CAS despite the unfavourable weather to keep the enemy's heads down and break their will to resist . Such combined arms manoeuvres requires tremendous coordination.</p> <p>The assault was initially conducted by a fixing assault courtesy of the combination of 53 and 55 Divisions stationed along the KILALY/MUHAMALE/NK axis by signaling an attempted breakthrough. This move prompted the Tamil Tigers to deploy its reserves to prevent a breakthrough by these two Divisions and were compelled to fix the reserves into position thereby preventing them from counterconcentrating at the L bund. With this opportune moment the 58 and 57 Division combined initiated their assault on the L bund. Well trained infantry teams spearheaded by Commandos and Special forces using cover and concealment headed towards their each individual objectives. In some locations sappers had cleared approach pathways under cover of darkness or smoke, some locations scouts had mapped pathways and some locations it was down to bangalore torpedos and saturation techniques. The extensive rehearsals conducted using captured earth bunds meant that even junior soldiers were trained well enough to operate independently in small units, using their own tactical judgement to solve problems and keep the assault moving forward, for any bogged down strike team on unfavourable ground can leave the team and the mission highly vulnerable. The units engaged in battle were so professional that unit leaders on the scene were making their own decisions, seizing fleeting opportunities and exploiting any weakness of the enemy even if it meant a slight change to the original approach. The assault was so successful that some points along the bund fell in a small matter of 15 minutes.</p> <p>The well dispersed infantry teams meant the Tamil Tiger indirect fire support were highly negated. Dispersion reduces vulnerability by putting fewer targets in the splash damage radius of an incoming shell. Artillery was never meant to target small units of soldiers. They are meant to target the centroid of formations. <br />It is hard to target these highly mobile assault teams. Hence the Tamil Tigers directed at the one thing that is not mobile, their own earthbund and its strongpoints which were captured by the initial assault. These defences were further strengthened with mobile MG posts stationed on top and behind the earth bund to bring down any attacker who managed to overcome the initial defences. The MG posts behind the bund were missed out by recce teams since the huge earth mound had obscured their Line of Sight (LOS). Machine guns are direct fire-flat trajectory weapons and attackers can use directional cover by obscuring the line of sight (LOS). Mortars and artillery on the other hand can fire over intervening obstacles and engage targets without LOS. Hence working together, machine guns and artillery/mortars compliments for each other's weaknesses. Such interlocking fields of fire reduces the cover or dead space thus complicates things for the attacker to find and exploit concealed positions.</p> <p>However, the incessant monsoons meant the the MUHAMALE axis was highly unfavourable to conduct the special infantry/mechanised warfare. The marshy kadol area had made a sizeable chunk of land to be submerged making forward movement and casualty evacuation a nightmare for forward field operatives. Using their experience and judgement the commanders were compelled to reach the Clausewitz's culminating point and pull back. This relieved a substantial amount of Tamil Tiger reserves and allowed them to counterconcentrate against 571 and 572 and by Saturday the 20th of December they managed to counterconcentrate against 574. The counterstrikes by the Tamil Tigers were aimed at achieving one objective. That was to regain the breachheads which the Sri Lankan forces would have otherwise used to pour in exploitation forces behind the enemy line to disrupt the Tamil Tiger FDL and render it incapable of fighting at full efficiency. Similar countertsrikes were conducted prior by the Tamil Tigers during the assault on the NACHCHIKUDA-AKKARAYAN earth bund. What made the difference this time was the heavy volume of mortar fire. The rate of fire at one grid location alone amounted to average 4 mortars per minute. Once the Sri Lankan forces withdrew from the breach heads the mortar fire concentrated ahead of the earth bunds with a reduced rate of around 4 mortars every 5-10 minutes. Exploiting the instrumental limitations on rough monsoonal seas the Tamil Tigers had managed to smuggle in a consignment of shells to maintain their high firing rate. However they were unable to persist with this rate since the Navy managed to intercept the floating warehouse on the 20th of December 08 some 70NMs off the MULLATIVU coast. After this interception, a significant reduction of Tamil Tiger fire support firing rates were observed.</p> <p>After the bund was breached within the next ten days of fighting 58 initiated the task of assaulting the strategic PARANTHAN junction. This was achieved by isolating the junction by cutting off the A9 from the North from THADDUVANKODDI and KOMARIKUDAKULAM. This move also ensured that the Sri Lankan forces were in hold of the high ground of KOMARIKUDAKULAM which later came in handy for laying siege on the former 54 Division HQ at ELEPHANTPASS. By January 1st 2009 the Tamil Tigers were compelled to withdraw from the PARANTHAN junction and by next day they withdrew from the KILINOCHCHI town limits. The minor skirmishes faced by the advancing 571 and 572 troops were to ensure the Tamil Tiger rear units had made a safe withdrawal.</p> <p>When the Sri Lankan forces had managed to divert and pin down reinforcements with 53/55 thereby siphoning forces away from major efforts while severely disrupting the enemy supplies by intercepting key routes and sea supplies, Paulus's German 6th army did not achieve this requirement. The Eastern bank of Volga was strategically important for the Soviets in this sense as this did not allow the Germans to cross over to the Eastern bank. Even though the Stukas had wreaked much havoc during the summer, it could not maintain its momentum and keep the supplies across the Volga in check. The SLAF however played a pivotal role. If high altitude SLAF operations during Eelam War III had stifled the SLAF's ability to provide effective Close Air Support, the current SLAF was a farcry to the previous era and were more than willing to 'get down there' to add the necessary punch. The results of SLAF sorties were also down to superior tactics and ordnance.</p> <p>Just like the Sri Lankan armed forces the German military doctrine was based on combined arms teams with close support provided by tanks, artillery and aircraft. To counter this the Soviets had employed hugging tactics and killzones within Stalingrad to ensure fighting raged on house to house and room to room. When in 1942 the Soviets had a 80Km length of STALINGRAD and hence depth to grind the Germans down till the winter arrived, the Tamil Tigers had only 8Km of the town straddling along the A9 to grind down the Sri Lankan forces. 582 from the North, 571 from the West, 572 from the South West and 574 from the Southern edge of the town meant the Tamil Tigers had no defence in depth of the town at all compared to the depth the Soviets enjoyed at STALINGRAD. Furthermore strategically the Volga river ensured the Germans failed to completely cutoff the city from the Soviet mainland. Whereas in the Sri Lankan theatre even though the forces had not completely cut off either PARANTHAN or KILINOCHCHI, it had done enough to disrupt the <strong>fluid defence</strong> of the Tamil Tigers set up by the mobile reserves that switched theatres upon requirement and resupplies via the sea.</p> <p>Hitler's lack of clarity of the overall battleplan meant that the Germans were compelled to sacrifice many of its experienced troops and other assets to fight on among the rubble of a city which was strategically insignificant. Rather than pinning down his forces in a ferocious street battle, Hitler could have heeded his commanders' advice and bypassed Stalingrad altogether to concentrate his total force on the Caucasus and the oil fields. The Sri Lankan battle planners however at any moment did not deviate from their overall objectives. They were very well aware that KILINOCHCHI was of little military value, however the fierce resistance of the Tamil Tigers especially of its highly valued reserves meant that it gave the battleplanners an opportunity to eliminate as much as reserves as possible then and there rather than engaging them again at the new defences that are coming up circumventing the MULLATIVU jungles. Furthermore was the fact that the KILINOCHCHI town being 8Kms in length meant 57 had to cross the town and its surrounding bund if it were to add pressure on the MULLATIVU jungles. Having also an eye towards preserving the town buildings as much as possible and avoiding a heap of rubble as in STALINGRAD the battleplanners took steps to avoid confrontations within the town. In addition to limiting collateral damage, as mentioned above, urban battle is the most vicious form of warfare and it is paramount that any commander avoid it as much as possible. Unlike in STALINGRAD the Tamil Tiger defences within the town dissolved once 58 Division had captured the PARANTHAN junction and making the KILINOCHCHI area into a salient.</p> <p>There is no doubt the Tamil Tigers were intending to make KILINOCHCHI the crowning moment of their defensive battleplan. There are many facets of a defensive battleplan. One is to entice the enemy towards you to maintain the initiative to give the enemy an idea of vulnerability but to draw them into a situation from which they cannot return and then to launch a spectacular counterstrike. The other is to wear the enemy off by building strong defensive positions that fighting against them would cause the enemy huge casualties and huge distress. Whichever option the defending commander chooses, he always has to choose a spectacular counter attack as the end game. Such a counterstrike at any stages remains the crucial factor in the defensive battle, battleplan. It is almost always the last act. However the great danger of this battleplan is that the defensive battle commander may never really know the enemy's full intentions. It very well might be the enemy who actually has the initiative intending to pin the defensive forces down and outflank them from elsewhere.</p> <p>Once Paulus was trapped by the Soviets at STALINGRAD Hitler swiftly promoted Paulus to the rank of Field Marshall. With no German officer of this rank having ever surrendered, with the promotion Hitler had made clear to Paulus what he had to do. However being let down by the Führer due to his lack of clarity in the overall battleplan and for not authorising the breakthrough at the opportune moment had greatly disappointed Friedrich Paulus. Instead of turning the gun on himself he surrendered with his men famously saying "I have no intention of shooting myself for that Austrian corporal". He later became a vociferous critic of the Nazis and joined the National Committee for a Free Germany.</p> <p>With the Sri Lankan military juggernaut eating away the Tamil Eelam territory it will not be long before Tamil Tiger higher echleons will face the same dilemma as that of Friedrich Paulus on whether to stay faithful to its leader and fight till the end for a lost cause or to opt for a headline creating defection/surrender thus putting an end to the bloodshed of prospectful youth that has held back Sri Lanka's development for quarter of a century. Only time will tell...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com49tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-44975121003066425492008-12-26T22:39:00.001+05:302008-12-28T03:40:59.993+05:30The Dilemma of the Tamil Tigers<p> <img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="460" alt="Mulliyawali" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFjG4H_yYrS9ktXYQN0XwmGq9FvEjvlYyp_KldIG6bc_GV1cOH5jStNHJmrcQgMVL3EQW3jQduNkRpM5d0VxQOgHelGF4PFTGyjMa8QBMBGIdg_3mI2riPGKru9LfMYmHLWN_84lHKvp0Y/?imgmax=800" width="663" border="0" /> </p> <p><font size="5"><strong>O</strong></font>n the aftermath of the capture of the entire JAFFNA peninsula in 1995 the battleplanners had drawn the blueprints to continue the series of operations into mainland Wanni with the main aim of extending the EPS defences up to KILINOCHCHI. With the intention of stalling these preparations the Tamil Tigers set about to dismantle the isolated MULLATIVU base on the 18th of July 1996 with Ceaseless Waves I.</p> <p>Since the fall of the base the Tamil Tigers have been in control of the coastal littorals spanning from KOKKUTHUDUVAI to EPS. This coastal stretch for decades have been quite significant to the Tamil Tiger military machine especially to its sea wing. Millions of dollars worth of cargo have been unloaded along this coastal stretch and hundreds of Sea Tiger missions have been conducted along this belt against both the SLA and SLN. The lack of land routes through the dense WELIOYA jungles also meant that the sea route was the most viable and quickest to reach areas South of MULLATIVU. Furthermore MULLATIVU being strategically positioned midway along the East coast made it ideal to intercept the sea bridge connecting the Jaffna peninsula to TRINCOMALEE. The observation posts at SAMPUR/SUDAIKUDA used to relay vital intelligence of naval movements to the sea tiger bases littered around these coasts.</p> <p>This heightened activity of the sea tigers along this stretch was the primary reason for the SLN to establish its doctrine of making a rendezvous point for the FAC escorts of COMNORTH and COMEAST just off the MULLATIVU coast and to conduct the now defunct Operation Waruna Kirana as a deterrent against weapons smuggling along the same waters.</p> <p>With the establishment of the current politico-military machine in 2005, one of the main objectives highlighted in the first Security Council Meeting was to clip the abilities of the Sea Tigers and thereby starve the Tamil Tigers of its much needed logistics. Carrying on the tradition of securing the coastal belt before jutting inland which successfully secured the Eastern province, the battleplanners set about to implement a similar doctrine towards Wanni. While securing the Western belt fell on the THOPPIGALA heroes of TF1, the responsibility of the Eastern belt fell on the newly formed 59 Division.</p> <p>Since the birth of 59 HQ on the 13th of December 2007 it has made serious inroads to the Tamil Tiger heartland maintaining roughly a 16Km front along the Eastern coast.</p> <p>At the moment 591 Brigade who laid siege on ALAMPIL are moving along the coastline and are operating South of TANNIYUTTU/CHILAWATTAI areas. Knowing very well the 59 troops were converging on MULLATIVU the Tamil Tigers set about creating an extension to the L bund all the way from the IRANAMADU tank connecting KALMADU, VISUVAMADU, MULLIYAWALI and CHILAWATTAI. However due to forward operating elements of 591 the Tamil Tigers have failed to extend the bund up to the coast at CHILAWATTAI. Such forward operating exploitation forces are known to operate around areas hugging the lagoon and the Vattapalai amman kovil. Some recon teams have also managed to conduct Forward Observation (FO) of the MULLIYAWALI airstrip facility. Once 591 intercepts the A34 it would severe MULLIYAWALI from MULLATIVU and the coast.</p> <p><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="526" alt="Mulliyawali airstrip" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhHkZ0TjUx02qnLYxpwayOsxVMhltNWFxDpcTM3l9nvASRqACYRlE5sfd6YNkRwA3ndwe6kBlcprCnjxtzSmdfuEXScvceqxYXqvX58JNioI-zwBeBu4oue6hgkta1fZh821AetHLLV7xvL/?imgmax=800" width="396" border="0" /> </p> <p><font size="4"><strong><em>Image of MULLIYAWALI airstrip. Note the paved North Eastern section and the unpaved but hardened South Western extension. Source- Jane's</em></strong></font></p> <p>593 Brigade meanwhile are heading towards the all important MULLIYAWALI area which holds important Government institutions such as the hospital and Vidyananda college. North of this buildup area holds the Tamil Tigers' latest air strip which has been undergoing a 1000m extension towards the South West. As highlighted earlier such a lengthy runway is not meant for the Tamil Tigers' Zlin/PC7 fleet but larger aircraft. Given its meager resources it is unlikely the Tamil Tigers would have invested so much time and effort on a white elephant. A similar guerilla organisation the FARC have had successful airdrops over Southern Colombia where aircrafts have flown over the Canary islands and Guyana dropping its cargo and flying through to IQUITOS in Peru's side of the Amazon river. Similar drops were to be made from KIGALI in Rwanda to the Alpha one base of UNITA rebels in Angola. The mercenary pilot who was recruited for the mission Brian 'Sport' Martin recalls him landing a Boeing 707 on a 'very narrow' 1800 yard runway with a landing weight of over 12 tonnes during a mission to Congo. In his <a href="http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/2001/0327traf.htm" target="_blank">interview</a> he has said "Whatever else one may think of them, the crews involved in this clandestine world are consummate aviators who are able to fly in conditions beyond normal limits". It is indeed beyond normal limits to attempt a landing on a 1000m airstrip. Perhaps this explains why the Tamil Tigers are pursuing to extend the MULLIYAWALI runway up to 2000m. The 1000m extension may also serve any logistics aircraft with sufficient over-run area if it attempts a landing during the rough monsoons which will help the Tamil Tigers to exploit the instrumental limitations of the SLAF. And hence they will be in a better position to entice any interested mercenary aviator to take up the mission of illegally navigating to the Wanni. This also brings to light one hidden advantage the Zlin 'airstrikes' pose. Any takeoff of the Zlin aircraft and its return back to Wanni unscathed no matter how inaccurate the bombing run is; can still be used to display the infancy of the Sri Lankan air defence/interceptor capability to any interested mercenaries and support any recruitment of such mercenary pilots easily to the organisation. If the possibility of a successful interception was high with a high risk landing on a short runway with a heavy landing weight, the Tamil Tigers may find it hard to recruit any potential mercenary pilots who are skilled enough for the job. If that is the case the plausible option would be to air drop the cargo without making a landing.</p> <p>Meanwhile 592 Brigade have made strides to prepare the ground for a possible link up of the 59 Division with two other Divisions, namely TFIII and TFIV. 592 augmented the efforts of the newly established TFIV by cutting off the MULLATIVU-NEDUNKERNI road from KODDALIKKALLU and are expected to intercept the ODDUSUDAN-MULLATIVU A34 road. This would render the Tamil Tiger resistance towards TFIII incapable of operating at full efficiency. The rapid movements of the daring commanders of this Division has made the Tamil Tigers to reposition the planned earth bund. According to captured/surrendered cadres the initial plan had been to position the bund defending the all important A34 which provides the Tamil Tigers a vital road link cutting through the dense jungles. However this was not to be.</p> <p>With the possible fall of both MULLIYAWALI and TANNIYUTTU the guerilla stronghold PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU comes under immense threat since the road from TANNIYUTTU junction runs straight to PUTHUKKUDIYIRUPPU via VATTAPPALAI amman kovil and KEPPAPULAVU. However this road runs through an urban area. Given the fact that the modern SLA doctrine of exploiting as much as cover and concealment via circuitous routes, it can be expected for the SLA to employ concealed, dispersed, small unit independent manoeuvre techniques. This terrain offers plenty of cover but the useable dead ground is often irregularly shaped and irregularly distributed. Hence to make most of it careful scouting, mapping of minefields, MG posts, sites of fighting positions to fit the peculiarities of each unit's immediate surroundings is required. Long gone are the text book formations that marched towards the objective along open roads and then held onto the objective with formulaic defensive formations. </p> <p>If the 57/58 Divisions are attempting to force the door on the Tamil Tiger heartland by assaulting KILINOCHCHI/PARANTHAN, then for those two divisions the areas surrounding MULLATIVU turns out to be the deep battle space where the Tamil Tigers are known to house its commanders/ammo dumps/supply routes/hospitals treating injured cadre and training bases for new recruits. Any strikes towards the rear reduces the command efficiency of the enemy, forces the enemy to restrict its movements and dents its aura of invincibility. Such strikes substantially increases the time the guerillas require to counter concentrate, move supplies or replacements of a sufficient force to the forward lines. This can also compel the enemy to disperse its stocks/fuel hence further slowing resupply and can seriously depress the enemy's operating tempos. Without a stable rear the guerillas can still continue to fight and offer resistance, however the performance will fall dramatically when they are denied the essential support and coordination that separates a military from an armed mob.</p> <p>With 59 Division inching towards the Tamil Tiger rear the Sri Lankan forces have easy access to this all important deep battle sphere. With the NAYARU lagoon and ALAMPIL coming under Government's writ, the 59 commanders have been busy establishing additional fire support bases surrounding this area making Tamil Tiger strongholds that are known to hold many vital guerilla installations within range of the T59 130mm howitzers. Such a development is a serious concern to the Tamil Tigers since it allows the field commanders a real time strike capability. However the saving grace for the Tamil Tigers has been the high concentration of civilian population held up in this area which pose as a deterrent. Since the SLA have no precision guided artillery shells such as the XM982 Excalibur 155mm projectile, artillery fire have been directed towards targets that are assessed to pose less collateral damage. SLAF's arsenal of precision guided munitions (PGMs) will still continue to see action till concentration of the civilian population are thought to be reduced to 'safer' levels. </p> <p>Furthermore is the fact that with every inch 59 forges ahead, is an inch the Tamil Tigers lose of their one and only coastal belt. Due to the rough seas that persisted during the last two months and SLN's instrumental limitations in such rough seas the Tamil Tigers had managed to unload significant amounts of supplies along the MULLATIVU coast. This was verified by civilians who managed to cross over into GOSL territory and surrendered cadres. Unfortunately this was also verified by the very high volume of indirect fire which some field commanders explained as the 'mortar monsoon'.</p> <p>The fierce defensive battle the Tamil Tigers are conducting along the PARANTHAN/KILINOCHCHI/IRANAMADU axis according to the pro-tamiltiger pundits is a war winning battle plan. However the ground situation does not reflect this at all. As mentioned previously in <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/10/tamil-tigers-defensive-gamble.html" target="_blank">the doctrine of a defensive battle plan</a>, its main objective is to invite the enemy to attack, deter the enemy long enough and grind them till the defending commanders decide an opportune moment to launch their counterattack to <strong>completely reverse the present status quo.</strong> Such a counterstrike at any stage remains the crucial factor in the defensive battle, battleplan. It is almost always the last act. However, the great danger of this battleplan is that the defender may not really know the enemy's full real intentions. It very well might be the enemy who actually has the initiative intending to pin the bulk of defensive forces down and outflank them from elsewhere.</p> <p>With so many avenues of approach, divisions and units available for the Sri Lankan battle planners to outfox the Tamil Tigers unlike in any other previous Eelam wars, they; and they only hold all the cards of surprise and dynamism to take any of the available avenues that may not be eagerly apparent to the enemy. As indicated by the last poll conducted in my portal, not even the diligent followers of the Sri Lankan war were able to predict what SLA's next objective was after POONERYN. As always only time told...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com52tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-10963660724723129372008-12-25T17:51:00.001+05:302008-12-25T17:52:43.214+05:30Await...<p>My next brief...</p> <p> <br />Please accept my apologies for being unable to update regularly..</p> <p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="284" alt="C-130" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrrJTosU5h-apRcZumdexkVBE1SeiQxcIyWy5lPnK7YG1t8SExdNY8L6ygMF0n-aLOBekt9Uq-XoLRDj4vfXKzp2dUWszdtPTCobBp27DCbdO6WvcovYJnGYe62wFRn0Tb4lWeJ1d2cjxz/?imgmax=800" width="394" border="0" /></p> <p> <br />May I also take this opportunity to wish the Sri Lankan blog community a Happy festive season. <br /></p> <p>  <img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="308" alt="Balckfive" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSCnLXyXm4jtj-g6IasCa3MFQ1QVIGghU3a2lYThPkSMGlsz58khRA_orZp8gowPMR8VDUylPYSpXzZ_rKpvWVf0HjWQ4If8teQkb2hjnqflXZ8LvmtqhHmbSWn-ODbV0ybEmtgzpEcizf/?imgmax=800" width="460" border="0" /> </p> <p>Image taken in Iraq 2006. Source: <a href="http://www.blackfive.net/main/2006/12/santas_unmanned.html" target="_blank">Blackfive</a>. </p> <p> </p> <p>Take Care all.</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-79145707921182342642008-12-04T04:36:00.001+05:302008-12-04T04:36:34.353+05:30The Crumbling of Muhamale<p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="420" alt="Paranthan" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjHiGr8OsSO1WLuHTk9BUjqR-1PgJB2mPmmkiq0ipWEwIhIuCfKU_A9Qanb6x4r0c9XrZWDpP8m_KT7X885SoqAzaE4kOVE6TspYUQVcbq4RfaX1PWO8_LrxQ_xrApm9RReooCw_KHMxW4d/?imgmax=800" width="678" border="0" /> </p> <p><font size="5"><strong>W</strong></font>ith at least two previous failures of a successful breakthrough through the Tamil Tiger Devil's garden along the KILALY/MUHAMALE/NAGARKOVIL axis, mainly due to indirect fire via anti personal/ anti-armor mines and arti/mortar units, battleplanners in this sector set about to destabilise the Tamil Tiger FDL using crumbling operations to force the enemy's defensive cohesion to flood away thereby destabilizing the FDL. Further as I have mentioned in an <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/09/battle-of-el-alamein-lessons-from-past.html" target="_blank">earlier brief</a> lengthily such a series of crumbling operations allows the Sri Lankan battle planners to master their opening game as well as shore up the morale of its soldiers. </p> <p>With the Tamil Tigers having more than 5 years to perfect their defences along the 7 miles stretch spanning from KILALY to NAGARKOVIL, this front provides the most fortified line in the current Sri Lankan conflict. The Tamil Tiger defences had provided them with concealment, cover, combined arms integration and more importantly a depth of 14kms towards EPS. The Tamil Tiger trenches and bunkers were irregularly distributed, formulaically interconnected, carefully camouflaged, combining ballistic protection with real concealment to withstand offensive fire. These positions were well fortified with anti-tank ditches, protective minefields and wire entanglements. Any cover the SLA could exploit were limited with interlocking fields of fire by positioning adjoining weapons so that each weapon can fire across the other's fronts. The defences were further strengthened with MG posts and mortars. Machine guns are direct fire-flat trajectory weapons and attackers can use directional cover by obscuring the line of sight (LOS). Mortars and artillery on the other hand can fire over intervening obstacles and engage targets without LOS. Hence working together, machine guns and artillery/mortars compliments for each other's weaknesses. Such interlocking fields of fire reduces the cover or dead space thus complicates things for the attacker to find and exploit concealed positions.</p> <p>Classic military doctrine suggests that attackers need 3:1 ratio against defenders. Once the defender has integrated combined weapons tactics with fortified positions the force ratio required for a breakthrough increases. Hence against well entrenched positions it jumps to 5:1. It is very rare for any commander to have the 3:1 let alone 5:1 force ratio which military theorists consider essential to break a fortified line but it is possible to gather the necessary superiority at least locally by using deception, tactics and surprise.</p> <p>Intermingled amongst these defences were observation posts and covering forces operating far from the main defences. The main defensive forces to the rear are to be warned by these cadres with warning of attack. Other than observation these covering forces are expected to carry out other functions such as intercepting SLA recce teams, slowing attackers' movements, canalising an assault and conducting their own reconnaissance. Even though it sounds straightforward in theory, this requires the cadres to often carry out orders from high command in the face of superior forces and in the case of a massive assault to manoeuvre and break contact with a superior attack force and fall back before being overrun while calling in reserves at the rear.</p> <p>With constant <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/09/battle-of-el-alamein-lessons-from-past.html" target="_blank">Monty style</a> crumbling operations causing daily attrition, the Tamil Tigers were compelled for a compromise.The Tamil Tigers knew their forward bunkers and observational posts were targets for such attacks hence they rationally reduced bunker manning levels leaving fewer on watch and relying more heavily on tactical warning to give units time to reoccupy bunkers in the event of a ground attack. Meanwhile the 57/58 Divisions were fast approaching the Tamil Tiger political capital and the environs of the JAFFNA lagoon. Urgent reinforcements were required to halt the enemy advance. This was another reason for unmanned bunkers due to overstretched cadre base where more reinforcements were required in defending the PARANTHAN-KILINOCHCHI axis. Hence much to the surprise of the attacking small units at MUHAMALE, men found a higher fraction of unmanned defending posts at the time of attack than would have been the case.</p> <p>With the 58 Divisions occupying the strategic POONERYN peninsula on the 19th of November, battleplanners rapidly set about positioning indirect fire batteries and making 58's first move towards PARANTHAN. With the POONERYN peninsula gone, for the battleplanners it was one less <strong>Call-for-fire zone (CFFZ). </strong>CFFZ<strong> </strong>is an area in enemy territory that the commander wants suppressed, neutralized, or destroyed. This also meant the battleplanners <strong>Artillery target intelligence zone (ATIZ) </strong>was limited to areas South of MUHAMALE and the PARANTHAN environs. ATIZ<strong> </strong>is an area in enemy territory that the commanders wish to monitor closely. With these developments elsewhere the time was ripe for the National front to flare up and occupy the already crumbled Tamil Tiger FDL which lay just 500m ahead of them. This perfect coordination between 58/53/55 and the loss of strategic POONERYN meant the Tamil Tiger fortifications across the lagoon at MUHAMALE/KILALY were under fire from additional fire support bases. Further it also meant that its own howitzers stationed at K-point were no longer able to continue suppressive fire towards SLA's artillery batteries in areas such as KODIKAMAM/MIRUSUVIL and MSRs carrying reinforcements and medevac missions to and from the theatre of engagement.</p> <p>This well coordinated movement of 58 and 53/55 not only made the Tamil Tiger ground cadre thin out, but also its limited indirect fire units. A fraction of these mortar/arti units which have proved to be anathema to the troops of 53/55 have been compelled to be diverted to suppress troops of 58 moving along the B69 KILALY lagoon. The reserves meant to defend the KILALY/MUHAMALE axis were drawn into an area where the same reserves will engage the 58 and 53/55 when the need arises. This thinning out greatly reduced the Tamil Tiger Force to Space Ratio (FSR) which is the number of troops per linear km. As said above it is very rare for any commander to have the 3:1 let alone 5:1 force ratio which military theorists consider essential to break a fortified line. With the Tamil Tigers moving a fraction of its men and assets to protect its rear, the battleplanners got the edge over the numbers they were hoping for; for an ultimate forward thrust.</p> <p><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="429" alt="DSC07102" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVSckNWVnLlu1zJgVUOlGS4KoK5xRpKlnCvFcPzPBIhLkLI9lPZaYbDY6qxH-KbmRLWQEZfwxCuDx0ylj9VyXIoF9OEX_IVUPFHOmnleu73kvHS7uFgie4SP8b2KrqqsWxkTVy5iexgy4l/?imgmax=800" width="642" border="0" /> </p> <p><strong><em><font size="4">Tamil Tiger grid maps of the MUHAMALE-KILALY axis</font></em></strong></p> <p>The breaching Sri Lankan armed forces made extensive Small unit manoeuvre, dispersion, cover and concealment thanks to modern tactics. The breaching effort was spearheaded by combat engineers operating under the cover of artillery, MBTs and smoke rounds with infantry support immediately available via Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) advancing immediately behind the echelon. The long and medium range artillery/MBRL support suppressed or destroyed enemy support fire bases until assault teams approached within around 300 meters whereupon 60mm/81mm mortars and direct fire from troops took over. Meanwhile fixed and rotary wing aircraft provided vital Combat Air Support (CAS) and electronic warfare units jammed Tamil Tiger communication systems and used Tamil Tiger radio emissions to provide targeting data of Tamil Tiger forward command posts. Such a combination of air and ground technology in which indirect fire served essentially a suppressive purpose - it induced the Tamil Tigers to take protective postures that reduced their ability to return fire, thereby reducing their effectiveness even without killing them directly.</p> <p>Facilitated by extensive rehearsals this complex combined arms manoeuvre focused their efforts simultaneously on the objective area exploiting what little cover the terrain provided thus presenting the Tamil Tigers with few opportunities to engage isolated forward operating units on their own favourable terms. The paraded corpses of fallen soldiers in previous engagements within this sector were mainly of such forward operating men.</p> <p>The extensive rehearsals conducted prior to the battle ensured that even junior soldiers were trained well enough to operate independently in small units, using their own tactical judgement to solve problems and keep the assault moving forward, for any bogged down strike team on unfavourable ground can leave the team and the mission highly vulnerable. The units engaged in battle were so professional that unit leaders on the scene were making their own decisions, seizing fleeting opportunities and exploiting idiosyncratic local conditions. Extensive battlefield rehearsals and intelligence gathering also meant the commanders were well aware of Clausewitz's culminating point. They very well knew that by halting their immediate operation with just one FDL under their occupation and fortifying the defences according to their requirements was suffice at least for the time being.</p> <p>The reason why the culminating point was set just after this FDL and the main thrust halted with limited aims was this operation was NOT designed for a breakthrough. Rather this operation was intended to exploit the temporary advantage garnered by the series of coordinated crumbling operations carried over the last few months. By occupying this FDL the SLA have seized important terrain and major sections of the Tamil Tigers' prepared positions. This positional advantage can then be used in subsequent offensive operations; i.e more crumbling type operations to engage as many Tiger cadres as possible within this sector before engaging them in the dense jungles of MULATIVU where they might withdraw. In military parlance this is termed as Fixing attacks where the Tamil Tigers can be pinned into place at little cost to the attackers.</p> <p>The main advantage of such operations holding limited aims is that it avoids over extension of troops and in the same time reduces its vulnerability to counterattack. In military doctrine any defender that holds a defensive depth as deep as 14kms (as the National Front) is expected to concede initial ground in the event of a forward thrust. Depth is a tradeoff for the defenders and 14kms of depth gives time for an astute defender in the likes of the Tamil Tigers to counterconcentrate troops in sufficient strength to grind the 53/55 military machine. Such depth also allows the Tamil Tiger battleplanners to rectify any miscalculations of their defence. To regain the lost ground which was lost initially, a counterattack is relied upon. Hence breakthrough attempts create such counterattack opportunities for the Tamil Tigers as seen previously. And with each counterattack, the attrition the Tamil Tigers will suffer to its experienced reserves is not easily replaceable since new junior recruits lack the experience, the morale, the skill and coordination to perform complex manoeuvres to push back the superior Sri Lankan forces. </p> <p>With the commanders of 53/55 finding lesser resistance, barring the weather, it will not be long before the National Front will flare up again with assault teams adding pressure on the remaining FDLs of the Tamil Tigers. With 58 troops having breached the earth bund defending the PARANTHAN town limits, it will be not long before the Tamil Tiger reserves based around the EPS region be under severe pressure facing a dilemma similar to the troops of 54 Division faced in 2000. If the Tamil Tigers are to withdraw and lose EPS and PARANTHAN it is sure to abandon what's left of KILINOCHCHI as well because the KILINOCHCHI area will become a massive salient. A salient is a battlefield feature which projects into enemy territory and any Tamil Tigers within this area will become highly vulnerable.</p> <p>There lies yet another strategically significant reason for the SLA commanders' need to push down from the National Front. If there was one counterstrike that could tip the balance in favour of the Tamil Tigers that would be the one to regain the Jaffna peninsula. Any daring counterstrike with the remaining cadre strength is sure to deplete the Tamil Tigers further of its cadre base and its assets, for with the current strength it will have to vacate its entire cadre base of the Wanni and mobilise it to accomplish the strike on Jaffna. Thus such a large scale ambitious counterstrike simply put; is a risky gamble for the Tamil Tigers. By doing so it is sure to lose the entire Wanni. This means it can choose only either Jaffna or the Wanni. </p> <p>If it opts for Wanni as it is doing at present and launches a counterstrike with all its might to regain a region of the Wanni for example POONERYN; it may succeed with its entire cadre base being mobilised for this objective. However, whether it will be the Gordian knot for its woes is the million dollar question. POONERYN holds no population base hence the Tamil Tigers will not be in a position to recruit its lost cadre. It may manage to replenish a small fraction of its supplies across the Palk Straits however, it will fail to meet the requirement since annihilating 58 Division alone to reach POONERYN will not mean the Tamil Tigers have seen the back of the Sri Lankan armed forces. By having mobilised its entire cadre to regain POONERYN means it would have lost the entire Wanni barring POONERYN and will be staring down the barrel of the rest of the offensive divisions.</p> <p>Therefore if the Tamil Tigers are to launch a successful counterattack, it has to be a region that holds a sizeable population base for new recruits and an area that is close enough to smuggle in vital supplies. Out of the entire Northern theatre of operations ONLY the Jaffna peninsula brings forth such rich dividends. Jaffna peninsula holds a population base of over 650000 compared to the sparsely populated Wanni which estimates are thought to hold less than 300000. And it is in close proximity to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu where many Tamil Tiger safe houses are known to exist. With the entire peninsula under its control it will have plenty of coastal belts to continue its smuggling operation with impunity.</p> <p>By mobilising the 53/55 Divisions and making them go on the offense and force its way South completely negates the Tamil Tigers' ability to launch ANY counterstrike to get a foothold on the Jaffna peninsula - the cultural centre of the Eelam ethos. This is why earlier I <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/10/tamil-tigers-defensive-gamble.html" target="_blank">briefed</a> my avid readers that any counterstrike by the Tamil Tigers after 53/55 have been mobilised may come too little too late.</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com54tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-87357564812584015562008-11-05T10:17:00.001+05:302008-11-05T10:30:05.326+05:30The March to Pooneryn and beyond<p><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYKsAe5INUy_BE4wFAXwZKdpTNuFjNLchyrJogoMUQBtD_tbYGhiG64Ac_pfFMyEO8wd5eTw4Wyhzxz2-HwiNFG2H_fiZCQkgBjfOyAhsf4qox2P4Wb6VLV7QUErOQqYYYrD3KTsHuk07c/s1600-h/58%20copy%5B3%5D.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="488" alt="58 copy" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgH9hmpDB12kVOJSjAsrU3gM9NSSxtOZG44WImqjtUuE8Hc-b3671Yu2VX4yOXXNAGtjhfZcPKcUwgUpDMGe084xIv-HvxUP_-ZfUsU-xoE7T5ro6J5MOAg4OcG-drd8gCmGuye3en29GnB/?imgmax=800" width="699" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><font size="5"><strong>U</strong></font>p until November 1993 the POONERYN defence complex formed a complementary defence mechanism encompassing EPS and the Jaffna islets in safeguarding the peninsula from the Tamil Tigers. Since the fall of the POONERYN defence complex, it has been of immense strategical value to the Tamil Tigers providing it with a base to disrupt the naval/air bridge connecting the Jaffna peninsula with the South using its T59I 130mm howitzers and coastal littorals to launch its Sea Tiger assets and smuggling operations.</p> <p>Pooneryn defence complex used to overlook the Jaffna/Kilaly lagoon and proved to be the nemesis for Tamil Tigers' free movement/logistics activities in this sector. It also proved to be a hindrance for Tamil Tiger radio traffic between Wanni mainland and the Jaffna peninsula which, barring the PALAY/KKS HSZ, was under complete control of the Tamil Tigers. This was the primary reason for Operation Thavalai (frog) to take place to overwhelm this isolated defence complex. This land mass also provided a suitable base for the Tamil Tigers to use the T-59I 130mm howitzers to disrupt the vital air/naval bridge at PALALY/KKS HSZ and any other target that falls within in its range spectrum. It also proved useful for launching its sea tiger assets during its many assaults on Jaffna islets and during its failed Jaffna offensive of 2006.</p> <p>With 58 Division making headway along the A32 bagging Tamil Tiger bases at VIDALATHIVU, ILLUPPAKADAVAI, VELLANKULAM, MULANKAVIL in a matter of weeks, the Tamil Tigers possibly borrowing a leaf out of Hindenberg's book set about to build their own Hindenberg line from PANDIVEDDIKULAM to AKKARANKULAM west, fortified with bunkers, deep trenches. The machine gun posts were positioned such that it severely limited the attacker's ability to exploit cover by providing interlocking fields of fire.</p> <p>Despite its immense fortification, the troops of 58 many months ago succeeded in punching through certain points along this earth bund and held on while the rear was exploited. Such limited 'bite and hold' operations are means to exploit and seize terrain which were major sections of the Tamil Tiger's defensive positions and considered important by the SLA battleplanners. The advantage of such limited ops is that it avoids the SLA overstretching themselves hence reducing its vulnerability to an impending counterattack. Soon as the 58 Division troops took up positions, the Tamil Tigers using its elites launched its own limited counterattacks to regain the lost strongpoints along the bund, without any success. One such area was the KARAMBAKULAM area where the Tamil Tigers had used the tank bund of the defunct reservoir for its defensive purposes. This area was breached on the 17th of September 08 with much sacrifice.</p> <p>Through the exploited KARAMBAKULAM area troops of 582 and 583  forged ahead. While 581 lay siege on the NACHCHIKUDA jetty from the South and the East, 583 moved North ahead of the earth bund and cut the A32 from the North of the NACHCHIKUDA base. </p> <p>Meanwhile 582 concentrated on expanding the breach head. A narrow penetrative corridor such as the one at KARAMBAKULAM means that there are fewer smaller routes of access for supplies. Fewer smaller routes of supplies means the troops that poured in through the defences or <strong>exploitation forces</strong> in military parlance will move slower with slower commitment. A small supply route also means, it can only sustain a smaller exploitation force. Further such a narrow frontage means it increases the vulnerability of a potential counterattack for, the counterattacking Tamil Tigers require to only advance a short distance to cut the supply route.  Mobilising troops through a narrow breach of a formidable defence line without further expanding the penetrative corridor always inherently risky. This is the reason why troops of 582 along with 571 troops of the 57 Division set about to completely dismantle the Tamil Tiger earth bund by expanding their punch holes in pre-determined stages. This was a slow process.</p> <p>In order to achieve the objective by destroying the hostile forces while preserving as much as SLA's own, increasing the ability to take and hold ground in minimum time; 582 ventured North towards MANNIYANKULAM, KUCHCHUKKULAM, NOCHCHIMODDAI and ANAIVILUNTHAN - North of KARAMBAKULAM to disrupt the flow of reinforcements and engage them North of the objective and make them battle fatigued by the time they reached the defenders at the earth bund.</p> <p>There was another objective in this move. MANNIYANKULAM holds a five way junction located 4Kms North of KARAMBAKULAM. This junction from the West connects to the A-32 road at the 11th and 12th mile posts, from the North to the Pooneryn - Paranthan road and from the South to the Akkarayankulam road. Hence this area alone provides the 58 battleplanners many avenues of approach for the future. </p> <p>One such avenue - the PARANTHAN-POONERYN road- bears the potential to cut off the entire POONERYN peninsula from the Tamil Tiger controlled Wanni and bring forth 58 Division's  long term objective - POONERYN. Once this road in under control it provides the SLA battleplanners the opportunity to enter the North of KILINOCHCHI town via PARANTHAN which once housed the outermost satellite camp of the EPS base complex.</p> <p>With the fall of NACHCHIKUDA on the 30th of October, 58 Division can be expected to lay siege on the VALLAIPADU sea tiger jetty located North West of NACHCHIKUDA. The PALAVI jungle areas surrounding VALLAIPADU is ideal for SLA's small unit independent manoeuvres, making it effective for cover and concealment. Even though a direct route exists to VALLAIPADU from the VALLAIPADU junction located South of JEYAPURAM, the current SLA strategy involves small units to leave exposed land and roads and take circuitous routes. Such routes require accurate ground reconnaissance, advanced scouting to map out minefields, enemy positions and strongpoints, prepositioning and rehearsals. All this in reality accounts for more time than the actual assault. However if 58 forges ahead up the A32 up to PALLIKUDA the entire DEVIL'S POINT landmass will be cut off from the Wanni mainland. Such a move will also prevent the Tamil Tigers from fortifying its positions close to POONERYN and will render the VALLAIPADU jetty inoperable with no land route available.</p> <p>The advantages to the military establishment of the fall of POONERYN is manifold.</p> <ol> <li>Opens up a land based MSR across the SANGUPIDDY-KERATIVU jetty linking POONERYN to the JAFFNA mainland. </li> <li>Thus reduces the workload of the Navy and SLAF in maintaining the bridge across the sea and air. </li> <li>The Tamil Tigers are set to lose its entire Western Coast and hence a logistical nightmare to its sea faring wing in smuggling its supplies from the TamilNadu warehouses. </li> <li>Provides the SLN to establish itself again at NAGATHEVANTHURAI overlooking the KILALY lagoon thus an observation point against Tamil Tiger infiltrations towards the Jaffna peninsula. </li> <li>And allows the SLN to block any refugee or fleeing Tamil Tigers cadres from entering Tamil Nadu. </li> <li>Provides the 51 Division which is based in the WALIKAMAM area to expand across the lagoon and perform holding duties. </li> <li>Puts the Tamil Tiger long range T59I 130mm howitzers out of the range of vital security establishments within the peninsula. </li> <li>Provides vital intelligence to the military establishment on Tamil Tiger artillery pillboxes at K-point </li> <li>Allows the 58 Division to concentrate on areas North of KILINOCHCHI along the POONERYN-PARANTHAN road </li> <li>Removes the Tamil Tiger artillery and W86 120mm heavy mortar pads that were within range of the operations sphere of 55/53 Divisions </li> <li>And provides the SLA additional fire support bases to conduct suppressive fire towards known enemy fire support locations. </li> </ol> <p>Since the days the earth bund was pierced, the Tamil Tigers made sure they repositioned their long range artillery from POONERYN's K point. Currently they are stationed at a location East of PARANTHAN giving the Tamil Tigers the opportunity to engage 55 troops at MUHAMALAI, 57 troops operating at AKKARAYAN, 58 troops operating at NOCHCHIMODDAI and 59 troops IF they manage to enter areas North of the Nayaru lagoon.</p> <p>If 58 Division decides to move East once it has achieved its objective and reaches PARANTHAN, the Tamil Tigers stationed at the former EPS complex may face the same harsh annihilation endured by the 54 Division troops at EPS in April 2000. That is of course, is if 53/55 commanders decide to position the 58 Division at PARANTHAN during their war gaming process. With the current mood among troops operating various <strong>crumbling operations</strong> at the National Front translating to something like "if we breakthrough, only 59 will stop us", the day the national front will flare up again is not far off. </p> <p>As always only time will tell...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com44tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-2661363213641927662008-10-15T02:42:00.001+05:302008-10-17T04:09:33.475+05:30Tamil Tigers' Defensive Gamble<p><a href="http://lh3.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SPULRKV5XLI/AAAAAAAAALU/bwGiPfMFJoA/s1600-h/Nightmare%5B3%5D.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="462" alt="Nightmare" src="http://lh5.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SPULSpJdIZI/AAAAAAAAALY/0FMmZ9a6X50/Nightmare_thumb%5B1%5D.jpg?imgmax=800" width="632" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><strong><font size="4"><em>Tamil Tigers' worst nightmare: A Counterstrike, too little too late</em></font></strong></p> <p><font size="5"><strong>D</strong></font>efensive battle is always a gamble. Defending commanders have deliberately chosen to absorb an enemy assault they know is coming, inviting the enemy to attack where it might most effectively be destroyed. If the strategy works the weakened attacker is left with little force to resist a counterstrike, if it fails the defenders will be left with no alternative but surrender.</p> <p>There are many facets of defensive battle. One is to entice an enemy towards you to maintain the initiative to give the enemy an idea of vulnerability but to draw them into a situation from which they cannot return and then to launch a spectacular counterstrike. Another is to worn the enemy off by building strong defensive positions that fighting against them would cause the enemy huge casualties and huge distress. In order to opt which of these is the ideal, the commander must have good and accurate intelligence on the enemy's intentions. It is vital to know what the enemy's intentions are, what their strengths are what their weaknesses are because a commander with such detailed intelligence can prepare not only to exploit the enemy's weaknesses but also prepare to strengthen his own weaknesses. With these intelligence at hand the commanders must have sufficient time to finalise their defensive battleplan and to prepare the ground on which the battle will be fought. At the start of the campaign the defending troops and the defensive positions must be able to stand up against and absorb the enemy attack especially when its at its ferocious and deter the enemy long enough and grind them till the commanders decide an opportune moment to launch their counterattack. Commanders must be realistic of their objectives of the counterstrike and not overstretch themselves. Such a counterstrike at any stages remains the crucial factor in the defensive battle, battleplan. It is almost always the last act. </p> <p>However, this plan has two great dangers. First being, this requires significant and sometimes deliberate sacrifice of one's own soldiers. Therefore maintaining morale dictates that defending troops must not know they are part of a deliberately planned defensive battle. And the population might think of the defensive battle as a negative set back and not understand that it can be a part of a war winning plan. Secondly a defensive battle commander is inviting the enemy to attack him but he may never really know the enemy's full intentions. It very well might be the enemy who actually has the initiative intending to pin the defensive forces down and outflank them from elsewhere. </p> <p>During the first World War, obliged to fight a war on two fronts- against Russia in the East and France in the West- the central powers, Germany and Austro-Hungary desperately required to preserve their dwindling manpower, for the horrific slaughters at Verdun and at the Somme in 1916 had exhausted the Germans as much as the French and the British. To shorten their defence line and thus economise on troops, the Central powers decided to build formidable fortifications across the vulnerable open country side of the Western and Central sectors of the Western front during the winter of 1916. This was named the Hindenberg Line. With this line German Field Marshall von Hindenberg was playing a longer game, preparing the central powers to absorb multiple British or French attacks until conditions changed and a counterstrike can be mounted. The Germans however also calculated that another campaigning season might see Russia collapse in the East. If that happens massive new forces will be released for a showdown in the West. To achieve this delay and free the forces pinned down in the East were the main objective of the Hindenberg line that ran for 90 miles from the north sea to Verdun. The Germans believed it was impregnable. Hindenberg hoped that this line was so formidable that it may persuade the allies not to attack buying him the time he needed.</p> <p>If the Lucy ring operating off Switzerland which was part of the Soviet Red Orchestra spy network of disaffected German officers were passing on German plans of the Battle of Kursk, in 1917 Hindenberg did not have this level of intelligence on British intentions. He only knew that an allied offensive will come. Nevertheless Hindenberg's line held up well against a variety of allied assaults such as the April 1917 Arras offensive where wave after wave of allied assaults were conducted on fruitless attempts of a breakthrough. The French army suffered serious casualties and collapsed putting it out of action for the rest of the year as a result. Throughout 1917, Hindenberg's defensive battleplan had achieved its objective with the British still struggling at the Passchendaele ridge only 6 miles from where they started. This bought the Germans vital time. In the end, the wait paid off. At the East the Russian revolution was sweeping across Russia. By March 1917 the Czar abdicated and during July 1917 a final desperate Russian offensive was comprehensively beaten by the Germans.</p> <p>In defensive battle the defending commander has an inherent advantage as far as intelligence is concerned. In particular he has the opportunity to gain intimate knowledge of the terrain over which the battle will be fought. Hindenberg's line was prepared over a year earlier. The section code named Siegfried in front of the town Cambrai where Haig had decided to launch his attack was 5.5 miles deep with excellent use of terrain. The defences incorporated thick belts of barbed wire, machine gun posts and trenches designed to stop tanks. Further behind these, to conserve troops Hindenberg established mobile reserves to reinforce whatever point the allies breached.</p> <p>The key operational problem of most defending forces is to gather enough time to muster sufficient reserves to nullify the <strong>differential concentration</strong>. In military parlance this means that attackers usually employ a disproportionately high concentration of force employment against a small portion of the defender's lines by using the initiative and surprise. Traditionally in the 1915s an attack was preceded by days of bombardment. This warns defenders that an offensive is shaping up in the horizon, advertising the point of attack and provided the defender vital time required to shift its reserves from elsewhere and even the numerical superiority or the differential concentration. But at Cambrai the early morning of November 20th 1917 was silent. The Germans with prior experience of day long bombardments were not expecting an attack. At 0620 hours the British employed the modern tactic the <strong>Hurricane Barrage</strong> which included a 1000 gun barrage and the bombardment by 14 squadrons of the Royal Flying Core. 300 tanks leading 6 infantry divisions broke off their lines under the cover of this Hurricane barrage. This new infantry tactics surprised the Germans since they did not anticipate an assault for two reasons. First the approaching winter usually signaled an end to the campaigning season until the spring next year and Hindenberg did not expect Haig to attack his lines yet again in the same year. Second, due to the modern system tactics employed by the British - the Hurricane Barrage - enabled the attackers to begin the assault before the defenders could respond to the local differential concentration.</p> <p>The British tanks tore through the seemingly impregnable defences. By 0800 hours the British had overrun the main Hindenberg line and by mid afternoon the British had advanced astonishingly over 6Kms. Such an advance was not accomplished in 4 months of fighting during the third battle of Ypres. At first it seemed the German defences were collapsing. However, Hindenberg's defensive battleplan made the British to be held up at the middle of the front with German field guns and machine gun posts that lay out of the range of the initial Hurricane Barrage. Hindenberg's defensive depth also meant that the British had to travel an increased distance through this 'Devil's Garden' to breakthrough completely. Once an attacker begins to break through such depth, its power progressively erodes. This entropic effect of depth, thus sets up the defender's reserves ability for a successful counterattack. In this process the British lost 179 tanks with 4000 casualties in just the first day. After 10 days since the beginning of the offensive the British were exhausted. Their lines of communication were stretched and they were still within the network of German defences. During this time the German defenders were slowing down the British advance enough to bring in the reserves for the next stage of Hindenberg's battleplan - the Counterstrike. They soaked up and entangled the British advance sufficiently enough for the counterattack phase.</p> <p>Hindenberg's counterstrike concentrated on the Southern end of the British line where the British were at their weakest. Hindenberg launched an hour long barrage, while small infantry teams infiltrated through the British defences softened up by the hour long barrage and took out the British guns that were thought to be safe in the rear. These specialist counterattack infantry teams used innovative tactics such as machine pistols and flame throwers to neutralise the fire support bases. This German counterattack managed to push back the British some 8 miles into the Southern British sector well beyond the original British line before the November 20th offensive. However Hindenberg ordered his men to take the counterstrike far enough to return the frontline to its approximate positions before the British offensive.</p> <p>Like Hindenberg commanders must be realistic about their objectives and not overstretch themselves. One of the most important aspects of the counterstrike plan will be how far that counterstrike should push before coming to its culminating point. The last thing a commander launching a counterstrike would want is to find himself at the end of a tenuous line of communication and vulnerable to a counterstrike himself.</p> <p>Since the fall of the Eastern province, the Tamil Tigers have been conducting defensive battle on 4 main fronts. This defensive battle was either forced by the multi-axis fronts opened by the Sri Lankan armed forces, or planned deliberately by the Tamil Tiger battleplanners attempting to emulate what they did during the 1997 Jayasikurui campaign where they vacated large swathes of land. What is surprising in these series of limited operation conducted by the armed forces is the fact that, large scale counter attacks that reversed the campaign outcomes in a matter of days has not featured in the Tamil Tiger battle plan of Eelam war IV yet. With territory fast shrinking and vital supply bases and coastal belts falling into Government hands, how long the Tamil Tigers plan to conduct their defensive battleplan remains to be seen. Defensive battle is always a gamble and for the Tamil Tigers any miscalculation thereby a failure is quite catastrophic.</p> <p>If the Tamil Tigers are indeed emulating the Hindenberg tactics, it surely is bound to fail for a number of reasons. If Hindenberg had a clear objective - to buy time by deterring the enemy for as long as his Eastern Russian threat was negated - with the current ground realities it is questionable as to whether the Tamil Tigers do have an overall objective. Like Hindenberg if the Tamil Tigers are buying time, it would either be hoping to seek international intervention or for the heavens to open up with the hope of driving the invading SLA to a muddy quagmire it faced during the last stages of Jayasikurui and during the early stages of the Wanni offensive last year to a lesser extent. </p> <p>The heavily fortified NACHCHIKUDA-AKKARAYANKULAM earth bund is a good deterrent for any invading force. However it is geometrically permanent and allows to be easily surveyed from air and LRS teams thus allowing the SLA to build plans around it. It also fails to deliver defensive depth (unlike the Hindenberg line) to its key towns and areas of strategic importance such as POONERYN and KILINOCHCHI, hence a few punched holes in its defence presents the SLA's elite reserves to pour in towards the area behind this earth bund which is relatively undefended and wreak havoc among the Tamil Tiger supply chains. This renders the Tamil Tiger FDLs incapable of functioning at full efficiency. These are the objectives of the SLA attack teams - breakthrough and exploitation - gaining access to the rear which holds the guerilla supporting infrastructure. If Hindenberg's defenders managed to cause severe casualties and immense distress on the attacking British and the French, thus far the Tamil Tigers have not managed to inflict such levels of casualties on the marauding small strike teams of SLA divisions. (The tactics of such small unit independent manoeuvre will be briefed more in detail in a future brief of mine). </p> <p>Yet another reason as to why the Tamil Tiger defensive battle gamble is poised to fail is its severe lack of intelligence. During the early days of the <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/03/siege-of-adampan.html" target="_blank">battles for ADAMPAN (ATTAMPANA)</a> the Tamil Tigers had fortified the UYILANKULAM-ADAMPAN road expecting 58 Division to meet the defenders head on. Instead, meeting head on turned out to be a SLA tactic that pinned down the Tamil Tiger defenders with fixing attacks while the 581 and 582 had encircled the town with a double envelopment.  As mentioned above without vital intelligence defensive battle is a risky gamble. It very well might be the enemy who actually has the initiative intending to pin the defensive forces down and outflank them from elsewhere.</p> <p> <a href="http://lh6.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SPULTqq2KnI/AAAAAAAAALc/cTZ5gZx6rls/s1600-h/Mannar6copy3.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="440" alt="Mannar6 copy" src="http://lh3.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SPULUyUq0RI/AAAAAAAAALg/LqsApy2eB0s/Mannar6copy_thumb1.jpg?imgmax=800" width="517" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><strong><em><font size="4">The inherent risks of Defensive battle: It very well might be the enemy who actually has the initiative with the intention to pin the defensive forces down and outflank them from elsewhere.</font></em></strong></p> <p>If the Tamil Tigers are to launch a Oyatha Alaikal (Ceaseless Waves) type assault bringing its lost territory and pushing the FDLs to status quo ante, it surely is risking overstretching itself in the process and hence being very vulnerable to a potential counterstrike by the SLA themselves, for in the current theatre of operations the Sri Lankan battleplanners have made sure they have left no vulnerable salient for the Tamil Tigers to exploit as happened before. With a dwindling experienced cadre base and supplies, how long it can hold and continue such a counterstrike, if it opts to, remains to be seen. As mentioned above once an attacker begins to break through such depth, its power progressively erodes. This entropic effect of depth, thus sets up the SLA's reserves ability for a successful counterattack.</p> <p>Perhaps this is another reason - not to overstretch itself during its counterattack - why the only form of counterattack the Tamil Tigers have thrown against the 57, 58 and 59 Divisions thus far has been limited attempts at re-capturing vital strong points or grounds of tactical importance. The majority of current limited counterstrikes have taken place along the Earth bund spanning across from NACHCHIKUDA to AKKARAYAN where Sri Lankan armed forces have pierced more than 3 points and have stationed themselves on this earth bund. In some positions the warring parties are positioned as close as a few yards. </p> <p>As mentioned in an <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/06/counterstrike-last-gamble-of-tamil.html" target="_blank">earlier brief</a> there are many reasons why thus far the Tamil Tigers have not opted the final phase of a defensive battleplan - the countertsrike. Main among them has been SLA's superior intelligence apparatus, superior defensive tactics (which I will brief in the future), superior aerial surveillance platforms hovering above monitoring FDLs on a 24/7 basis and the Tamil Tigers' lack of leadership and SLA's pursuit of eliminating key Tamil Tiger field operatives. Not all commanders have the ability to launch a counterattack battleplan. As much as a commander that leads an offensive into enemy territory needs to be dynamic and bold, the commander who launches the counter strike needs to be even more dynamic and even more bolder often because he himself has just suffered a defeat and he’s just got to take on an enemy that’s just won a victory and exploit a certain success that might not be eagerly apparent to him. What he needs to do is to move quickly, he needs to be fast and above all, he needs to throw caution to the wind. With the Tamil Tigers losing its premier commanders with the likes of renegade Karuna, Balraj, Charles, Thamil Chelvan etc it is unlikely that the replacements will be able to emulate and deliver the same dynamic bold feats and charisma of these late commanders.</p> <p>With a decisive counterstrike capable of returning the FDLs to status quo ante yet to materialise, the Sri Lankan armed forces, adhering to its own deadlines and tactics will continue to inch in further into Tamil Tiger territory, making it even harder for the Tamil Tigers to stage a comeback with supplies and cadre strength diminishing each day due to daily attrition. As each day passes by, as troops inch closer and closer towards KILINOCHCHI and POONERYN, the day the premier battle hardened offensive divisions 53 and 55 will unleash itself is not far off. Any counterstrikes afterwards may come too little too late for the Tamil Tigers. </p> <p>Only time will tell...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com23tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-30246189679818696122008-10-11T13:51:00.002+05:302008-10-11T20:53:31.244+05:30Farewell General Sir...<p><a href="http://lh4.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SPBiFLPvSvI/AAAAAAAAALM/4TyzdtnghR4/s1600-h/Perera3.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="414" alt="Perera" src="http://lh6.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SPBiF4Lq1VI/AAAAAAAAALQ/hPw6qxVAzbc/Perera_thumb2.jpg?imgmax=800" width="335" align="left" border="0" /></a> </p> <p></p> <p></p> <blockquote> <p><em><strong>With eyes full of tears, she begged me not to go, for the sake of their future. However, I was determined to go. When Elephant pass and Jaffna were about to fall, the officers in Jaffna called me and said that they would perish unless I come and save them. This compelled me to ask for permission from General Weerasuriya to go to north. I told my daughter, that if I stayed back, one family would be pleased, but 32,000 security personnel would perish, leaving their families in woe and misery </strong>- Maj Gen Perera prior to taking over the post of OOC Jaffna, April 2000 (Excerpts from interview with Tissa Ravindra Perera).</em></p> </blockquote> <p></p> <p></p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> </p> <p> <br /></p> <p></p> <p></p> <p></p> <p>October 6th, 2008 a dastardly act of terrorism took away one giant tower of strength of the Sri Lankan armed forces. Major General Janaka Perera who fought with valour and vigour for 34 years to safeguard his country from the scourge of terrorism is to take the journey to his last resting place today.</p> <p>General Sir, you were a real officer and charming gentleman and above all a very professional soldier, who always had your subordinates in mind. Your daily radio addresses calling us "Maage abheetha weerodara puthanuweni (My brave sons)" and bunker hops made us feel we were secure and defeat a long way away. Most of all you made us feel we were all worthy; worthy enough to be your own son. You gave us hope when there was none.</p> <blockquote> <p><em><strong>The President said that she had sent Lakshman Kadirgamar to arrange Indian ships to evacuate the soldiers and asked for our opinion. The Defence Chiefs, Defence Secretary and the Defence Minister were at the meeting, but no one answered. I told the President not to do it and explained to her that we would not be able to save at least 10,000 soldiers, if this plan was carried out. I said that the only way left for us was to fight and that I would take up that responsibility.</strong> - Maj Gen Perera prior to taking over the post of OOC Jaffna, April 2000 (Excerpts from interview with Tissa Ravindra Perera).</em></p> </blockquote> <p>General Sir, Sleep well. We shall meet again. Perhaps in the same land where terrorism will long be eradicated, where racial animosity will be a thing of history and where every citizen will treat each other with nobility and dignity irrespective of political clout. May you attain the supreme bliss of Nibbana.</p> <p align="center"><span style="font-family: trebuchet ms"><strong>He only, in a general honest thought <br />And common good to all, made one of them. <br />His life was gentle, and the elements <br />So mix'd in him that Nature might stand up <br />And say to all the world 'This was a man!'</strong></span></p> <div align="center"> <pre><strong><span style="font-family: trebuchet ms">This was Janaka Perera...</span></strong></pre><br /></div> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-42150499419975618692008-09-28T05:48:00.001+05:302008-09-28T05:48:52.828+05:3057 expands its tentacles<p><a href="http://lh4.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SN7NaGLp31I/AAAAAAAAALE/C60_yzC2Ggk/s1600-h/57%20copy%5B7%5D.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="454" alt="57 copy" src="http://lh6.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SN7Na4DAErI/AAAAAAAAALI/BwXbRu7LaA8/57%20copy_thumb%5B3%5D.jpg?imgmax=800" width="533" border="0" /></a> </p> <p>After 57 successfully captured MALLAVI and UYILANKULAM on the 22nd of August 08, displaying immense flexibility and manoeuvrability the focus of 57 shifted to the A9 trunk road. The triple assault on the SFHQ-W on the 9th of September 08 at VAVUNIYA made the battleplanners shift their focus towards the A9, which was used to tow the Tamil Tiger heavy guns and possibly to make one of their Zling-143 aircraft airborne.</p> <p>With the Tamil Tiger main defence line already running from NACHCHIKUDA to West of AKKARAYANKULAM, they set about with hectic preparations to extend their earth bund towards the East of AKKARAYANKULAM to prevent 57 from reaching the outskirts of KILINOCHCHI. To seize the initiative early on from the Tamil Tigers, troops attached to 571 were dispatched with two main objectives at hand:</p> <p>1. Cut off the AKKARAYANKULAM-TERUMURIKANDI road</p> <p>2. Thereby cutting off any supplies running towards AKKARAYANKULAM, and encircle the AKKARANKULAM tank thus outflanking the staunch Tamil Tiger defences based west of AKKARAYANKULAM. This also relieves the pressure on 58 Division battling the same earth bund running between NACHCHIKUDA to KARAMBAKULAM.</p> <p>While 571 is faced with these objectives, 572 from KOKAVIL and 573 from MANKULAM are tasked with cutting off the A9 to prevent the Tamil Tigers from exploiting the A9 to bring vital security installations under its artillery range and bringing in supplies to its VAVUNIYA front. With this move the 57 Division is very well poised to capture two major hubs of the Tamil Tigers. If KOKAVIL is of political value, MANKULAM is of the highest military value for it is a vital junction that connects the A9 to the A34 that runs through dense MULATIVU jungles towards the North East. The overall military gain of this move is the denial of the A9 from KOKAVIL to MANKULAM to the Tamil Tigers. With the cut off of the A9 from the North, the 56 and 62 Divisions further South battling the Tamil Tigers are expected to find a depleted resistance and ease through the territory once the Tamil Tiger defences flood away on its own due to the lack of vital supplies and medevacs.</p> <p>With one of the priorities being to filter out civilians as much as from the Wanni hinterland before a final onslaught, thus far the battleplanners have left the A9 as a conflict free zone. This is to make sure the civilians moving towards the OMANTHAI entry/exit point to be free of hassle as well as to ensure the smooth flow of humanitarian aid.</p> <p>With the current developments taking shape on the A9 from MANKULAM onwards, aid agencies are expected to take the A34 towards MULATIVU avoiding the current conflict zones. This move also highlights the likely areas where a major military thrust is likely to take place.</p> <p>With the Tamil Tigers fast losing its vast swathes of territory it once had, its VIPs and valuable assets are now confined to a limited land area - namely the dense MULATIVU forest. Using the knowledge of Tiger guerilla doctrine, the capability of modern weapon systems/platforms and the laws of elimination, the day of the dreaded decapitation strikes for the Tamil Tigers that will eliminate their once invincible leaders once and for all is not far off. Only time will tell...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com18tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-57243399967896723802008-09-16T03:49:00.001+05:302008-09-18T23:18:00.430+05:30Battle of El-Alamein: Lessons from the past<p><a href="http://lh5.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SM7fXQQlbJI/AAAAAAAAAK0/TiLTBIAjPFU/s1600-h/2_Battle_of_El_Alamein_0013.png"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="565" alt="2_Battle_of_El_Alamein_001" src="http://lh6.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SM7fZHDrckI/AAAAAAAAAK4/zAdMimuIYpE/2_Battle_of_El_Alamein_001_thumb1.png?imgmax=800" width="565" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><font size="1"><em>Image Courtesy of </em></font><a href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Noclador" target="_blank"><font size="1"><em>Noclador</em></font></a></p> <p><strong>B</strong>reaking a fortified line is what every soldier fears and a commanders last resort. It means attacking defences head on that are dug in, protected and cannot be outflanked. The enemy is well armed and well prepared and are expecting the attack. </p> <p>The defender gets to choose the exact ground he wants to defend and he often has time to prepare and maximise his use of weapons. The attackers know that they will take heavy casualties thus the troops must be clear as to why they have been asked to sacrifice themselves. Therefore the most important aspect about breaking into a fortified line is morale. The infantry has to have the drive and morale to get through the obstacles. Otherwise if the attack bogs down they are as good as dead resulting in defeat.</p> <p>Commanders who initiate to break a fortified line can have a range of objectives; either to simply seize ground, to destroy the enemy army in that position or to break through to begin a different type of battle. Once initiated commanders must seize the initiative and maintain that advantage from the first moment and must not allow their attack to stall or slow. They must keep it moving. They also must be flexible enough to cope with unforeseen problems or exploit unexpected advantages.</p> <p>Such an example was the Second battle of El-Alamein where the German Field Marshall Rommel - the commander of the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsches_Afrikakorps"><font color="#000000"><em>Deutsches Afrikakorps</em></font></a> had made the allied 8th Army withdraw and setup a FDL at a point adjoining the Qattara depression and the Mediterranean sea. From here the allied 8th Army launched unsuccessful counter attacks at Rommel's africa corps. As a measure of defence Rommel too setup his own FDL facing the allies. This allowed his exhausted troops to regroup before a final assault. Even though he had planned for a regroup, constant allied raids were crippling his supplies across the sea by two thirds. Knowing very well the allies were regrouping with uninterrupted supplies, Rommel decided to breakthrough while the allied buildup was incomplete. However the allies managed to halt the advance at Alam el Halfa ridge. Expecting General Montgomery - the commander of the 8th Army to strike and capitalise on the victory, Rommel dug in a fortified line.</p> <p>Rommel's frontline was 40 miles long. The desert ahead of the FDL was largely flat and open so any movement can be seen for miles. At the front lay a minefield 5 miles deep covered with barbed wire. This was code named devil's garden. Behind this were the formidable German anti-tank guns in well concealed positions designed to withstand heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. Following classic military doctrine Rommel's defences avoided being linear. Instead it was built to be a defensive web allowing the defender to fight at every direction. Behind this web Rommel concealed his armour to counter any breakthrough of his defences.</p> <p>Classic military doctrine suggests that attackers need 3:1 ratio against defenders. Against well entrenched positions it jumps to 5:1. At El-Alamein Montgomery had 200000 men, 1000 tanks and 900 aircraft. Against him Rommel had 100000 men, 500 tanks and 350 aircraft. This is in addition to the minefields. In military parlance minefields are known as a <strong>combined arms weapon</strong>. They are designed to channelise armor and men into predetermined kill zones. To deal with mines the offender has to slow down and that makes him very vulnerable for the enemy. To avoid the enemy counter fire he needs to speed up, but this makes him vulnerable to mines. But this did not deter Montgomery. Despite the heavy odds, he and his men had no other choice. A flank was not available to exploit. From the South was the impassable Qattara depression and from the North was the Mediterranean sea. Montgomery was also not comfortable with the superiority of the force ratio. But he was getting his supplies freely through the Mediterranean whereas Rommel's supplies were successfully intercepted by air strikes. Montgomery also enjoyed the intelligence advantage with Enigma decoding German transmissions. </p> <p>It is very rare for any commander to have the 3:1 let alone 5:1 force ratio which military theorists consider essential to break a fortified line but it is possible to gather the necessary superiority at least locally by using deception and surprise.</p> <p>First General Montgomery takes a bold decision to attack the line from the North when his earlier predecessors attempted at the South thereby trapping the enemy against the Mediterranean coast. This was while his deception battleplan set about to convince Rommel that he was indeed following his predecessors and was attacking the South. He positioned dummy trucks and tanks. A dummy oil pipe was built from El-Alamein to the South slowly enough to convince Rommel that the allies will not initiate an assault (on the South) till the pipe was complete. False radio traffic made the German listeners focus on the South. In the North immense efforts were underway to camouflage troops and tank concentrations. The deception was so successful that Rommel left for Germany for medical attention with just a month before Montgomery's D day.</p> <p>On the approach to D day Montgomery conducted an diversionary attack on the South to pin down half of Rommel's forces. At the north in Operation Lightfoot infantry were tasked with cutting two corridors through the devil's garden. Engineers were to clear a path under the over of artillery for tanks and mark them with white tape and hooded lanterns. The objective of the two tank divisions was to cross the devil's garden by dawn and strike.</p> <p>On October 23rd 1942 at 2140 hours under the cover of a barrage of 1000 guns, the Allied infantry advanced towards their objectives. The artillery and infantry advanced in a <strong>creeping barrage</strong>. In military parlance it mean artillery moves 100 yards every 3 minutes with the infantry following. In a creeping barrage coordination has to be precise. At the battle of El-Alamein the 51st Highlanders advanced too fast, running into friendly fire from the allied barrage. Nevertheless Montogomery's initial assault had gained sufficient impetus until the tank divisions were to churn along the route cleared by the engineers. Unfortunately the path cleared by the engineers was only one tank wide. Once the first tanks were hit by 88mm anti-tank weapons, the entire pathway was blocked trapping the tanks within the devil's garden. The gun flashes of the incoming troops made picking up the targets easier for the Germans and battered the bogged down tanks with artillery. As the sun rose the advance faltered. The tanks had failed to clear the minefields and make headway to support the infantry who had crossed the minefields by dawn. Instead of moving on without losing momentum, they were forced to dig in. Within a few hours Montgomery had lost the impetus to Rommel. During the first 48 hours of battle Montgomery lost over 200 tanks and he called off operation Lightfoot.</p> <p>One of the key requirements in breaking a fortified line is not lose the momentum created by the initial impetus and to be flexible in changing tactics when their plans go wrong or to exploit advantages when they go right. All attacks lose impetus with time. Clausewitz wrote about this as being the <strong>Culminating point</strong>. The key is to be smart enough to recognise that point, rapidly refuel, rearm and get your men moving again towards the objective or re-plan the assault.</p> <p>Once Montgomery called off his large scale offensive, he switched to a series of small scale assaults on enemy strongpoints along the defence line code named <strong>crumbling</strong>. Montgomery was the master of deliberate attack. His crumbling attacks were aimed at getting amongst the enemy and to force the enemy's defensive cohesion to flood away. He also used his force ratio supremacy of the air. He used over 800 bomber sorties and over 2000 fighter bomber sorties each day on pre-identified targets.</p> <p>With these crumbling attacks, Rommel's forces were pinned down with supplies running out fast, giving Montgomery room to manoeuvre. Trying to assume Montgomery's next move, Rommel moved a large part of his Africa core over to the Mediterranean. But the allies learn this through intelligence intercepts and plans the assault further towards the South than planned. It is code named <strong>Supercharge</strong>.</p> <p><a href="http://lh4.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SM7faHzZxfI/AAAAAAAAAK8/Y9ypKB48shU/s1600-h/2_Battle_of_El_Alamein_0055.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="569" alt="2_Battle_of_El_Alamein_005" src="http://lh3.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SM7fbNNwVYI/AAAAAAAAALA/wkUQ8WMuZtM/2_Battle_of_El_Alamein_005_thumb3.jpg?imgmax=800" width="569" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><font size="4"><strong><em>Monty's Supercharge </em></strong><font size="1"><em>Image </em>c<strong><em>ourtesy of </em></strong></font><a href="http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Noclador" target="_blank"><strong><em><font size="1">Noclador</font></em></strong></a></font></p> <p>By the time - November 2, 1942 - Supercharge is begun, Montogomery has 800 tanks left with plenty of fuel. Rommel was left with only 102 tanks with fuel and ammo critically low. Despite the initial breakthrough as before, Montgomery lost some 200 tanks at the day's end due to heavy resistance and mines. The attrition had however reduced Rommel's tanks to less than a 100 and at breaking point. Once the line was broken, despite Hitler's orders of not to retreat, Rommel orders his men to retreat and take up defensive positions 60miles to the rear to counter the break out stage of the Allied 8th Army.</p> <p><strong><em><font size="4">The Sri Lankan theatre:</font></em></strong></p> <p>If General Montgomery had a stretch of 40 miles to manoeuvre his units deceptively or otherwise, the Sri Lankan battleplanners have only a narrow stretch of only 7 miles to successfully manoeuvre its units. With no available flank - at least on ground - they have to meet the Tamil Tigers head on. The narrow stretch also makes it far more easier for the Tamil Tigers to coordinate their fire support. </p> <p>With the Tamil Tigers having more than 5 years to perfect their defences along the 7 miles stretch spanning from KILALY to NAGARKOVIL, this front provides the most fortified line in the current Sri Lankan conflict. Like Rommel the Tamil Tigers have tried their best to increase their force ratio using minefields, trenches, camouflaged boobytraps, highly mobile artillery and mortar units which have littered the coastline spanning from KILALY to POONERYN. They have used the minefields successfully as a combined arms weapons, channelising the armour units of the 53 and 55 Divisions to take the path through pre-planned kill zones. The largely open flat area of no man's land means, any troop movement is easily spotted by the Tamil Tigers. On these kill zones the Tamil Tigers on previous occasions were known to employ the <strong>box barrage</strong> where the artillery/mortar would rain on 3 or 4 barrages forming a box thus trapping troops within. Such a barrage can only be conducted on pre-registered locations and was successfully conducted to trap 1GR and 5VIR during the April 08 offensive. This is the Sri Lankan Devil's Garden.</p> <p>As my previous briefs have mentioned, the biggest challenge the Sri Lankan forces face in this sector is the neutralisation of the enemy indirect fire support. One method is to conduct suppressive counterfire at targets identified by their trajectories (ie firefinders). The second method is to use close air support by the SLAF using its superior platforms to target mobile artillery/mortar units and the third is to thin out the enemy's limited resources by conducting a multi axis approach. With the Sri Lankan armed forces moving steadily within the KILINOCHCHI district towards the sectors that houses the artillery/mortar units - POONERYN/PARANTHAN/KILALY axis - the Tamil Tigers may be forced to deploy some of its assets which otherwise could be used to halt an advance in the MUHAMALE sector. The effects of this method is already evident since the Tamil Tiger commander who was based at MUHAMALE was known to be appointed in charge of defending the KILINOCHCHI district from the 57 and 58 divisions.</p> <p>Emulating the crumbling operations of General Montgomery, the 53 and 55 Divisions have been carrying out successful small scale assaults on the Tamil Tiger FDL on a constant basis. The main aim of such attacks is to destabilize the FDL defences causing the cohesion and morale of the defenders to flood away. Further such a series of crumbling operations allows the Sri Lankan battle planners to master their opening game as well as shore up the morale of its soldiers. In addition they have been conducting daily training exercises, honing their coordination and skills.</p> <p>Just like General Montgomery successfully used his superiority of the air to enhance his force ratio, the SLAF too needs to be taken into consideration for future battles in this sector since it can significantly increase the force ratio of the Sri Lankan armed forces within this sector. The intention of SLAF air strikes are to cause widespread destruction with the aim of depleting target numbers thus reducing the number of forward targets for the infantry to engage. This is particularly important for areas that are out of SLA's artillery range i.e the deep battle space where ammo dumps, transit camps for reinforcements etc are likely to be located. Further it can also reduce the number of fire support assets the Tamil Tigers may have access to.</p> <p>Lastly the commanders must be skilled enough to recognise the all important Clausewitz's <strong>culminating point</strong> - the point at which the force is unable to perform well enough to achieve its objective - as well as be flexible with the overall battleplan. The last thing a commander requires is his strike force to stall or slow in the midst of a Devil's garden as happened during April 08 when 55 were ordered to stall till 53 caught up. The only way this culminating point be recognised early on, is through experience and practice. The War Gaming process is important in this aspect since it allows the battle planners to test their operational plans without committing troops thus allowing the planners to determine high pay-off targets, define critical events, rectify any flaws in planning and coordination, synchronize fire support with other battlefield operating systems and gives a rough estimate of the expected casualties.</p> <p>Breaking a fortified line was always an option of last resort when sacrificing waves of soldiers was a choice commanders couldn't avoid. In the Southern Wanni the armed forces have been breaking fortified line after line till they met the NACHCHIKUDA-AKKARAYANKULAM line. The fact that differentiates this line from the rest of the lines is the one single fact that this line falls perfectly within the defensive umbrella of the Tamil Tiger artillery/mortar units - the same units that have proved anathema to the combi of 53 and 55 Divisions elsewhere since October 2006.</p> <p>With territory shrinking thus limiting space for manoeuvrability to shoot and scoot and with superior SLAF platforms dedicated to hunt such units prowling day and night, tougher testing times are ahead for these dedicated Kutti Sri Mortar units of the Tamil Tigers. Only time will tell...</p> <p>PS: To get a better understanding of the battle from a logistics and general strategy point of view, I would highly recommend reading Mr. Bailey's <a href="http://historyandwar.blogspot.com/2008/09/racing-against-clock-lttes-logistical.html" target="_blank">Racing against the clock: The LTTE's logistical gamble</a></p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com18tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-44412122501477546892008-08-10T12:38:00.001+05:302008-08-10T12:38:18.537+05:30The Double Siege of Thunukkai and Mallavi<p><a href="http://lh3.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SJ6T3aQ3JAI/AAAAAAAAAKU/rzYJ6zeb3jo/s1600-h/Thunukkai2copy3.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="455" alt="Thunukkai2 copy" src="http://lh4.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SJ6T4eKgTUI/AAAAAAAAAKY/PMxnj8W92Zg/Thunukkai2copy_thumb1.jpg?imgmax=800" width="698" border="0" /></a><font size="5"><strong></strong></font></p> <p><font size="5"><strong>S</strong></font>oon after NADDANKANDAL 16Km Northeast of PERIYAMADU was taken by the 57 division on the 11th of July 08, battleplanners set off to lay siege on two heavily populated areas in Western Wanni - THUNUKKAI and MALLAVI. These two towns are of immense strategic importance since the fall of these areas brings the SLA heavy weapons dangerously close to the Tiger Heartland.</p> <p>Expecting the inevitable advance of the 57 troops the Tamil Tigers set about to heavily fortify the towns and its suburbs. Main among the defences has been the earth dam built parallel to the Paliaru which runs from Vavunikulam tank to VELLANKULAM. This runs parallel to the VELLANKULAM - MANKULAM road which runs through THUNUKKAI. Despite the staunch defences overlooking an open area, several units of 57 have managed to breach it at several points.</p> <p>At the moment 571 Brigade is operating on the Western flank of the 57 Division and is expected to reach TENNIYANKULAM and cut off the THUNUKKAI-NACHCHIKUDA road in the process. 572 currently are located in the general area of KALVILAN just South East of THUNUKKAI. 573 meanwhile are expected to cut off the MALLAVI-MANKULAM road just North of VAVUNIKULAM.</p> <p>The loss of the VELLANKULAM-MANKULAM route in several places has resulted in a serious logistics nightmare for the Tamil Tiger organisation as this is the primary MSR to smuggle in military items inland from South Indian safe houses. The smuggled items were known to be taken directly to MANKULAM or either to KILINOCHCHI via KOKAVIL.</p> <p>As mentioned during an <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/04/flank-attack-hit-enemy-where-it-least.html" target="_blank">earlier brief</a> - As long as modern warfare presents with a well entrenched enemy, a battle planner will always consider to build up his force, conceal the main thrust, attack from the flank and finally encircle his enemy minimising his own casualties, for public opinion will not allow for a nation's troops be thrown head on against a well entrenched enemy. This time is no different...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com44tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-61825349195465690132008-06-26T04:20:00.001+05:302008-06-26T04:22:33.898+05:30Counterstrike: The last gamble of the Tamil Tigers<p><font size="6"><strong>C</strong></font>ounterstrike is an integral part of war; get it right and it can reverse the course of a conflict and save the homeland, get it wrong and it can mean a quick defeat. Counterstrike has been the preferred battleplan of aggressive commanders who finds themselves fighting on their own territory. Such battleplans are littered throughout history – Robert E Lee in Virginia in the mid 1860s, Napoleon towards the end of his career while defending France are some of them.</p> <p><a href="http://lh3.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SGLLs351IKI/AAAAAAAAAJ0/JXkakpI_sTE/s1600-h/Tanenburgh%20copy%5B11%5D.jpg"><img style="border-right: 0px; border-top: 0px; border-left: 0px; border-bottom: 0px" height="360" alt="Tanenburgh copy" src="http://lh6.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SGLLuDw_kkI/AAAAAAAAAJ4/2a6R5Dthgc4/Tanenburgh%20copy_thumb%5B9%5D.jpg?imgmax=800" width="832" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><strong><em><font size="4">The first and classic example of a counterstrike in the 20th century: the Battle of Tanenburgh</font></em></strong></p> <p>The plan for a counterstrike implies that you know the enemy is going to attack which relies on intelligence. The importance of intelligence was seen in the 20th century’s first and classic example of counterstrike; the battle of Tanenburgh on the eastern front during WWI. In September 1914 the Germans faced their greatest fear; a war on 2 fronts against France and the allies on the west and Russia from the east. The German battle plan relied on intelligence estimates that Russia will be slow to mobilise. But Russia mobilised 2 large armies in just 2 weeks. They advanced into the German eastern province of Prussia in a pincer movement threatening to cut off the single German army left to defend the region. The combined strength of the Russians amounted to 375000 men vastly outnumbering the Germans. The German intelligence misreading of the situation put their country in huge peril. But they made good of their blunder by an extraordinary intelligence cue, they intercepted a message from the General of the northern Russian army saying he can do nothing to support any action of that in the south. Even though they are still vastly outnumbered this new intelligence gave the confidence to the Germans that they could use the full force to destroy the Russian southern army without fear of attack.  Germany’s great WW1 leadership team Generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff had picked off the opportunity to take on the Russian southern army on its own. They moved quickly one core of their small army South by railway to take up positions on the west flank of the advancing Russians. A 2nd core was moved to the North East of the Russian advance. The Russians were totally unaware of these moves. Then the Germans struck. One core slashed across the Russian rear while the 2nd pushed down to link up and squeeze the Russians back. The threat to Germany's eastern border, thus ended.</p> <p>As much as intelligence holds the key to a successful counterstrike, so is one's force strength - translated in military terms as force ratio which is your strength compared to that of the enemy. The strength is calculated not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of factors such as sophistication of equipment, training and morale. The importance of force ratio is clearly seen in Joseph Stalin's counter strike against Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. Even though Stalin held sufficient intelligence on the impending German offensive towards Russia, Stalin decided against a pre-emptive strike or a counterstrike once the Operation Barbarossa had crossed the Russian Eastern border. It was at the earliest stages of the operation the Germans at their weakest. If the Soviets were going to launch a counterstrike it had to be in those early stages. But the Soviets opt not to. In just over 2 weeks the panzers cut more than 300 miles into the Soviet Union opening up the routes to Leningrad, Stalingrad and Moscow. With the soviet winter fast approaching by December the Germans were just 19 miles off Moscow with the golden towers of the Kremlin within their sights. The main reason behind Stalin's decision to withhold any counterstrike in defence was he did not meet the required force ratio to meet the German challenge. In 1930s Stalin had wreaked massive purges in the red army. Before he can do anything to confront Hitler he had to build up his army again. Further, at outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 both Hitler and Stalin shared the same fear; war on 2 fronts. In Hitler's case it was war against the allies at the west and the Soviet union to the East. For Stalin and his generals it was Hitler on their western border and against Japan on their eastern. They cannot throw all its forces against operation Barbarossa because they have to keep an substantial force in the east to cover a possible attack by Japan. So in the summer of 1941 as the Germans moved deeper into the Soviet Union the balance of force ratio at the west is beginning to shift in Germany's favour. It is at this stage the Russian spy in Japan Dr. Richard Sorge passes on the intelligence Stalin had been waiting for. Sorge confirmed Japan will go to war, not north and west towards Russia as Stalin feared but South and East giving Stalin the opportunity to mobilise his 40 Eastern and Siberian Divisions to the West to meet the German threat thus meeting his requirement of force ratio for a successful counterstrike. </p> <p>  <a href="http://lh5.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SGLLvNyqzDI/AAAAAAAAAJc/-MeNW5m5bEE/s1600-h/oddusudan%20copy%5B9%5D.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="600" alt="oddusudan copy" src="http://lh5.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SGLLwad9ygI/AAAAAAAAAJg/WGjltPPgWwM/oddusudan%20copy_thumb%5B5%5D.jpg?imgmax=800" width="817" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><strong><em><font size="4">The land that eluded Jayasikurui</font></em></strong></p> <p>When Operation Jayasikurui was inching ahead along the A9 with heavy casualties the Tamil Tigers prior to recommencing their ceaseless waves series of attacks, carried out a series of six devastating counterattacks on SLA defences. These operations were less known since they did not involve holding land, but to incur maximum damage to the foe and to stall the main advance and drive the focus of the battleplanners away from their main objective.</p> <p>The first of the series came on the 9th of June 1997 where the Yearlong Jayasikurui campaign began - Vavuniya's THANDIKULAM entry/exit point and NOCHCHIMODAI defences- while 55 and 53 were on the verge of an all-important link-up at PULIYANKULAM. Karuna and 600 of his men/women stormed the defences flank West from 3 points between THANDIKULAM and KOKKUVELIYA cutting off 55 from its rear support base. They held onto a 3Km stretch between NOCHCHIMODDAI to THANDIKULAM for one whole day. It was not until Wednesday when troops backed by commandos managed to link up the lost stretch of the A9. The casualties added up to over 200.</p> <p>The second counter offensive came on the 24th of June. This time the offensive broke through the Eastern flank of the 55 division at PANNIKANIRAVI isolating 551 from the rest of the Division. Simultaneously to this attack, the Tamil Tigers struck at PERIYAMADU to pin down the 53 division thus preventing it from sending reinforcements to the 55 Division. Since the two divisions were yet to link up at PULIYANKULAM, the Tamil Tigers exploited the gap between the two divisions to manoeuvre its fighting units to strike the Eastern flank of 55 despite 53 positioned on a wider eastern flank to 55. The Tamil Tigers who breached the Eastern flank then went onto breach the Western flank to make their exit, leaving a trail of destruction. Casualties on this occasion added to over 100. The third counter strike saw defences between PULIYANKULAM and OMANTHAI fall on 1st of August 1997 leaving over 70 casualties. By this stage, the Jayasikurui campaign was yet to bring PULIYANKULAM under its control.</p> <p>By September the commanders realised on how futile it has been to strike PULIYANKULAM head on. Instead they decided to make 55 bypass the town and emerge at the A9 North of the town linking up with 53 in the process. By doing so it would envelope the town cutting off supplies. Towards the end of September 55 achieved its objective by holding a small stretch of the A9 just North of PULIYANKULAM. However, as planned 53 failed to link up due to the 4th Counter offensive by the Tamil Tigers. 53 came under attack at KARAPPAKKUTTI - North East of PULIYANKULAM leaving over 50 casualties. With this set back 53 continued their thrust on a wider flank encompassing PULIYANKULAM and cutting off supply routes from MULLATIVU to PULIYANKULAM.  While one column of troops were moving parallel to the A9 at KARUPPUKUTTI, 53 were moving ahead from NAINAMADU towards KARUPPADDAMURIPPU. This was the setting for the 5th Counterstrike that took place on the 5th of October 1997. 533 commando brigade and 552 both came under fire at South of KARUPPADDAMURIPPU. This initial strike was a diversion to the main strike that took place further South of KARUPPADDAMURIPPU at KARUPPUKKUTTI and SINNA ADAMPAN. Fighting continued for 3 days and as before, caused the troops positioned South of KARUPPADDAMURIPPU to be isolated from the supporting columns further South. The casualties were over 50 on this occasion with a huge haul of military hardware falling into guerilla hands including the air conditioned mobile command post (MCP) of GOC 53 division.</p> <p>The 6th Counter strike came on the 4th of December barely 3 weeks after the Jayasikurui campaign finally managed to capture PULIYANKULAM (on the 14th of November 1997). Troops broke out of PUTUR and moved towards the strategic MANKULAM junction/town. The strike took place at KANAKARAYANKULAM just North of PULIYANKULAM that led to over 140 casualties mostly of which were commandos. </p> <p>The big hallmark of each of these counterstrikes has been the extensive use of mortar/artillery fire to support the forward columns of the Tamil Tigers. The intelligence estimates suggested by 1997 the Tamil Tigers had extensive stocks of shells for 81mm and 120mm calibre mortar/artillery. The 81mm were mostly courtesy of the 32400 mortars it managed to divert from Zimbabwe Defence Industries, while the Mulativu defence complex housed over 6000 120mm shells when it was over run in 1996. This is in addition to the regular shipments it received during the same period continuing onto 2000. In addition to the vast volumes of indirect fire, the primary reason for SLA’s failure during these years has been its inability to counter/suppress such fire. One such contribution towards this inability has been the lack of sufficient platforms in SLAF’s arsenal. By the year 2000 SLAF were in possession of only 5 Kfir C2 aircraft with only two combat worthy. More effective ground attacking platforms such as the Kfir C7 and the MIG27Ms saw service within the SLAF only in July 2000. In addition to superior platforms SLAF have also been strengthening its array of available munitions particularly to target large numbers of loose formations of combatants. Prior to 2000 SLAF only used unguided low drag iron bombs and unguided rockets on such loose formations/waves which is very ineffective.</p> <p>When SLAF for the last 6 years have slowly increasing its capabilities to counter mass waves of Tamil Tigers and its support fire, so has the SLA with almost triple the amount of artillery assets and fire locating radars than it previously had during the late 1990s and early 2000. The most notable of the additional assets has been the RM-70 MBRL with its superior rate of fire it can suppress enemy fire and movement for a considerable period. The lack of any successful military campaign since the capture of EPS in early 2000 especially the battles to capture Jaffna in September 2000 and August 2006 speaks great volumes of the effectiveness of the new fire power of the Sri Lankan armed forces. </p> <p>The other dimension to the Tamil Tiger failure on such a counterattack has been its lack of leadership and SLA's pursuit of eliminating key Tamil Tiger field operatives. Not all commanders have the ability to lanch a counterattack battleplan. As much as a commander that leads an offensive into enemy territory needs to be dynamic and bold, the commander who launches the counter strike needs to be even more dynamic and even more bolder often because he himself has just suffered a defeat and he’s just got to take on an enemy that’s just won a victory and exploit a certain success that might not be eagerly apparent to him. What he needs to do is to move quickly, he needs to be fast and above all, he needs to throw caution to the wind. With the Tamil Tigers losing its premier commanders with the likes of renegade Karuna, Balraj, Charles, Thamil Chelvan etc it is unlikely that the replacements will be able to emulate and deliver the same dynamic bold feats and charisma of these late commanders.</p> <p>The Sri Lankan armed forces with its multi-pronged approach to Wanni since the liberation of the Eastern province has surely put the pressure on Tamil Tiger battleplanners to turn the tide in its favour. With no successful offensive since the year 2000 Ceaseless Waves III coming forth and with three bloody noses - twice in Jaffna (2000 and 2006), once in MUTHOOR/TRINCOMALEE in 2006 - the onus is on the Tamil Tigers to fulfil the aspirations of its ever dwindling Diaspora support base. Only time will tell...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com15tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-7724469259911876612008-06-16T21:22:00.000+05:302008-06-16T21:26:47.091+05:30Overview of the front from the men themselves<p>Major General Chandrasiri</p>      <div class="wlWriterSmartContent" id="scid:5737277B-5D6D-4f48-ABFC-DD9C333F4C5D:8d9eb719-8d04-4770-8f63-b859ddb82cbb" style="padding-right: 0px; display: inline; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; margin: 0px; padding-top: 0px"><div><embed src="http://images.video.msn.com/flash/soapbox1_1.swf" quality="high" width="432" height="364" wmode="transparent" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" pluginspage="http://macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" flashvars="c=v&v=cef6bdd6-4f95-496f-a22a-a42c77271b15&from=writer"></embed></div></div> <p></p> <p></p> <p></p> <p> </p> <p>Brigadier Gunaratna</p> <p></p>      <div class="wlWriterSmartContent" id="scid:5737277B-5D6D-4f48-ABFC-DD9C333F4C5D:75796e25-5f52-4608-8642-36984b00580c" style="padding-right: 0px; display: inline; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; margin: 0px; padding-top: 0px"><div><embed src="http://images.video.msn.com/flash/soapbox1_1.swf" quality="high" width="432" height="364" wmode="transparent" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" pluginspage="http://macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" flashvars="c=v&v=47144eff-30b3-4de0-8e3d-be80a2c0638e&from=writer"></embed></div></div> <p></p> <p> </p> <p>Brigadier Udawatta</p>      <div class="wlWriterSmartContent" id="scid:5737277B-5D6D-4f48-ABFC-DD9C333F4C5D:bf6b501b-e073-4a81-9802-b84c01ec52ad" style="padding-right: 0px; display: inline; padding-left: 0px; padding-bottom: 0px; margin: 0px; padding-top: 0px"><div><embed src="http://images.video.msn.com/flash/soapbox1_1.swf" quality="high" width="432" height="364" wmode="transparent" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" pluginspage="http://macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" flashvars="c=v&v=6ac802e1-2972-4fb3-a2db-d3e0b10554e7&from=writer"></embed></div></div> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com7tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-2980940805863715702008-05-14T01:39:00.001+05:302008-05-14T01:39:30.961+05:30The successful siege of Adampan<a href="http://lh6.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SCn1c1MNKCI/AAAAAAAAAJE/N3PhOEYU2J4/s1600-h/Mannar7copy8.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="557" alt="Mannar7 copy" src="http://lh5.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SCn1elMNKDI/AAAAAAAAAJM/hNa2IqRZBFc/Mannar7copy_thumb6.jpg?imgmax=800" width="654" border="0" /></a> <p><strong><font size="5">W</font></strong>ith Adampan under siege for over 5 months, courtesy of the 3 prongs of 58 division, it was always hard to guess for the Tamil Tigers as to which prong might take the initiative to wrest control of this all important urban area.</p> <p>The good news came courtesy of 582 brigade on Friday the 9th of May 2008, which around a week earlier made indications that it would advance along the A32 towards PAPPAMODDAI from THIRUKETHISWARAM kovil. Tamil media released a news item on how its defensive units thwarted this 'major thrust' when all the time it was one clever deceptive move by the 58 divisional battle planners.</p> <p>583 brigade which were pinned down at PALLIKULI for over 2 months made its move bypassing the town and reaching the ADAMPAN town junction via NEDUNKANDAL.The ground work for this move was laid on 22nd of March 2008 when PARAYAKULAM and ILANTHIVAN were brought under Government control.</p> <p>Meanwhile at the time of posting 581 are involved in wresting control East of the Adampan box which otherwise would leave the Eastern flank open for possible Tamil Tiger counter attack. This move also aids the now captured MADHU sanctuary area.</p> <p>As I said in my earlier brief</p> <p>With the ADAMPAN box firmly within its grasp, the SLA has the opportunity of joining the all important A32:</p> <ol> <li>From North of ADAMPAN junction via MULLIKANDAL and MINUKKAN towards PAPPAMODDAI </li> <li>From North of ANDANKULAM junction via KANNADI and PARAPPUKADANTHAN west </li> <li>From North of THIRUKETHISWARAM via PAPPAMODAI </li> </ol> <p>Whatever option SLA takes, it will not be welcome news to the Tamil Tigers. With the supply sea routes fast shrinking with its overseas arms network in close scrutiny than never before, it will attempt to defend its sea bases tooth and nail. One such base of particular interest to the SLA is VIDULAITIVU, notorious for its sea smuggling operations conducted to and from TamilNadu safe houses. Unfortunately for the Tamil Tigers this base lies in close proximity to the A32 making any siege against the sea base fall perfectly in line with SLA's long term goals.</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com52tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-53556610609561888562008-03-08T05:47:00.001+05:302008-05-14T00:38:15.145+05:30The Siege of Adampan<p><a href="http://lh5.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R9JGb7t_edI/AAAAAAAAAFc/K01RK4GnD2E/Mannar6%20copy%5B5%5D"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="Mannar6 copy" src="http://lh3.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R9JGdbt_eeI/AAAAAAAAAFk/pOYOrFOtTmE/Mannar6%20copy_thumb%5B3%5D" border="0" height="492" width="578" /></a> </p> <p><span style="font-size:180%;"><strong>A</strong></span>dampan (Attampana) village is situated in the Manthai West Assistant GA Division in the Mannar district and falls within the Mannar rice bowl hence making it a farming village. Adampan, since the advent of Eelam war I has bared the brunt of conflict between Government forces and the the Tamil Tigers in securing the coastal areas surrounding Mannar.</p> <p>Lt. Gen Kobbekaduwa during Eelam war II carried out a series of operations on the backdrop of severe threats posed to SLA bases at SILAVATHURAI, KOKKUPADAYAN. The main objective was to interdict Tiger supply lines along the Mannar coast that were smuggling much needed supplies into Wanni hideouts. Operation Tiger chase was launched as a result in the general area of ADAMPAN, ARIPPU and PARAPPAKADANTHAN areas of Mannar. This was supported by subsequent operations to clear up fleeing Tiger cadres code named Operation Brush up. This focused mainly along the A20/A14 West of VAVUNIYA.</p> <p>Since the success of General Kobbekaduwa, due to successive policy shifts brought about by successive elected governments, the areas fell to the Tamil Tigers during the period of 1991 to 1997. The same area at least the South of it came within the cross hairs of the military again only in February 1997 when Operation Edibala was launched by the 53 Division led by Brig Vasantha Perera and Brig Nanda Mallawarachchi. The aim was to capture the A14 plying from POOVARASANKULAM To MANNAR. This was a prerequisite to the lengthy Jayasikurui campaign.</p> <p>Coming onto Eelamwar IV with the loss of vast swathes of the Eastern shores, and the permanent naval blockade by the SLN along the VETTILEIKERNI - KOKKUTUDUVAI coast, the Western coast running from MANNAR to POONERYN has become the sole supply route of the Tamil Tigers. From the SLA's point of view with the MSR A9 from OMANTHAI to MUHAMALE being out of bounds, the A32 from Illupaikaduwai, Pooneryn to Jaffna across the Sangupiddy ferry runs an ideal prospect of being an alternative till the A9 is liberated from Omanthai to Muhamale. The added advantage of the A32 is unlike the A9 the A32 route needs to be defended from only one flank (East). If this is to be achieved, the Western coast becomes equally valuable to the SLA as it is to the Tamil Tigers. The third dimension is the added advantage to India. With the great majority of refugee influx originating from this same coastal belt it can seriously reduce the number of refugee influx to Tamil Nadu. The fourth added benefit is for the SLN where the shallow waters of the Mannar basin hampers its Super Dvora FACs operating, making only the lightly armoured IPC waterjets operate to interdict Tamil Tiger smuggling activities. Thus securing this coastal stretch will significantly reduce the threats posed to SLN waterjets and its personnel from superior if not swarming fleets of Sea Tigers.</p> <p>This is the backdrop for the battles for Adampan and its surroundings.</p> <p>The first major thrust took place on December 1st 2007 when MANTHAI north of ADAMPAN was captured. This came as a surprise to the Tamil Tigers stationed at ADAMPAN since they expected the thrust to come about from PALLIKULLI located South of ADAMPAN. Seeing the overall plan of SLA to circumvent ADAMPAN the Tamil Tigers launched a fierce counter attack as early as the next day to no avail. Backed by the lack of preparedness of the LTTE, 582 brigade made further inroads on the 11th of December 2007 capturing NARIKKULAM and on the 27th December, strong points of CHETTUKKULAM (9GW), close to ADAMPAN junction. Further limited operations were carried out intermittently bringing the road joining CHETTUKKULAM and THIRUKETHISWARAM under control. Currently they are holding positions just under 1Km from the ADAMPAN junction (just ahead of CHETTUKKULAM).</p> <p>The second major thrust took place South of ADAMPAN on 22nd of December 2007 when 581 brigade (10 GR) took on the UYILANKULAM road block of the Tamil Tigers. After securing the UYILANKULAM area 581 brigade troops tactically moved along the Giant's tank bund with one flank to defend. 8 GW troops of 581 Brigade reached SINNAODAIPPU sluice gates and its adjacent areas north of GIANT TANK by 28th February 2008. </p> <p>While the 581 brigade was moving North of Giant's tank troops attached to 583 brigade - 6 GW and 9 GW made their thrust towards PALLAKULLI capturing VIYATTANKULAM in the general area of VANNANKULAM on 29th of January 2008. Just a week later on the 8th of February 2008, 8 SR of 583 ensured the fall of the South of the now defunct ADAMPAN tank.</p> <p>On the back of a diversionary move by 583 brigade, troops of 581 captured the all important ANDANKULAM junction on the 4th of March 2008 bringing the UYILANKULAM-ANDANKULAM road under government control. This is of significant strategic value since the road east of the junction continues up to the Madhu church.</p> <p>With these developments 581 brigade at the time of posting are positioned under 1 Km East of ADAMPAN at MANTHOTTI and NEDUNKANDAL with a firmly secured ANDANKULAM junction while 583 brigade are stationed at the newly captured PARAPPAKANDAL town. This is roughly 1Km from ADAMPAN.</p> <p>With this status quo the next step would be 581 and 582 to initiate movements towards ADAMPAN junction, linking up in the process and completely securing the stretch of road plying from ANDANKULAM to THIRUKETHISWARAM. This also means that ADAMPAN town is 'boxed' in as the map suggests bringing the town and its vast surrounding area of the Mannar rice bowl to the hands of the military. Once the town is strangulated by the two pincers (581, 582), 583 brigade can be expected to make its entry into the town centre.</p> <p>The network of tanks and irrigation systems in this area has made paddy farming the primary source of livelihood for its inhabitants. This rice bowl also means the area is open terrain, ideal for snipers and indirect fire support. At the area North of this green belt - roughly located at the VAUNIYA-MANNAR border - jungle terrain begins. These jungles are known to continue up to the suburbs of KILINOCHCHI. With roughly 50 SqKms under its belt, once the 58 division manages to secure remaining rice bowl, it can seriously dent the Tamil Tigers' fire support brigades which long has been a nemesis for advancing troops. </p> <p>With the ADAMPAN box firmly within its grasp, the SLA has the opportunity of joining the all important A32:</p> <ol> <li>From North of ADAMPAN junction via MULLIKANDAL and MINUKKAN towards PAPPAMODDAI </li> <li>From North of ANDANKULAM junction via KANNADI and PARAPPUKADANTHAN west</li><li>From North of THIRUKETHISWARAM via PAPPAMODAI</li> </ol> <p>Whatever the option SLA takes, it will not be welcome news to the Tamil Tigers. With the supply sea routes fast shrinking with its overseas arms network in close scrutiny than never before, it will attempt to defend its sea bases tooth and nail. One such base of particular interest to the SLA is VIDULAITIVU, notorious for its sea smuggling operations conducted to and from Tamil Nadu safe houses. Unfortunately for the Tamil Tigers this base lies in close proximity to the A32 making any siege against the sea base fall perfectly in line with SLA's long term goals. </p>Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com28tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-6040694166616817252008-04-22T01:05:00.000+05:302008-04-22T01:07:43.224+05:30The mother of all debacles: 8 years since<p><strong><font size="6"></font></strong></p> <p><a href="http://lh4.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SAu0pNnAxcI/AAAAAAAAAIk/EcuFPw6WnY0/s1600-h/EPScopy7.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="449" alt="EPS copy" src="http://lh4.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SAu0rNnAxdI/AAAAAAAAAIs/V8IOl2D61Dk/EPScopy_thumb3.jpg?imgmax=800" width="795" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><strong><font size="6">E</font></strong>PS - Elephant pass, known for its impregnable defences comprising sophisticated chain linked and plexi glass, blended by natural defences fell to the offensive Tamil Tiger ceaseless waves III formations on the 21st of April 2000 exactly 8 years ago. </p> <p>EPS till 2000 remained as a permanent impregnable cork to the Tamil Tigers allowing SLA maintain supremacy over the thin neck of land. The EPS defences extended from VETTILEIKERNY and IYAKACHCHI in the North to PARANTHAN in the South and was spread well over 70 square kilometres complete with man made satellite bases with well complimented natural obstacles of lagoon and sea fronts forming a tactically sound fortification. It was home to the 54 Division. In addition over two Divisions were deployed for its defence. How formidable and tactically sound these defences were proven by the Tamil Tigers' failed attack on that area in July-August 1991, when it was under siege for nearly two months.</p> <p>The EPS defences have long been an anathema to the Tamil Tigers for it not only has denied them free access to the populous peninsula but also hindered the line of communication between the Wanni heartland and Jaffna - the focal point of the Eelam ethos. </p> <p>Even though EPS fell in April 2000, the actual assault began in December 1999 on the back of the successes of Ceaseless Waves II which completely reversed the years worth of 'successful inroads' within a matter of days beginning with ODDUSUDAN. Ceaseless Waves I was the attack on the Mullaitivu defence complex which was home to the 225 brigade. </p> <p>During the initial stages of the build up to the attack in an apparent prelude the Tamil Tigers commenced regular mortar barrages towards South Western part of the peninsula such as ARIYALAI and TANANKILAPPU. Barrages were also cued towards the Eastern sector of EPS. SFHQ-J COM also spoke of increased infiltration into the peninsula to conduct harassing fire towards convoys and check-posts.</p> <p>On December 11, 1999 the Tamil Tigers launched Ceaseless Waves III (Oyatha Alaikal) after a brief respite during its Heroes week. With human waves attempting to break through the staunch EPS defences from the South at PARANTHAN town/junction, Sea Tigers made a landing and managed to secure a beach head by the 12th extending from VETTILEIKERNI to KADDAIKADU. Since the fall of MULATIVU, VETTILEIKERNI's radar and surveillance post was the sole point that performed maritime surveillance. In addition supplies to the entire EPS sector were unloaded here. Even though troops managed to hold on, by Friday 19th, they withdrew from the PARANTHAN town, junction and adjoining areas. This was the last Southernmost area under Government control after EPS. The fall of the satellite camps at PARANTHAN ensured that the main EPS complex would come within range of guerrilla artillery and mortars.</p> <p>This brought about yet another uneasy lull to the fighting. Even though the guns were somewhat silent, the preparations for the next stage were hectic. Tamil Tigers made good use of this period to finalise their main battle plan using sand models, mock beach assaults and grid mapping (see below for example) the entire EPS area highlighting SLA strong points and breach points. Furthermore they were reinforcing the newly captured Eastern coastal belt with new trenches and bunkers supplemented with probing attacks on the Southern (just North of Paranthan Jct) and Northern (IYAKACHCHI FDL) defences.</p> <p><a href="http://lh4.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SAu0tNnAxeI/AAAAAAAAAI0/5E43s-qeBSw/s1600-h/DSC07102.jpg"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="419" alt="" src="http://lh3.ggpht.com/sierraekofoxtrot/SAu0u9nAxfI/AAAAAAAAAI8/sTVDhhuDsL8/DSC07102_thumb.jpg?imgmax=800" width="627" border="0" /></a> </p> <p><strong><em><font size="2">An example of a field map of the Tamil Tigers encompassing the MUHAMALE-KILALY-NAGARKOVIL axis. This was found in a pocket of the corpse of a self styled 'Lieutenant' during the failed 2006 Jaffna offensive.</font></em></strong></p> <p>After bracing themselves for the inevitable - the final push towards EPS commenced during the early hours of 26th March 2000 when Sea Tiger units made a landing at NAGARKOVIL, thus extending the beach head from NAGARKOVIL to KADDAIKADU. Once this was secured they made a diversionary thrust using one of their companies North and North West towards KODIKAMAM and MANALKADU. While the diversion was taking place, the remaining companies breached the VATHIRAYAN box from the North and the South (cadres led by Theepan who moved North astride the coastal road passing the CHUNDIKULAM sanctuary from VETTILEIKERNI) capturing CHEMPIANPATTU, MULLIYAN, MARUTHANKERNY making troops withdraw further inland. By doing so the Tamil Tigers had <strong>created</strong> a flank East to the EPS defences.</p> <p>With the coastal belt from NAGARKOVIL to KADDAIKAU fully secure, 3 more companies amounting over 1200 cadres led by Balraj moved along this coast from South and crossed the narrow lagoon just North of MARUTHANKERNY and began intercepting convoys plying along the A9 MSR. By 6th April Balraj and his men had succeeded their mission objective by capturing and holding onto a 4Km stretch of the A9 from MUHAMALE to PALLAI. They blew up a bridge at KATTIARATAN in the process.</p> <p>The operations command with this development were made to re-route the MSR along the dirt tracks via KACHCHAI, ALIPALLAI towards CHAVAKACHCHERI. However, this route proved hazardous since the soft sandy earth at some points along this route did not support wheeled vehicles and made them break down on the way. In addition it came under constant mortar bombardment from the cadres stationed along the A9 and from beached units launched from the PARANTHAN coast.</p> <p>Even though a counter attack by the CLI and Airmobile Brigade succeeded in re-capturing a 1Km stretch of the MSR, Tamil Tigers pressed on Northwards towards ELUTHMADUWAL, MIRUSUVIL and KODIKAMAM. This was despite Balraj's men running the risk of being boxed in at one stage. By doing so the Tamil Tigers ensured that level 1 reinforcement critically needed to reinforce EPS defences will have to deal with Balraj first before getting to EPS. Waiting in the wings, uncommitted, was Karuna and his men said to be over 1000 strong positioned South of EPS at PARANTHAN and MURASUMODDAI.</p> <p>After a 2 day lull during the festive season, the Tamil Tigers made their final thrust. It originated from the Eastern flank - VATHIRAYAN. The thrust came from 3 prongs. Reinforcements were reduced only to a trickle by this stage and the fighting further North forced troops to move further inland. With the EPS defences fast dissipating Karuna made the final move by committing his reserve troops to overrun the complex. By 21st April 2000 troops were ordered to abandon the base and withdrew deploying itself in delaying positions.</p> <p>Its been 8 years since this heart breaking debacle where many a dedicated officers and men laid their blood and soul in defence of this all important base. Since then with utmost dedication and patience SLA have turned the tables on the Tamil Tigers and are conducting frequent probing attacks on the very same defences that were breached. This is a portend of events yet to unfold.</p> <p>Only time will tell...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com27tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-41163666015708899422008-04-03T04:26:00.000+05:302008-04-16T02:18:18.754+05:30Flank attack: Hit the enemy where it least expects you to<p><a href="http://lh6.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R_QRrOblBkI/AAAAAAAAAIE/PsijxHcGPPo/Desert%20Storm.jpg"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="Desert Storm" src="http://lh6.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R_QRsOblBlI/AAAAAAAAAIM/op5NbVFnDrs/Desert%20Storm_thumb.jpg" border="0" height="412" width="555" /></a> </p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;"><strong><em>A classic flank attack: Operation Desert Storm 1991</em></strong></span></p> <p><span style="font-size:6;"><strong>F</strong></span>lank attack - going around the side of the enemy instead of taking him head on is one of the most basic of manoeuvres. The ultimate goal is encirclement - sealing off and destroying the enemy. </p> <p>In the modern theatre of battle where casualties run in hand in hand with the political will and stamina to continue combat, flank attack is ideal since it allows the commander to appear where the enemy least expect you to. The idea is not to hit the enemy head on but hit him in the side where he might be weak. If a formation comes from the front towards 100 men, all 100 can shoot at it, but if it comes from the side and if the defence line is only 3 deep, then only 3 can shoot at the incoming formation. Hence it can literally roll down the flank and crush the defender 3 at a time.</p> <p>One of the classic flanking manoeuvres to take place was operation Desert Storm in 1991 where the allied coalition were pitted against Saddam's forces in Kuwait.</p> <p>Norman Schwarzkopf - the supreme commander of the allied forces - at first prepares a head on assault from Saudi Arabia into Kuwait to drive the Iraqis out. But his battle planners urged him to reconsider pointing out the open flank to the west to exploit it. Intelligence also suggested that Saddam had a massive well equipped army dug into defensive positions all along the Kuwaiti border. Further to add such a head on assault with the 4th largest army of the world at the time was just the amount of casualties Schwarzkopf wanted to avoid with the Vietnam war syndrome firmly at the back of his mind. </p> <p>To avoid hitting the well entrenched Iraqis head on, he and his battle planners decided that the main thrust would be toward Saddam's western flank 150 miles deep inside Iraq. With this in mind he begins his force build up in such a way that the build up would lead the Iraqis to believe the main thrust would be from South of the Kuwaiti border. Reports were deliberately leaked to the media to deceive the Iraqis that Schwarzkopf's Rules of Engagement (ROE) limited him to fight only within Kuwait and not in Iraq itself. Further as part of the concealment ops in November 1990 "Exercise Imminent Thunder" - a major amphibious assault landing exercise - by the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is conducted South of the border. Naval units bombard the Kuwaiti coast and mine sweeping takes place. As further concealment, a base/FARP just 25 miles South of the Kuwaiti border is built. An ammo dump at Gravel Plains adjacent to the Kuwaiti border is also stationed. This made it easier to hide the main heavy attack units - the US 7th core and British armoured 1st division - in the desert West of the perceived main thrust. Like the fake radio messages to convince the Germans that an army existed in Kent in England before the D-day landings deception experts flood the air waves with with radio to convince Saddam that key units are still in original start positions along the Kuwaiti border. Furthermore trucks are driven to start positions in the East as a decoy while the real logistics for the main thrust move at night camouflaging themselves at day covering their tracks in the open desert. </p> <p>During the final approach to D-day Schwarzkopf began his air campaign. Under this air cover Schwarzkopf moved his 7th core 150 miles west and 18th airborne core west to the 7th core. Then he launches his ground attack. First the southern assault backed by a faint amphibious assault on the Kuwaiti border. Meanwhile the 18th swept across Saddam's flank in the far west and cut off Iraqi supply lines. Then the tanks of 7th core and the British penetrated the Iraqi defences west of the Kuwaiti border conducting the "Hail Mary Pass" to trap Iraqis in Kuwait in one giant pincer movement.</p> <p>While initiating a frontal assault from Kuwait pinning Iraqi forces in Kuwait and luring in more reinforcement into Kuwait, his flank attack will prevent reinforcement (after Iraqi reinforcements are in Kuwait), seal off escape routes, encircle them and destroy Saddam's army once and for all. Timing on giving the green light for the flank attack was crucial. As turned out, his frontal attack which was part of the concealment, was too successful and drove Iraqis out of Kuwait too quickly that his flank attack did not have enough time to <strong>completely</strong> seal off their escape. The success of the flanking manoeuvre meant that Saddam who earlier promised the "mother of all battles" was forced to perform the "mother of all retreats" as then Secretary of Defence Dick Cheyney elegantly put in.</p> <p><strong><span style="font-size:130%;">The Sri Lankan example:</span></strong></p> <p><a href="http://lh3.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R_QRteblBmI/AAAAAAAAAIU/fvT38ZVpBCo/Vakarai%20copy%5B6%5D.jpg"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="Vakarai copy" src="http://lh3.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R_QRueblBnI/AAAAAAAAAIc/wGe0YUk6ruw/Vakarai%20copy_thumb%5B4%5D.jpg" border="0" height="478" width="548" /></a></p> <p>Coming onto the Sri Lankan theatre a classic flank attack was the liberation of VAKARAI (Viharaya) and subsequently the entire four-six sector comprising VAKARAI, KATHIRAVELI and VERUGAL.</p> <p>After the successful completion of the SAMPOOR campaign, the Tamil Tigers were pushed South of the Verugal river. </p> <p>Unlike Schwarzkopf who enjoyed a free open Western flank through the Iraqi desert the 23 Division commanders did NOT have a clear flank to exploit. The tiger defences were up to 3 lines deep South of the PANICHCHANKERNI bridge. Hence the initial battle plan was to <strong>create</strong> a flank involving the thin neck of land protruding East of the four-six sector mainland - that is the narrow stretch of land running up to CHALLITIVU bordering the Upparu lagoon.</p> <p>On 16th of January 2007 (D-day) troops broke out from KADJUWATTA and by 18th January succeeded in breaking the second line of defence and by the same day evening the 3rd line of defence as South of PANICHCHANKERNI falls to the troops. With these rapid gains in hand 23 division builds up troops, artillery and armour South of the PANICHCHANKERNI bridge hinting that an imminent thrust was about to take place across the bridge. This was further strengthened by heavy volumes of artillery/MBRL fire towards the North bank defences of the Tamil Tigers and engineering units' persistent attempts to diffuse the explosives set along the bridge under the cover of artillery fire.</p> <p>With this heavy build up of a superior force on the Southern bank, what the Tamil Tigers failed to realise was the fact that 23 division had <strong>created</strong> a flank East of their defences with the capture of the 3 defence lines they held a few days ago at PANICHCHANKERNI. The flanking attack spear headed by the Special forces commence across the narrow UPPARU lagoon backed by Special infantry and captured the VAKARAI town and hospital by 19th January 2007 (D+3). This caught the Tamil Tigers who were awaiting the main thrust from South unawares. The main thrust was so successful that the Tamil Tigers had no time to muster any counter attack and were in full retreat towards the TRICONAMDU jungles West of VAKARAI and THOPPIGALA. The rapid retreat of the Tamil Tigers who had fortified positions caught the battle planners by surprise, that troops (7GW, 6VIR) converging in to close the gap at TRICONAMADU failed to do so in time. Had the guerillas offered resistance and then retreated along the same jungle terrain, this may have given troops ample time to position themselves to intercept the fleeing guerilla cadres.</p> <p>This VAKARAI battle also highlights the success of the transition of attritional guerilla warfare to a full blown conventional one. For nearly three months since October 2006, 23 division backed by Special forces conducted a series of raiding operations laying the groundwork for the final assault. The timing of the transition was crucial in this instance. The importance of the timing of the transition from guerilla warfare to a conventional one was amply demonstrated on 6th October 2006 when troops broke out from KADJUWATTA with the same four-six sector as their objective. The conventional tactics of the operation failed giving the Tamil Tiger media <a href="http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=19837" target="_blank">bread and butter</a> that lasted for weeks.</p> <p>As long as modern warfare presents with a well entrenched enemy, a battle planner will always consider to build up his force, conceal the main thrust, attack from the flank and finally encircle his enemy minimising his own casualties for public opinion will not allow for a nation's troops be thrown head on against a well entrenched enemy.</p>Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com19tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-66371040280830669702008-03-20T05:44:00.001+05:302008-03-20T19:22:21.584+05:30A move on Pooneryn? Assault from the sea?<p>Pooneryn defence complex until November 1993 overlooked the Jaffna/Kilaly lagoon and proved to be the nemesis for Tamil Tigers' free movement/logistics activities. It also proved to be a hindrance for Tamil Tiger radio traffic between Wanni mainland and the Jaffna peninsula which, barring the PALAY/KKS HSZ, was under complete control of the Tamil Tigers. This was the primary reason for Operation Thavalai (frog) to take place to overwhelm this isolated defence complex. The secondary reason was to use the same T-59I 130mm howitzers the SLA used to shell the Tamil Tiger dominated Jaffna peninsula, for their own targets, i.e PALALY/KKS HSZ and any other target that falls within in its range spectrum.</p> <p>Since the fall of the base the Tamil Tigers have put this sector to good use. The POONERYN sector has been used as a crucial launching pad for its sea tigers during its many assaults on Jaffna islets and during its failed Jaffna offensive of 2006. It is also being used as pointed out above to disrupt air traffic of PALAY base and for possible decapitation strikes against SLA top brass. </p> <p>Out of these, intermittent shelling disrupting the vital air bridge and possible decapitation strikes against military top rungs are the main concerns springing from this sector for the SLA. There is much debate over over how to neutralise the howitzers in this sector especially among the lay public.</p> <p><strong>The first option</strong> is to use air recon and vector in the Kfir/MIG27 for air interdiction. During the Tamil Tigers' failed 2006 Jaffna offensive, heavy 130mm barrages were directed at the PALAY and KKS bases to cut off the air and naval bridge linking the Jaffna peninsula to the Southern mainland. During this period an AN32B transporter was used as bait to lure the Tamil Tigers to fire the two 130mm howitzers positioned at K-point while Beech B200T SIGINT was on a recon mission loitering above. Soon as the firing began the Beech picked up the heat signature through its FLIR sensors. Two Kfirs were scrambled on the 19th of August 2006 and successfully destroyed the two howitzers. Since this strike the Tamil Tigers have used their remaining howitzers sparingly and intermittently using a network of underground bunkers/tunnels to avoid detection. This is quite a similar tactic employed by Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi's Japanese during its siege of Iwo Jima during WWII. It was Iwo Jima that Japanese heavy artillery were concealed in massive chambers reinforced by steel doors built inside Mount Suribachi, to keep off projectiles from American bombardment.</p> <p><strong>The second option</strong> is to occupy the land and push back/capture the howitzers putting PALAY /KKS beyond its 27Km range. With troops currently operating in and around the Mannar rice bowl 54Kms South, the sole option for occupying the land is to insert troops in via the sea or air. With the POONERYN sector's geography being a mirror of the MUHAMALE/NAGARKOVIL/PALLAI sector the same reasons I explained earlier on <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/02/should-sla-make-move-on-eps.html" target="_blank">should SLA make a move on EPS</a> applies here. </p> <p>The land again is open and barren with little or no cover for any troops that would have landed in attempting to secure the beach head. The open stretch of land further necessitates the need for the armoured cavalry, which again needs to be brought in from mechanized landers. For it to be successful at least 100 such units are necessary and the deployment has to be in real quick time (Bear in mind that landing crafts of SLN can achieve only a max of 20 knots) to drive home the element of surprise and to ensure the beach head remains out of Tamil Tiger mortar range. Also worth to note is that the Tamil Tigers had positioned cadres loyal to its former political head specifically to defend this sector. Which means one should expect significant amount of defence along this coast making the need for armour ever more important since it involves breaking a fortified line.</p> <p>However, what can be done is to reduce the defence in depth the Tamil Tigers possess in this sector. A small example:</p> <p>The independent brigade led by late Brigadier (then Colonel) Percy Fernando landing at the Eastern coast of Jaffna to capture the jetty during Riviresa II. This landing took place while 532 brigade was moving from the ground towards Jaffna East and Air Mobile brigade had landed to secure the Jaffna fort. In this instance the Tamil Tigers were deprived the defence in depth for the simple fact that their defences was thinned out and just weren’t able to muster any anti-amphibious defences. </p> <p>It is very easy to fall into the trap when planning an assault from sea. It is not just a case of getting troops to a coastal belt but also getting the troops to cross the shoreline and enter the hinterland. It is no good performing an assault via sea merely based on maritime supremacy. You need to break out and achieve the overall objective that led to the assault in the first place. </p> <p>The battle planners must be 100% certain why the landing is being undertaken and what the immediate aims are. They must know what troops will face, not just enemy's strengths and possible reinforcements, but also the terrain of the target area and local factors such as tides, beach conditions and mud flats which might impact on the landings. The importance of such intelligence was magnified during the successful landing of Incheon during the Korean war when "Trudy Jackson" led by Eugene Clark relayed detailed intelligence on enemy defences, sea tide ranges, whether the beach could hold assault vehicles back to General Macarthur. On the other end stands the battle of Dieppe where the lack of intelligence led to the allied armour being stuck on the soft pebbled beach.  </p> <p><a href="http://lh6.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R-JpmublBjI/AAAAAAAAAHs/Ajaxs5tKARs/Beach1%5B4%5D"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="404" alt="Beach1" src="http://lh5.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R-GsWublBeI/AAAAAAAAAH0/d2CGXCGthh0/Beach1_thumb%5B3%5D" width="333" border="0" /></a></p> <p><strong><em><font size="3">After having sufficient intelligence the landing takes place followed by the lodgement phase to secure the beach head for swift reinforcements and supplies.</font></em></strong></p> <p>Once the intelligence is in place they must consider the approach to the target beach head. The sea crossing could be just a few miles from surrounding islets or all the way from KKS with full naval supremacy in place. Prior to the landing the enemy defence must be softened up and breached. Troops must have the right equipment to proceed from sea to land while under fire. Subsequent to the landing lodgement phase begins to secure the beach head against counter attack and to ensure vital reinforcements and supplies start flowing swiftly and smoothly. Finally the troops must break out from the beach head and begin the next stage of the overall battleplan. It is critical to remember that assault from sea is rarely a battleplan just in itself. It is intended to be part of a larger military campaign.</p> <p><a href="http://lh4.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R-GsXeblBfI/AAAAAAAAAH4/k53ek5S9Rbc/beach2%5B3%5D"><img style="border-top-width: 0px; border-left-width: 0px; border-bottom-width: 0px; border-right-width: 0px" height="412" alt="beach2" src="http://lh6.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R-GsX-blBgI/AAAAAAAAAH8/etxqwCo3K5E/beach2_thumb%5B2%5D" width="335" border="0" /></a></p> <p><strong><em><font size="3">Soon after lodgement troops need to break out to move to the next stage of the battleplan to avoid being pinned down.</font></em></strong></p> <p>To conclude, the failed operation Thrivida Pahara to relieve a besieged MULATIVU base in July 1996 can be brought up to show the importance of achieving the aforementioned objectives during a coastal assault battleplan. A coastal assault was the only way to reinforce the besieged base since it lies in close proximity to the shoreline. Special forces were airlifted from Trincomalee under the leadership of Lt. Col Fazly Laphir to secure a suitable beach head for troops that were just dispatched from KKS. These troops were also carrying vital supplies and were 20 miles away from the target shoreline. Due to heavy guerilla resistance the Special forces team were forced to make a landing 5Km South of MULATIVU at ALAMPIL. From there the team had to track North amidst heavy resistance. The all important naval supremacy for the reinforcing troops failed to exist due to Tamil Tiger sea wing and its homicide wing. One of the homicide boats managed to ram itself against the Shanghai class FGB SLNS Ranaviru killing 36 sailors on board. Due to heavy resistance the naval task force managed their landing only 3 days later and reached the base 7 days later since the raid, which by then the time frame to achieve the overall objective - relieving the siege on MULATIVU with vital supplies - had long gone. </p> <p>Like General Macarthur General Holland Smith, and Lt. Gen Kobbekaduwa (Operation Balavegaya), get the tricky coastal assault right and you secure a stepping stone to ultimate victory. Get it wrong and you achieve massive loss of life, political and military disaster.</p> <p>This is by no means to say the Pooneryn sector is not earmarked. The A32 is a very good prospect and is ideal as a MSR from ILLUPAIKADUWAI, POONERYN to Jaffna across the Sangupiddy ferry till the A9 is liberated from OMANTHAI to MUHAMALE. Unlike the A9 the A32 route needs to be defended from only one flank (East), which is a major advantage. </p> <p>Only time will tell...</p> Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com26tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-74908068969144319652008-02-06T06:16:00.001+05:302008-03-15T08:25:50.806+05:30Should SLA make a move on EPS?<p> </p> <p><a href="http://lh5.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R6kDYXXGysI/AAAAAAAAACc/TesMUSjAz7g/map_admin_kilinochchi28"></a></p> <p><a href="http://lh5.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R6kDZXXGytI/AAAAAAAAACk/Fuca0qEDSCM/map-admin-jaffna%5B5%5D"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="map-admin-jaffna" src="http://lh5.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R6kDaXXGyuI/AAAAAAAAACs/QG_TUHHLcaw/map-admin-jaffna_thumb%5B3%5D" border="0" height="295" width="545" /></a> </p> <p> </p> <p></p> <p><b></b></p> <span style="font-size:180%;"><strong>E</strong></span>PS - Elephant pass, known for its impregnable defences comprising sophisticated chain linked plexi glass blended by natural defences fell to the offensive LTTE ceaseless waves III formations on the 21st of April 2000. Since then Tamil Tigers have flooded into the Jaffna peninsula. <p></p> <p>EPS till 2000 remained as a permamnent impregnable cork to the Tamil Tigers alowing SLA maintain supremacy over the thin neck of land dominating all land communications between the LTTE's Wanni bases and Jaffna. The EPS defences extended from Vettilaikerny and Iyakachchi in the North to Paranthan in the South and was spread well over 70 square kilometres complete with man made satellite bases with well complimented natural obstacles of lagoon and sea fronts forming a tactically complementary fortification. It was home to the 54 Division. In addition over two Divisions were deployed for its defence. How formidable and tactically sound these defences were established by the LTTE's failed attack on that area in July-August, 1991, when it was under siege for nearly two months.</p> <p>It still stood tall to wave after wave of tamil tiger cadres during the initial thrusts of ceaseless wave III until the MSR was cut off from Muhamale to Pallai. Although the base fell on April the initial assault on EPS began as early as November 1999. If the guerillas took on EPS in 1991 in a conventional style operation, ceaseless wave III saw EPS being cut off its MSR prior to commencement of the full frontal assault.</p> <p>Because it secured the gateway to Jaffna - the cultural centre of the Eelam ethos, the victory of Elephant Pass is considered as the greatest victory ever in the history of LTTE in its struggle for the separate homeland, Tamil Eeelam. With the fall it gave the LTTE's sea arm - the sea tigers unprecedented access to the coast spanning from Kokkutuduvai to Vettileikerni that facilitated them a greater capability of offshore movement to sustain maritime operations and logistics.</p> <p>With the reversal of fortunes on the back of a revamped strategy there is much demand from the gung-ho Sri Lankan lay camp for a forward march towards EPS and bring the famed base back to its former glory. With just over 2 months away for the 8th year since the fall of EPS, with the current theatre of operations in mind; how feasible is it to march, hold captured ground and rebuild the formidable fortifications? Most of all, by doing so what strategic advantage would it bring to SLA?</p> <p>Kilaly - Muhamale - Nagarkovil axis since 2001 has been the 'national front' or the new EPS of the security forces. The defences constructed along this axis is pretty much similar if not stronger compared to the defences existed at EPS. </p> <p>With the advent of the divisions 57, 58 and 59 based at Southern Wanni the SLA have managed to put pressure on the LTTE's southern front spanning from the Mannar rice bowl from West towards Kokkutuvai in the east.</p> <p>The aim of continued marauding raids from the North and subsequent return to original lines means that it deprives the LTTE a much needed stable launching pad if the need arises to storm the Northern defences in a bid to capture Jaffna. </p> <p>In August 2006 saw one of the bloodiest, fiercest multi-pronged fighting courtesy of the LTTE - code named ceaseless waves IV. It began with the LTTE concentrating on assault landings on Jaffna islets thereby using those as springboards to land at the coast of Jaffna thus flanking the Jaffna defences. At the same time another assault group was deployed to outflank the SLA defences of Muhamale and Eluthmaduval by assault landing at Kilaly.</p> <p>For such a large scale operation the LTTE requires massive man power as well as large stocks of ammunition, especially indirect fire ammunition. This is something the LTTE are not enjoying at present. Thanks to marauding small scale group attacks the LTTE are pinned down all the way from Mannar to Welioya. Likewise by creating an ever hostile environment from the Northern front the SLA has managed to pin down the LTTE's Northern formations in a defensive posture. This is always welcome news for the Jaffna command. Ever since the dawn of Eelam wars, this defensive posture of LTTE is something the SLA has never enjoyed.</p> <p>Unlike in the East and Southern Wanni, the Northern FDLs are fixed with each facing the other across a no man's land. This makes it a conventional FDL. If the SLA are to move ahead of their FDLs as they did on the 29th of January aiming to hold ground and subsequently march towards EPS, they need to negate the indirect fire threat positioned along the Pooneryn-Paranthan axis. One needs to bear in mind that the LTTE does not require its long range 130mm type 59 howitzers to target the area spanning from Muhamale to EPS. All it needs are its 120mm heavy arti mortars. One shell landing in close proximity to troops can account for 8-10 deaths. Hence to account for 100+ casualties all it takes is a dozen of such rounds. SLA have learnt their lesson the hard way especially on October 11th 2006. In my opinion before such a ambitious operation takes place SLAF and SLA's artillery batteries needs to neutralise these indirect fire support of the Tamil tigers more than anything else. Given the fact that the lTTE has in possession over 100 of such T-86 120mm mortar guns and their past successes of the shoot and scoot manoeuvre, relying on neutralising such fire for the forward march is tactically unsound. </p> <p>The other reason as to why it is hard for such a forward march is the fact that this sector is flat open land which provides no cover to advancing troops. The land is so barren that only small ground hugging twigs and isolated palmyrah trees grow. This makes conventional warfare the only tactic available for the men of 55/53 divisions. The highly successful unorthodox 8 man guerilla team tactics are suicidal on such barren open land. They can easily fall prey to ever so vigilant LTTE spotters (thereby mortars), snipers and booby traps. The thin isthmus of land also means that the tigers can employ bottle neck tactics where superiority by numbers does not account for anything. Even if SLA manages to dislodge the tamil Tigers from their first FDL (as they did on October 11 2006) they have to prepare themselves for the impending counter attack with little or no defensive cover making the hunter become the hunted. By opening up one single front allows the LTTE's artillery/mortar units to cue its fire power on one area. The conventional tactics the SLA are forced to employ also means that this area is expected to hold a large concentration (troops/ground area ratio) of infantry men. Hence even if the Tiger mortar/artillery lacks proper accuracy it can still cause considerable amount of splash damage casualties thus stalling the forward thrust. This makes the front line armour run the risk of being isolated by the supporting columns. Moreover even if the forward thrust was successful in securing EPS, the thrust will have to continue up to at least Paranthan as part of its former impregnable defences in order to take out LTTE mortar units out of range.</p> <p>This is the reason why an assault landing brought about rich dividends to both warring parties - first to Lt. gen Kobbakaduwa in 1991 and last to Balraj and his fighting formation who landed successfully at the Vettileikerni corridor (Part of the Vathirayan box) outflanking the enemy defences. Unless a similar feat could be pulled off, the EPS base will remain elusive for the SLA for years to come. Only time will tell...</p>Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com10tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8529559593869860314.post-23161110956040108032008-02-17T22:24:00.001+05:302008-02-18T00:24:05.718+05:30The story of Thambimuththus (SAMs)<p><a href="http://lh4.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmbwCAqqI/AAAAAAAAADA/E-3Vhk3kxCY/AntiAirCraftMissile_46"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="Anti-Air-Craft-Missile_4" src="http://lh4.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmdwCAqrI/AAAAAAAAADI/rNGzoRz7Z_4/AntiAirCraftMissile_4_thumb4" border="0" height="331" width="441" /></a> </p> <p><strong><em>The SA-14 GREMLIN unearthed from the environs of THOPPIGALA. The system consists of the 9P59 gripstock, 9P51 thermal battery/gas reservoir, and 9M36-1 missile.</em></strong></p> <p>Thambimuththu - Sam Thambimuththu was a Sri Lankan MP from the Batticaloa district. Like may other moderate Tamil Leaders he too fell victim to a Tamil Tiger assassin while on his way to the Canadian embassy at Gregory Place on the 19th June 1990. This is no biography of the late TULF parliamentarian, but his first name SAM, which in military acronym means Surface to Air Missile. The Tamil Tigers since acquiring a batch of SA-7 from the Pakistani Inter Services Agency (ISI) code worded their armament as Thambimuththu. The name of one popular Tamil Moderate was desecrated as such with one of the most deadliest weapons the Red Army in Afghanistan and our own SLAF experience during the early 1990s.</p> <p>The desire of the Tamil Tigers for SAM capability existed as early as 1986. During "Operation Tiger" led by Tamilnadu DIG intelligence K. Mohandas, the Tamil nadu police captured SAMs, AK-47, rocket launchers and pistols. According to Tamil Nadu sources as many as ten LTTE cadres undertook training of SA-7 in an undisclosed location in Uttar Pradesh. This group was said to be led by a Pulendran, who later committed suicide at the Palaly base in 1987. When the IPKF landed in Sri Lanka as per the Indo-Lanka agreement there are two accounts of SAMs being used against IPKF gunships. Neither was successful. This is in addition to a captured SA-7 from the ceiling of a school teacher by the IPKF. </p> <p>Since the 1980s the LTTE SAM threat rose to its height commencing Eelam war III, when within the span of two days it downed two HS748 Avro transports in April 1995. During Eelam war III the Tamil Tigers managed to down 9 SLAF aircraft, 5 of which were MI24 gunships. To bring down these aircrafts the Tigers used a mixture of SA-7, SA-14 and FIM 92A Stinger variants. In addition to these successful hits, the Tamil Tigers have also fired at least 5 more stingers and a SA-14 at Kfir (2x), AN-32 (1x) and MIG27 floggers (3x) without success between 1998-2001. To date according to available information the LTTE have used SA-7, HN-5, SA-14 and FIM92A for its operations against the SLAF.</p> <p>The SA-7 MANPADs were acquired through the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) in 1994. The Tamil Tigers using its network of vessels aided the ISI run Pakistani terror organisation Harkat-ul-Mujahideen to ship at least two shiploads of arms to the Philipino terror group Moro Islamic Liberation Front. In return the ISI provided the LTTE the much needed SA-7 in addition to AA guns and ammunition as the shipping fee. In 1998 the LTTE acquired a second batch of SA-7 and its Chinese equivalents HN-5 from blackmarket sales in Cambodia. The source of the SA-14s was a Belgian blackmarket arms dealer operating from Bulgaria who diverted a transfer from North Korea to Vietnam and records indicate the transfer taking place in 1998. The FIM92A Stingers were obtained from a Kurdish Guerilla (Kurdistan Workers' party PKK) source in Germany in 1997. These were originally meant for Iraqi forces led by the then President Saddam Hussein courtesy of CIA.</p> <p>So what made an organisation who used to have access to MANPAD systems with such ease during the mid to late 1990s, to lose free access to the much needed SLAF deterrent?</p> <p>It comes in the form of the two golden options in MANPAD defense</p> <p>1. The defensive option - Protecting the target</p> <p>2. The proactive option - Controlling MANPAD prolliferation</p> <ul> <li><strong><span style="font-size:130%;">The defensive option - Protecting the target</span></strong> </li> </ul> <p>Eelam war III saw SLAF lose 5 Gunships, all of which were equipped with the Sirena 3M warning system. This is a system that functioned independently to the IR jammer and the ASO-2V flare dispensers, thus the pilot had to activate the IR jammer and the flare dispenser upon receiving warning by the Sirena 3M antennae. Even though this system with a lot of deficiencies were installed in MI24s, the MI17 fleet were installed the IAI/flightguard systems as early as 1997. The worth of this automated system was proven in a SAM encounter on the 10th of November 1997. A formation of SLAF helicopters was fired by a salvo of five SA-14 SAMs. The three Mi-17s in the 'pack' were fitted with flight guard, and escaped unscathed saving 90 troops and 12 crew. But the escorting Mi-24 (CH619) with Sq Ldr. Thilina Kaluarachchi and F/O Dhanesh Gunasekara onboard had the Sirena 3M system. The pilot was late in activating the Hotbrick jammer and releasing the flares. Even though F/O Dhanesh made it out unscathed from the wreckage (crashed onto water), he stayed behind to save his 'guru' Kaluarachchi who was sinking fast with the wreck. Unfortunately he didn't make it and sacrificed his own life in that endure. </p> <p>Now however, all MI24/35/17s of SLAF are equipped with the flight guard system. And the results are quite notable. All LTTE missiles fired at SLAF aircraft fitted with the Flight Guard system have failed to inflict damage.<br /></p> <p>In addition to electronic countermeasures SLAF has also made modifications to overall flying tactics to negate the Tamil Tiger AA capability. Thus far using MANPADs the LTTE have managed to bring down only SLAF transports and MI24s. The LTTE is yet to bring down any SLAF Mig-27 or Kfir fighters. MANPADs nowdays are highly ineffective against low level fast jets. Even without proper counter measures in place the hit probability is around 40%. Even if we consider the Afghan conflict which brought MANPADs to notoriety, the Mujahideen only managed to bring down only MI24 gunships and Su25 Frogfoots. The same MIG27 active with the SLAF was at full swing during the Afghan conflict and the Mujahideen failed to bring a single MIG27 down with its MANPADs.</p> <ul> <li><strong><span style="font-size:130%;">The proactive option - Controlling MANPAD prolliferation</span></strong> </li> </ul> <p>Mombasa - November 2002 was an important milestone in the history of MANPADs. An Israeli Airlines Boeing 757 was fired by Al-Qaeda operatives using 2 SA-7 missiles during take off narrowly missing it. The weapons used in the November 2002 Mombasa attack were Soviet-era SA-7s produced at the VA Degtyarev Plant in Kovrov, Russia, in 1978. While the launchers were produced in Russia, the missiles used were produced in Bulgaria in 1993 and sold as part of a larger consignment to Yemen in 1994. From Yemen, the missiles made its way either directly to Somalia, by a Mogadishu arms dealer in early 2002, or as part of three consignments from the Eritrean government to a Somali faction led by Hussein Aideed in 1998. This single event led to the stringent measures that are present today to control MANPAD proliferation among non-state violent actors. </p> <p>Tracking the proliferation of MANPADs is a difficult endeavour. The black market is the primary source for these weapons. Unlike state-to-state transfers, usually documented and visible, the illicit black market MANPAD trade defies accurate tracking. The lightness and compact size of MANPADS make them highly portable on the battlefield, but this quality also makes them extremely easy to transfer illegally and discreetly within and between states. The SA-7, for instance, weighs around 14kg (missile tube and launcher)—far less than most heavy machine guns—and is only 1.49m in length. A weapon of this size fits easily into the boot of a car, into a golf bag, or within bundles of produce small enough to be carried on the back of a person or animal. Perhaps because of this, most illicit transfers have become known only after a weapon has been used against an aircraft with eye witness accounts, distress calls or recovery of a used launcher or fragments from expended missiles. An example from the Sri lankan conflict being the shooting down of CR834 HS748 Avro on the 29th of April 1995. On board was the younger brother of current Air chief Air Marshall Roshan Goonathilaka - Air commodore Shirantha Goonathilaka. The last minute frantic calls by the crew "missile, missile" shed the first light that the Tamil Tigers had indeed laid their hands on MANPADs. This also solved the mystery on the loss of a similar HS 748 the previous day.</p> <p>The USA while pursuing its very own MANPADs which were supplied to non-state actors (i.e. Mujahideen, PKK, Angola's UNITA) in return for a bounty as much as 80000-150000 USD, it still has failed to make the numbers match. Following this, as a response to the loss of a number of Stingers, the US established bilateral regulations forcing recipients of US MANPADS to accept rigorous controls over any MANPADS that were purchased from the US. Recipients were required to provide proof they had received the missiles and to submit to periodic inspections to verify their status. In addition, the Stinger Project Group (SPG) was set up to administer joint procurement of MANPADS for selected NATO countries. The Project established strict conditions whereby group members were permitted to export Stingers only to SPG countries. Both of these US-led measures centred on reducing the potential for MANPADS technology to fall into the hands of potential enemies of the United States for example Iran where it is believed some Stingers were ended up.</p> <p>In Russia, the threat from MANPADS took a different form, but has been no less influential on policy-making. Kremlin's concerns stems from the repeated use of SA-18s and similar second generation weapons to down Russian aircraft in Chechnya. In November 2002, Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov urged the CIS and Baltic states to halt the flow of IGLA (SA-14/16/18) missiles to the region. Initially there was strong disagreement on the proposal for mutual notification of transfers of former Soviet missiles, apparently due to commercial concerns. However, pressure from Moscow prevailed. In addition to its own concerns the Kremlin also faced pressure from both Israel and the US. Israel long feared MANPADS could end up in the hands of Hezbollah, and this prompted Moscow to terminate a deal which would have supplied Syria with SA-18s.</p> <p>These measures were put forward to a much wider audience in the form of the 33-state Wassenaar Arrangement, G-8 summit and Bangkok's APEC summit where the participants agreeing that they would, in future, require end-user certification for all MANPADS exports and prohibit re-transfers to third parties without prior consent.</p> <p>All these developments have been key in keeping a tight lid over the movement of Soviet (SA-14/16/18), American FIM-92B/C/D, and other more advanced second and third generation MANPADs. However, the same cannot be said of older first generation SA-7's and early second generation FIM-92A and HN-5 missiles. These systems can still be acquired, albeit with more difficulty than before. The Soviet SA-7 is in service in the greatest number of countries some of which are known for their lack of export transparency. These missiles also feature prominently in re-export. For example, from 1982 to 1994 China is thought to have exported between 2,858 and 5,500 pieces of its own SA-7 equivalent, the Hong Ying HN-5, to states including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, and North Korea. These states are hardly transparent and puts a spanner in arrangements controlling MANPAD proliferation among non-state actors.</p> <p><i>Jane’s Intelligence </i><i>Review </i>outlines 13 non-state groups confirmed to be in possession of MANPADS, with a further 14 groups reported to possess. But not all of them use MANPADs. Two crucial factors dictate whether these weapons are likely to be used:</p> <ul> <li> <div align="center"><span style="font-size:130%;"><strong>The knowledge needed to operate them</strong></span> </div> </li> </ul> <p>As much as the issue of the number of stockpiled weapons is important so is the proliferation of MANPAD knowledge. The November 2002 Mombasa attack reportedly failed because the weapons were fired too close to their intended target. MANPAD launch sequences require extensive training in the form of training devices and simulated firings, which is often not readily available outside of state armed forces. These practices are not known to be available to non-state groups. If more trained operators become available, errors, such as may have happened in Mombasa, will be less likely to occur.</p> <p>The basic firing sequence of a MANPAD is as follows. The shooter will activate the thermal battery when the target is sighted to power the missile seeker. The battery nominally operates for 60 seconds or less. The shooter will then attempt to acquire the target by allowing the IR seeker to lock onto the target. The gripstock produces a tone and a green light in the sight comes on once the seeker has detected the target’s signature. The trigger is then depressed halfway to uncage the seeker, and the missile gyro is spun up in 4 to 6 seconds. The aiming sight has markers to aid the shooter in estimating the lead angle for the shot. Then only the triger can be fully depressed for a successful launch. If this process is rushed it will not lock onto the target. The ejector charge expels the round from the tube at 28 metres/sec, while imparting initial axial spin, upon which the boost/sustain motor ignites and accelerates the weapon to full speed inside two seconds. The contact fuse is armed 45 metres into the flight. Missile control is effected by a pair of canard surfaces and fins, using a rolling airframe control law.</p> <p>If the missile used is an older design, with a cooled or uncooled seeker, and properly operated, the shooter will opt for an aft hemisphere shot against a climbing target. The missile will track the exhaust plumes and as it nears the target, select the brightest infrared source, either the nearest engine or the engine at the highest throttle setting. Depending on missile type and engagement geometry, the weapon may fly up an engine tailpipe, impact an engine nacelle, cowling or pylon, or even the aircraft’s wing. A newer missile with a two colour seeker fired in the forward hemisphere may track the aircraft’s centroid rather than engines, and impact the fuselage or centre section. How much damage is done by a missile impact will vary significantly with target aircraft type, engagement geometry and missile type. The process is similar for operator-guided missiles, although there is no seeker to cool. In both cases, the operator must be aware of the capabilities i.e the angles, minimum and maximum ranges at which it can be used. </p> <ul> <li> <div align="center"><span style="font-size:130%;"><strong>The continued functioning of the weapons themselves</strong></span></div> </li> </ul> <p>There is some debate over the shelf-life of MANPADS, with a number of specialists claiming that weapons such as the Afghan War-era Stingers are unlikely to function today due to material determinants, such as deterioration of the propellants, batteries, and coolant units. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that MANPADS may be more durable than has been speculated for one simple reason - MANPADS are designed for use in harsh environments and rough handling by troops on the battlefield. Their propellants and coolants are reported to be serviceable after nearly 30 years of storage. They are issued in hermetically sealed cases—often featuring in-built environmental monitors, such as hygrometers—that are designed to protect them from the elements up until the last minutes before firing. </p> <p>Most MANPADS feature a thermal battery, which differs from other types of batteries that they are activated only on command. Once the battery is activated it has a life of just several minutes, and must be discarded and replaced immediately after use. Hence for the operator to engage successive targets or successive attempts he must have a ready supply of batteries. This offers the advantage of multiple firings and increases the likelihood of successful firing if one or more are damaged. This may be a significant problem for actors that have acquired a weapon through illicit channels. This was the quagmire the Tamil Tigers faced after receiving its first batch of SA-7 missiles.</p> <p>On the other hand as a saving grace for non-state actors thermal batteries have a far greater shelf-life and durability than other batteries, raising concerns that systems in the hands of non-state actors may remain operational for long periods of time. According to Eagle Picher, the maker of batteries for the Stinger missile system, claims an established storage life of thermal batteries on the order of 20 years or more. Most external environments can be expected to have little or no effect on the inactivated battery. The battery is excellent for applications involving extended storage under uncertain conditions. The precise storage life of a battery is impossible to determine and depends on environmental conditions.</p> <p>While bearing in mind that MANPAD batteries have a finite shelf life, these can be replaced with commercially purchased batteries available on the open market and anyone with a sound technical proficiency should be able to construct hybrid batteries to replace used ones. The Tamil Tigers are never short of such cadre. However, this is easy said than done. One crucial feature of thermal batteries is that they are custom manufactured for acute voltage, start time, and configuration requirements. In short, batteries are tailored to the requirements of the weapon. This is even made harder in modern MANPADS, such as the Stinger, Mistral, SA-14, and SA-16 where the battery and coolant unit (BCU) are combined as one unit, dictating the manufacture of a complex module.</p> <p>In conclusion the shelf life of a MANPADs is, in large part, dependent on the conditions in which the weapon is stored. Not only the batteries that are in risk of deterioration, but missile propellants, seeker coolant too runs the risk of deterioration with time. Usually such missiles are hermetically sealed by the manufacturer and takes into consideration the rough handling by soldiers in the field. However, the SAMs the security forces have captured thus far suggests that these endure poor storage conditions, which sheds light that these MANPADs are indeed second or third hand acquisitions. </p> <p>With the international arms market under close scrutiny than ever before, the Tamil Tigers have been looking at alternatives to replace its dwindling MANPAD stock and to even lay their hands on more advanced 3rd generation MANPADs such as the SA-18. However since these developments and the Tamil Tigers' involvement in the movement of advanced MANPADs to Islamic Terrorist organisations via LTTE vessels, CIA and the world's other intelligence agencies have kept close tabs on the LTTE. One such measure was to keep track of and all the ships registered to the LTTE under various international carriers and front organizations.</p> <p></p> <p><a href="http://lh6.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmgQCAqsI/AAAAAAAAADQ/G2sT57zqFSY/VERUGALRECOVERIES_014"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="VERUGAL RECOVERIES_01" src="http://lh4.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmiwCAqtI/AAAAAAAAADY/T_mPtO2wIzw/VERUGALRECOVERIES_01_thumb2" border="0" height="362" width="442" /></a> </p> <p><strong><em>PF-89 found buried in subsequent search operations after the fall of THOPPIGALA. Photo Source - MCNS</em></strong></p> <p><a href="http://lh4.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmnwCAquI/AAAAAAAAADg/3rxFS3bec_0/DSC070975"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="DSC07097" src="http://lh3.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmqgCAqvI/AAAAAAAAADo/TBZtyQG1Df4/DSC07097_thumb3" border="0" height="333" width="442" /></a></p> <p><strong><em>PF-89 left behind by LTTE during its failed 2006 Jaffna Offensive. Photo Source - SFHQ-J<br /></em></strong></p> <p><a href="http://lh4.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmrwCAqwI/AAAAAAAAADw/xeSZtIoVeKo/clip_image0021"><img style="border-width: 0px;" alt="clip_image002" src="http://lh5.google.com/sierraekofoxtrot/R7hmtACAqxI/AAAAAAAAAD4/F_JCuQyqAu0/clip_image002_thumb" border="0" height="297" width="443" /></a></p> <p><strong><em>M136 AT4 U.S.army light anti-tank weapon destined for the LTTE, on display during a news conference at the Justice Department in Washington, Oct. 11, 2007. Photo Source - Justice Department<br /></em></strong></p> <p>One such alternative the Tamil Tigers have opted are IR guided anti-tank weapons and RPGs. Two notable examples are the Chinese PF-89 and the American M136 AT4. These serve as dual purpose weapons to engage ground targets as well as airborne targets. This is a crude alternative with the backdrop of the current worldwide crackdown on MANPAD proliferation and the Tiger's inability in procuring sufficient quantities of 2nd or 3rd generation MANPADs. Similar tactics are seen courtesy of the Iraqi insurgents against the USAF with varying degrees of success. The method is to engage one aircraft/helo with at least a salvo of 5. But still current flight guard systems are suffice to negate this threat. </p> <p>In many cases of surface-to-air attacks on aircraft, misreporting is quite common. Airbursts occurring near low-flying aircraft have frequently been reported as attacks by MANPADS when in fact they are usually RPGs or ATGMs. Attacks on aircraft at very low altitudes, those occurring under 1,000 feet, are almost exclusively RPGs/ATGMs. Guerrilla and terrorist forces have successfully adapted the RPG to the anti-aircraft role. This skill was demonstrated perhaps in the best published case when two US special ops MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali insurgents in October 1993. </p>Long - Rangerhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04253650655846996279noreply@blogger.com8