The Fallacy of the Stalingrad example

The Stalingrad-esque earth bund at Southern KILINOCHCHI. Source- SLA media.

The Summer of 1942 Hitler's forces occupy western Europe. The previous year Hitler had turned his attention east and launched operation Barbarossa against the Soviets. Initially it sweeps everything before it before the Soviet winter grinds it to a halt when Stalin counter attacked. After stabilising his FDLs and re-equipping his men after the set back at the battle of Moscow, Hitler decides to move South towards the Caucasus to capture the vital Russian oil fields. Friedrich Paulus the commander of the German 6th army was handed the operation to capture the Caucasus. The operation was code named Blue. 

In Paulus's original campaign to take the Caucasus Hitler had not ordered him to consider the Soviet city of Stalingrad to be important. But after the initial success of Blue during the summer Hitler turns his eyes towards Stalingrad. Despite the city not being in initial German plans, Stalingrad with its population of 500000 was a key rail and transport centre on the West bank of the Volga river.

Stalingrad was however not an easy target. It straddles along 20 miles along the precipitous West banks of the Volga. On the North stands the industrial sites of the DZERZHINSKY tractor factory which was now turning out quarter of the red army's tanks and other vehicles, the BARRIKADY arms plant, the Red October steels plant and the LAZUR chemicals plant. All these provided excellent opportunities for the defenders to dig in or to turn them into formidable defensive fortresses. Further South was the city centre. All these make up a lethal labyrinth in which attackers may get pinned down in pre-planned kill zones. Geographically there was another key hurdle Paulus had to face. The Tsaritsa river runs through the city in a 200 foot deep gauge to the Volga river. There are no bridges across the Volga so supplies and people have to be ferried across which should be a major disadvantage for the defenders. But this also meant that unless Paulus's men can cross the Volga they will run the gauntlet of the Soviet guns on the Eastern bank.

In striking a key hub of the enemy such as STALINGRAD the battle planners must be absolutely clear on why they are getting locked into this particularly risky type of operation and how the target fits to the overall battleplan. It is therefore important to the commander who is considering putting his troops into a city to have a clear idea what he is trying to accomplish. In 1942 Stalingrad was not in Hitler's original plan for the Southern area of the Soviet union and his drive to seize the oil fields of the Caucasus. The initial thrust of Operation Blue goes well for Hitler. This apparent success; apparent because the soviets have actually withdrawn to avoid mass loses leads a now confident Hitler to change his plan. He did not want to simply head for the oil fields, instead he wanted to take the whole Caucasus. And to prevent a buildup of Soviet forces there he wanted to take and destroy Stalingrad. But only when the Summer 1942 campaign appears to go well Hitler changed his mind and decided to take the city. This decision proved a serious lack of clarity in Hitler's strategic thinking in 1942. Battle of Stalingrad was really fought as an afterthought at the end of that year. At the beginning of the Summer Hitler really wanted push to the South to the Caucasian mountains and open the gateway to the Middle East and importantly to gain the oil. But there was another reason for Hitler's decision to strike Stalingrad and it was personal. Stalingrad was Stalin's city. He had commanded the city for 4 months during the civil war of 1919-1921. In the summer of 1942 when Soviet resistance to the German advance collapses, Stalin decreed that Stalingrad would be a fortress from which there would be no retreat. And Hitler ordered that the city must fall. So Hitler's decision to strike Stalingrad was partly a personal tussle; dictator against dictator.

At Stalingrad surprise was less important since when Soviet resistance at the German advance collapsed that summer Stalin expected an attack on the city. For General Paulus therefore the vital element was speed and momentum of the attack before Stalingrad's defences can be strengthened. On August 23rd 1942 Paulus launched his attack. But his plans were already in danger due to Hitler's indecision. A month earlier confident that Stalingrad will fall easily Hitler transferred the 4th Panzer brigade South fatally weakening the assault force for Stalingrad. The tank units attacking the Southern part of the city were severely understrength with their crews exhausted. Soviet artillery on the eastern bank of the Volga continued to bombard the German positions. German tanks were bogged down by heaps of rubble and barricades. Where they were able to move forward, they came under Soviet antitank fire from wrecked buildings.They were hemmed in by ravines that criss-crossed the area thus losing the all important impetus and momentum. Only on the last day of August do they breakthrough the outer Soviet defences and advance towards the heart of the city. Paulus's infantry struck between the two German armoured thrusts to push the Soviets into the Volga. But German advances in the South meant that a large Soviet force was left untouched to the North. And Paulus is only too aware of the danger of attacks to his flank and rear by these. This makes him to delay his final push. Its not until September 13th, 21 days after the first advance that he pushes forward reluctantly. But the delay has cost him the essential requirement of speed and given the Soviet defenders vital time. This time allowed the Soviets to deploy the Elite 13th Division in sufficient strength that developed the concept of Kill Zones along heavily mined areas through which on they knew the way to face Paulus's 200000 men. MG posts protruding through windows and anti-tank weapons littered the streets. Snipers also successfully inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans. Notable among them was Vasily Zaytsev. The Soviet Hugging tactics also meant that the Germans had to fight close quarter battles with the Soviets. The Germans used to leave swastika flags spread on the ground to mark ground controlled by them for the Stuka dive bombers but the Soviet tactics meant the Germans had to fight on their own or risk casualties from their own support fire.

In the first days of October Paulus launched what he hopes will be his final offensives against the 3 remaining Soviet strong points. The tractor factory, Red October steel works and the BARRIKADY arms plant. In 10 days half of the Red October plant and most of the BARRIKADY complex have fallen. By early November Paulus had reduced the Soviet held area to two small enclaves, one 8 miles long 1 mile deep and the other even smaller. Paulus appeared to have regained momentum. He seemed to be on the verge of victory. But the winter arrived.

As the winter begins to bite the Soviets continue to cling onto the two small enclaves. Factory workers were repairing damaged Soviet tanks, vehicles and weapons on the battlefield itself. Some volunteered to man tank gun positions. They were holding out and most crucially resupplying over the frozen parts of the Volga and via flotillas of small boats over non-frozen parts.  Protected by gun boats these make over 35000 runs over the Volga bringing supplies and crucially men into Stalingrad. Many were killed as they waited to board the ferries by the Luftwaffe which had complete control of the skies before the winter struck. But still 120000 made it ashore. The Luftwaffe continued their air superiority into early November and Soviet aerial resistance during the day was nonexistent. But due to the heavy volume of 20000 sorties the number of serviceable aircraft of the Luftwaffe fell to 40%. The Kampfwaffe bomber force was hardest hit with almost 50% assets out of service. This was further compounded by  the removal of substantial number of aerial assets for combat in North Africa hence the Germans found their air-arm to be spread thin across Europe and struggled to maintain its strength in the Soviet-German front. This meant the only hindrance to Soviet reinforcements and artillery across the Volga was out of the equation. Meanwhile factory workers repaired damaged Soviet tanks and other weapons close to the battlefield, sometimes on the battlefield itself. These civilians also volunteered as tank crews to replace the dead and wounded, though they had no experience or training in operating tanks during combat

Paulus on the other hand was facing serious resupply problems. His communication line stretched over 800 miles. Bomb damage made it difficult for him to get his supplies through the city. Attrition and the atrocious weather meant the Luftwaffe struggled to maintain the air bridge. But Paulus's real problems haven't even begun. At Stalingrad with his forces locked in battle in the city, Paulus is aware that the Soviets are building up their forces. Jo Stalin as ruthless as ever had turned Stalingrad into a trap. Stalin and his Generals were prepared to sacrifice the men defending the city to annihilate the German army there. He moved troops and equipment into the area secretly. He had moved his reserves from Moscow to the Southern Volga and strengthened the Soviet air arm, the Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily (VVS) at the Stalingrad region with platforms from the entire country. By mid November he had more than a million men, 13500 heavy guns, 900 tanks and 1100 aircraft in position. One Soviet offensive was to strike South East while the Second towards North West and trap the German armies in a lethal pincer movement. Stalin knew this was the best way to trap Paulus and his 6th army since most of the troops locked into Stalingrad were German. But the rest of the front including their all important rear and the flanks where the pincers will move in are held by poorly equipped allies; Romanians, Hungarians and Italians. The Soviets struck in the early morning of November 19th. After 4 days of fighting at the German flanks the two arms of the Red army pincers met. A quarter of a million Germans were now trapped to the East of Stalingrad.

To General Paulus at Stalingrad his exit strategy was clear. He signals Hitler to withdraw his troops from Stalingrad. Instead Hitler accepts Luftwaffe chief Hermann Goring's commitment that his planes can fly in enough supplies and fly out the wounded until Paulus's forces can be relieved and Stalingrad captured. Goring assures Hitler that he can drop 60 tonnes of resupplies everyday. A similar plan had been used successfully a year earlier at the Demyansk Pocket, albeit on a much smaller scale. Also, Soviet fighter forces had improved considerably in both quality and quantity in the intervening year. But the mention of the successful Demyansk air supply operation reinforced Hitler's own views, and was endorsed by Hermann Goring several days later. Despite the bravery of his pilots and crews it was a vain offer. Only one or two days does the Germans receive more than 5 tonnes. As a result there was a massive deficit and one can only wonder where the Germans found the wherewithal to continue the fight. Despite the obvious, Hitler refuses to accept that Paulus and his men faced disaster. He orders Field Marshall Erich Von Manstein to batter the Soviets to a standstill so that Paulus can hold till spring to mount a counter offensive. But in reality all Manstein was able do was to provide Paulus and his besieged men a last chance to save themselves. German panzers seeked to carve a corridor through the Russian lines to give Paulus the way to breakout. They got to just 30 miles of the besieged men before they are halted. But this still gave Paulus a chance of a breakout. Paulus knew his losses would have been massive but he needed authorisation from Hitler for his exit strategy. Manstein also asked for Hitler's permission to authorise the breakout. But Hitler does not even dare to reply. Paulus and his men are forced to fight on. Their situation increasingly became desperate. On Christmas day alone 1280 Germans die of frost bite, Typhus and starvation. To survive they ate their horses, dogs, even the frozen corpses of their dead comrades. Paulus finally surrenders on January 31st. In the 5 months of the Stalingrad campaign 750000 Germans and their allies had lost their lives. Soviets lose the same number including many civilians. In the end 108000 Germans are taken prisoner. Only 5000 returned to see Germany again.

 The Sri Lankan theatre:

The Chinese Parliament: Maj Gen Jagath Dias discussing the second assault on the bund from Southern KILINOCHCHI with 574 brigade. Such discussions meant that unit leaders on the scene were making their own decisions, seizing fleeting opportunities and exploiting any weakness of the enemy. Source- SLA media

Just like Stalin had said that there will be no retreat from Stalingrad  the ever elusive Tamil Tiger leader too made a similar decree that the fall of the KILINOCHCHI town was merely a day dream of the Sri Lankan Commander in Chief. But unlike Hitler who lacked a clarity in his overall theatre wide ambitions, the Sri Lankan Commanders knew exactly what their overall objectives were and what the exact strike points were to have a domino effect on Tamil Tiger defensive positions.

The vital PARANTHAN junction situated North of KILINOCHCHI proved to be the grounds of utmost tactical importance to the Sri Lankan forces since the fall of this vital junction opens the gateway; the A35 to the dense jungles of MULLATIVU, opens up the rear of the impregnable Tamil Tiger National Front via the A9 North and most importantly for the KILINOCHCHI objective - makes the KILINOCHCHI town a massive salient. A salient in military parlance is a vulnerability that any commander cannot ignore. Any troops or assets positioned in a salient must be evacuated because it is surrounded by 3 sides and risks being 'pinched out'.

With this important potential exploit in mind the battle planners set to work.

First among the objectives was to secure a stable MSR close as much as to the theatre of operations. This objective fell on 574 which secured the TERUMURIKANDY Kovil junction on December 10th while the other two arms 571 and 572 kept on the pressure on the Tamil Tiger earth bund from the West and South West. This ensured the A9 was available for supplies and casualty evacuation since the available jungle routes were in dire straits due to the incessant rains.

One of the prime requirements of an assault on a highly defended town/city as explained above is to have surprise, speed and to maintain that speed and momentum not giving the defender sufficient time to further strengthen the defence. With 57 Division completely breaching the earth bund at AKKARAYANKULAM in September 08, it was no surprise for the Tamil Tigers as to where its next objective lay and hence even before the AKKARAYANKULAM bund was breached heavy earth moving equipment and civilians were brought into construct the L bund running all the way from the JAFFNA lagoon to the IRANAMADU tank. Having breached the AKKARAYANKULAM bund the 571/572 and 574 began its advanced scouting and mapping of the Tamil Tiger defences along with their own crumbling type operations to master their opening game as part of their war gaming process. This was while 58 Division made speedy progress to capture the POONERYN sector and reach the Earth bund that stood between them and PARANTHAN across the B69. In addition to the bund, a massive stream of water lay in front of them. Most of these waters came from the overflowing IRANAMADU tank which the Tamil Tigers had opened the sluice gates to the full. Tactical it may sound, however the heavy rains wouldn't have allowed the Tamil Tigers any other option but to open the sluice even if 58 troops were not stationed on the B69.

Once 57 had laid the groundwork for a final assault it was not allowed to breach the L bund on its own before 58 reached it from the Northern end for several reasons.

1. If 57 had initiated an assault on the L bund on its own the Tamil Tigers may have opted to withdraw from the bund as well as from the KILINOCHCHI town itself thus allowing 57 to expose their Northern flank and position itself as a salient. Armed with a fresh consignment of artillery and mortar shells the Tamil Tigers could have made light work of 57 troops and trapped them within KILINOCHCHI pretty much the same way the German 6th army was trapped in Stalingrad in 1942.
2. If 57 had engaged KILINOCHCHI on its own, the Tamil Tigers would still have had easy access for reinforcements/supplies along the A9 North. Prior to the battle it was very well known that the Tamil Tigers were using the same reserve forces in defending KILINOCHCHI as well as the National Front. Harsh weather had made most of the routes impassable. Therefore the A9 was invaluable particularly through the marshy lagoon at EPS to re-induct reserve cadre to each battlezone depending on the need. Hence it was paramount to disable the Tamil Tigers ability to use the A9 connecting two theatres.
3. The battle planners knew that 58 Division's pressure and capture of PARANTHAN would make the KILINOCHCHI town limits a salient to the Tamil Tiger positions. Any stringent defences or kill zones the Tamil Tigers may have had in store for the Sri Lankan forces within the town limits were forced to dissolve with 58's move further North. One may argue that the Sri Lankan forces should have engaged the enemy without letting it flee, however it must be emphasised that battle in urban environments is the most vicious form of warfare. The commanders must be clear on why they are committing their troops to this very risky and dangerous form of warfare where fighting may rage street by street, house by house even down to room by room. Therefore it was important to minimise confrontation within the town limits as much as possible.

On the 16th of December 08 despite the adverse weather the well coordinated assault on the L bund commenced. The assault in the midst of the heavy monsoons added the element of surprise to the Sri Lankan battleplanners. During the battle of Cambrai in the early morning of November 20th 1917 Hindenberg did not expect the Allied Commander Haig to launch an assault for the approaching winter usually signaled an end to the campaigning season until the spring next year. A similar surprise element was added by the Tamil Tigers during their failed JAFFNA offensive of August 2006 during the low tide season in an attempt to outflank the KILALY FDL by conducting a beach landing.

The element of surprise was further enhanced by a hurricane barrage on Tamil Tiger strongpoints. The hallmark of Indirect fire support throughout history has been its inaccuracy and the requirement of enormous amounts of time and ammunition thereby giving away the attacker's objective and allowing the defender to counterconcentrate. The Hurricane barrages are not intended to destroy the enemy objective but suppress it enough while small units work their way forward. Such suppression must be maintained until the target objective is overrun and lifted to extend the coverage and to allow the assault team to reach the objective without taking casualties from friendly fire. This is in addition to the SLAF's role in providing excellent CAS despite the unfavourable weather to keep the enemy's heads down and break their will to resist . Such combined arms manoeuvres requires tremendous coordination.

The assault was initially conducted by a fixing assault courtesy of the combination of 53 and 55 Divisions stationed along the KILALY/MUHAMALE/NK axis by signaling an attempted breakthrough. This move prompted the Tamil Tigers to deploy its reserves to prevent a breakthrough by these two Divisions and were compelled to fix the reserves into position thereby preventing them from counterconcentrating at the L bund. With this opportune moment the 58 and 57 Division combined initiated their assault on the L bund. Well trained infantry teams spearheaded by Commandos and Special forces using cover and concealment headed towards their each individual objectives. In some locations sappers had cleared approach pathways under cover of darkness or smoke, some locations scouts had mapped pathways and some locations it was down to bangalore torpedos and saturation techniques. The extensive rehearsals conducted using captured earth bunds meant that even junior soldiers were trained well enough to operate independently in small units, using their own tactical judgement to solve problems and keep the assault moving forward, for any bogged down strike team on unfavourable ground can leave the team and the mission highly vulnerable. The units engaged in battle were so professional that unit leaders on the scene were making their own decisions, seizing fleeting opportunities and exploiting any weakness of the enemy even if it meant a slight change to the original approach. The assault was so successful that some points along the bund fell in a small matter of 15 minutes.

The well dispersed infantry teams meant the Tamil Tiger indirect fire support were highly negated. Dispersion reduces vulnerability by putting fewer targets in the splash damage radius of an incoming shell. Artillery was never meant to target small units of soldiers. They are meant to target the centroid of formations.
It is hard to target these highly mobile assault teams. Hence the Tamil Tigers directed at the one thing that is not mobile, their own earthbund and its strongpoints which were captured by the initial assault. These defences were further strengthened with mobile MG posts stationed on top and behind the earth bund to bring down any attacker who managed to overcome the initial defences. The MG posts behind the bund were missed out by recce teams since the huge earth mound had obscured their Line of Sight (LOS). Machine guns are direct fire-flat trajectory weapons and attackers can use directional cover by obscuring the line of sight (LOS). Mortars and artillery on the other hand can fire over intervening obstacles and engage targets without LOS. Hence working together, machine guns and artillery/mortars compliments for each other's weaknesses. Such interlocking fields of fire reduces the cover or dead space thus complicates things for the attacker to find and exploit concealed positions.

However, the incessant monsoons meant the the MUHAMALE axis was highly unfavourable to conduct the special infantry/mechanised warfare. The marshy kadol area had made a sizeable chunk of land to be submerged making forward movement and casualty evacuation a nightmare for forward field operatives. Using their experience and judgement the commanders were compelled to reach the Clausewitz's culminating point and pull back. This relieved a substantial amount of Tamil Tiger reserves and allowed them to counterconcentrate against 571 and 572 and by Saturday the 20th of December they managed to counterconcentrate against 574. The counterstrikes by the Tamil Tigers were aimed at achieving one objective. That was to regain the breachheads which the Sri Lankan forces would have otherwise used to pour in exploitation forces behind the enemy line to disrupt the Tamil Tiger FDL and render it incapable of fighting at full efficiency. Similar countertsrikes were conducted prior by the Tamil Tigers during the assault on the NACHCHIKUDA-AKKARAYAN earth bund. What made the difference this time was the heavy volume of mortar fire. The rate of fire at one grid location alone amounted to average 4 mortars per minute. Once the Sri Lankan forces withdrew from the breach heads the mortar fire concentrated ahead of the earth bunds with a reduced rate of around 4 mortars every 5-10 minutes. Exploiting the instrumental limitations on rough monsoonal seas the Tamil Tigers had managed to smuggle in a consignment of shells to maintain their high firing rate. However they were unable to persist with this rate since the Navy managed to intercept the floating warehouse on the 20th of December 08 some 70NMs off the MULLATIVU coast. After this interception, a significant reduction of Tamil Tiger fire support firing rates were observed.

After the bund was breached within the next ten days of fighting 58 initiated the task of assaulting the strategic PARANTHAN junction. This was achieved by isolating the junction by cutting off the A9 from the North from THADDUVANKODDI and KOMARIKUDAKULAM. This move also ensured that the Sri Lankan forces were in hold of the high ground of KOMARIKUDAKULAM which later came in handy for laying siege on the former 54 Division HQ at ELEPHANTPASS. By January 1st 2009 the Tamil Tigers were compelled to withdraw from the PARANTHAN junction and by next day they withdrew from the KILINOCHCHI town limits. The minor skirmishes faced by the advancing 571 and 572 troops were to ensure the Tamil Tiger rear units had made a safe withdrawal.

When the Sri Lankan forces had managed to divert and pin down reinforcements with 53/55 thereby siphoning forces away from major efforts while severely disrupting the enemy supplies by intercepting key routes and sea supplies, Paulus's German 6th army did not achieve this requirement. The Eastern bank of Volga was strategically important for the Soviets in this sense as this did not allow the Germans to cross over to the Eastern bank. Even though the Stukas had wreaked much havoc during the summer, it could not maintain its momentum and keep the supplies across the Volga in check. The SLAF however played a pivotal role. If high altitude SLAF operations during Eelam War III had stifled the SLAF's ability to provide effective Close Air Support, the current SLAF was a farcry to the previous era and were more than willing to 'get down there' to add the necessary punch. The results of SLAF sorties were also down to superior tactics and ordnance.

Just like the Sri Lankan armed forces the German military doctrine was based on combined arms teams with close support provided by tanks, artillery and aircraft. To counter this the Soviets had employed hugging tactics and killzones within Stalingrad to ensure fighting raged on house to house and room to room. When in 1942 the Soviets had a 80Km length of STALINGRAD and hence depth to grind the Germans down till the winter arrived, the Tamil Tigers had only 8Km of the town straddling along the A9 to grind down the Sri Lankan forces. 582 from the North, 571 from the West, 572 from the South West and 574 from the Southern edge of the town meant the Tamil Tigers had no defence in depth of the town at all compared to the depth the Soviets enjoyed at STALINGRAD. Furthermore strategically the Volga river ensured the Germans failed to completely cutoff the city from the Soviet mainland. Whereas in the Sri Lankan theatre even though the forces had not completely cut off either PARANTHAN or KILINOCHCHI, it had done enough to disrupt the fluid defence of the Tamil Tigers set up by the mobile reserves that switched theatres upon requirement and resupplies via the sea.

Hitler's lack of clarity of the overall battleplan meant that the Germans were compelled to sacrifice many of its experienced troops and other assets to fight on among the rubble of a city which was strategically insignificant. Rather than pinning down his forces in a ferocious street battle, Hitler could have heeded his commanders' advice and bypassed Stalingrad altogether to concentrate his total force on the Caucasus and the oil fields. The Sri Lankan battle planners however at any moment did not deviate from their overall objectives. They were very well aware that KILINOCHCHI was of little military value, however the fierce resistance of the Tamil Tigers especially of its highly valued reserves meant that it gave the battleplanners an opportunity to eliminate as much as reserves as possible then and there rather than engaging them again at the new defences that are coming up circumventing the MULLATIVU jungles. Furthermore was the fact that the KILINOCHCHI town being 8Kms in length meant 57 had to cross the town and its surrounding bund if it were to add pressure on the MULLATIVU jungles. Having also an eye towards preserving the town buildings as much as possible and avoiding a heap of rubble as in STALINGRAD the battleplanners took steps to avoid confrontations within the town. In addition to limiting collateral damage, as mentioned above, urban battle is the most vicious form of warfare and it is paramount that any commander avoid it as much as possible. Unlike in STALINGRAD the Tamil Tiger defences within the town dissolved once 58 Division had captured the PARANTHAN junction and making the KILINOCHCHI area into a salient.

There is no doubt the Tamil Tigers were intending to make KILINOCHCHI the crowning moment of their defensive battleplan. There are many facets of a defensive battleplan. One is to entice the enemy towards you to maintain the initiative to give the enemy an idea of vulnerability but to draw them into a situation from which they cannot return and then to launch a spectacular counterstrike. The other is to wear the enemy off by building strong defensive positions that fighting against them would cause the enemy huge casualties and huge distress. Whichever option the defending commander chooses, he always has to choose a spectacular counter attack as the end game. Such a counterstrike at any stages remains the crucial factor in the defensive battle, battleplan. It is almost always the last act. However the great danger of this battleplan is that the defensive battle commander may never really know the enemy's full intentions. It very well might be the enemy who actually has the initiative intending to pin the defensive forces down and outflank them from elsewhere.

Once Paulus was trapped by the Soviets at STALINGRAD Hitler swiftly promoted Paulus to the rank of Field Marshall. With no German officer of this rank having ever surrendered, with the promotion Hitler had made clear to Paulus what he had to do. However being let down by the Führer due to his lack of clarity in the overall battleplan and for not authorising the breakthrough at the opportune moment had greatly disappointed Friedrich Paulus. Instead of turning the gun on himself he surrendered with his men famously saying "I have no intention of shooting myself for that Austrian corporal". He later became a vociferous critic of the Nazis and joined the National Committee for a Free Germany.

With the Sri Lankan military juggernaut eating away the Tamil Eelam territory it will not be long before Tamil Tiger higher echleons will face the same dilemma as that of Friedrich Paulus on whether to stay faithful to its leader and fight till the end for a lost cause or to opt for a headline creating defection/surrender thus putting an end to the bloodshed of prospectful youth that has held back Sri Lanka's development for quarter of a century. Only time will tell...

Battle of El-Alamein: Lessons from the past

Image Courtesy of Noclador

Breaking a fortified line is what every soldier fears and a commanders last resort. It means attacking defences head on that are dug in, protected and cannot be outflanked. The enemy is well armed and well prepared and are expecting the attack.

The defender gets to choose the exact ground he wants to defend and he often has time to prepare and maximise his use of weapons. The attackers know that they will take heavy casualties thus the troops must be clear as to why they have been asked to sacrifice themselves. Therefore the most important aspect about breaking into a fortified line is morale. The infantry has to have the drive and morale to get through the obstacles. Otherwise if the attack bogs down they are as good as dead resulting in defeat.

Commanders who initiate to break a fortified line can have a range of objectives; either to simply seize ground, to destroy the enemy army in that position or to break through to begin a different type of battle. Once initiated commanders must seize the initiative and maintain that advantage from the first moment and must not allow their attack to stall or slow. They must keep it moving. They also must be flexible enough to cope with unforeseen problems or exploit unexpected advantages.

Such an example was the Second battle of El-Alamein where the German Field Marshall Rommel - the commander of the Deutsches Afrikakorps had made the allied 8th Army withdraw and setup a FDL at a point adjoining the Qattara depression and the Mediterranean sea. From here the allied 8th Army launched unsuccessful counter attacks at Rommel's africa corps. As a measure of defence Rommel too setup his own FDL facing the allies. This allowed his exhausted troops to regroup before a final assault. Even though he had planned for a regroup, constant allied raids were crippling his supplies across the sea by two thirds. Knowing very well the allies were regrouping with uninterrupted supplies, Rommel decided to breakthrough while the allied buildup was incomplete. However the allies managed to halt the advance at Alam el Halfa ridge. Expecting General Montgomery - the commander of the 8th Army to strike and capitalise on the victory, Rommel dug in a fortified line.

Rommel's frontline was 40 miles long. The desert ahead of the FDL was largely flat and open so any movement can be seen for miles. At the front lay a minefield 5 miles deep covered with barbed wire. This was code named devil's garden. Behind this were the formidable German anti-tank guns in well concealed positions designed to withstand heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. Following classic military doctrine Rommel's defences avoided being linear. Instead it was built to be a defensive web allowing the defender to fight at every direction. Behind this web Rommel concealed his armour to counter any breakthrough of his defences.

Classic military doctrine suggests that attackers need 3:1 ratio against defenders. Against well entrenched positions it jumps to 5:1. At El-Alamein Montgomery had 200000 men, 1000 tanks and 900 aircraft. Against him Rommel had 100000 men, 500 tanks and 350 aircraft. This is in addition to the minefields. In military parlance minefields are known as a combined arms weapon. They are designed to channelise armor and men into predetermined kill zones. To deal with mines the offender has to slow down and that makes him very vulnerable for the enemy. To avoid the enemy counter fire he needs to speed up, but this makes him vulnerable to mines. But this did not deter Montgomery. Despite the heavy odds, he and his men had no other choice. A flank was not available to exploit. From the South was the impassable Qattara depression and from the North was the Mediterranean sea. Montgomery was also not comfortable with the superiority of the force ratio. But he was getting his supplies freely through the Mediterranean whereas Rommel's supplies were successfully intercepted by air strikes. Montgomery also enjoyed the intelligence advantage with Enigma decoding German transmissions.

It is very rare for any commander to have the 3:1 let alone 5:1 force ratio which military theorists consider essential to break a fortified line but it is possible to gather the necessary superiority at least locally by using deception and surprise.

First General Montgomery takes a bold decision to attack the line from the North when his earlier predecessors attempted at the South thereby trapping the enemy against the Mediterranean coast. This was while his deception battleplan set about to convince Rommel that he was indeed following his predecessors and was attacking the South. He positioned dummy trucks and tanks. A dummy oil pipe was built from El-Alamein to the South slowly enough to convince Rommel that the allies will not initiate an assault (on the South) till the pipe was complete. False radio traffic made the German listeners focus on the South. In the North immense efforts were underway to camouflage troops and tank concentrations. The deception was so successful that Rommel left for Germany for medical attention with just a month before Montgomery's D day.

On the approach to D day Montgomery conducted an diversionary attack on the South to pin down half of Rommel's forces. At the north in Operation Lightfoot infantry were tasked with cutting two corridors through the devil's garden. Engineers were to clear a path under the over of artillery for tanks and mark them with white tape and hooded lanterns. The objective of the two tank divisions was to cross the devil's garden by dawn and strike.

On October 23rd 1942 at 2140 hours under the cover of a barrage of 1000 guns, the Allied infantry advanced towards their objectives. The artillery and infantry advanced in a creeping barrage. In military parlance it mean artillery moves 100 yards every 3 minutes with the infantry following. In a creeping barrage coordination has to be precise. At the battle of El-Alamein the 51st Highlanders advanced too fast, running into friendly fire from the allied barrage. Nevertheless Montogomery's initial assault had gained sufficient impetus until the tank divisions were to churn along the route cleared by the engineers. Unfortunately the path cleared by the engineers was only one tank wide. Once the first tanks were hit by 88mm anti-tank weapons, the entire pathway was blocked trapping the tanks within the devil's garden. The gun flashes of the incoming troops made picking up the targets easier for the Germans and battered the bogged down tanks with artillery. As the sun rose the advance faltered. The tanks had failed to clear the minefields and make headway to support the infantry who had crossed the minefields by dawn. Instead of moving on without losing momentum, they were forced to dig in. Within a few hours Montgomery had lost the impetus to Rommel. During the first 48 hours of battle Montgomery lost over 200 tanks and he called off operation Lightfoot.

One of the key requirements in breaking a fortified line is not lose the momentum created by the initial impetus and to be flexible in changing tactics when their plans go wrong or to exploit advantages when they go right. All attacks lose impetus with time. Clausewitz wrote about this as being the Culminating point. The key is to be smart enough to recognise that point, rapidly refuel, rearm and get your men moving again towards the objective or re-plan the assault.

Once Montgomery called off his large scale offensive, he switched to a series of small scale assaults on enemy strongpoints along the defence line code named crumbling. Montgomery was the master of deliberate attack. His crumbling attacks were aimed at getting amongst the enemy and to force the enemy's defensive cohesion to flood away. He also used his force ratio supremacy of the air. He used over 800 bomber sorties and over 2000 fighter bomber sorties each day on pre-identified targets.

With these crumbling attacks, Rommel's forces were pinned down with supplies running out fast, giving Montgomery room to manoeuvre. Trying to assume Montgomery's next move, Rommel moved a large part of his Africa core over to the Mediterranean. But the allies learn this through intelligence intercepts and plans the assault further towards the South than planned. It is code named Supercharge.

Monty's Supercharge Image courtesy of Noclador

By the time - November 2, 1942 - Supercharge is begun, Montogomery has 800 tanks left with plenty of fuel. Rommel was left with only 102 tanks with fuel and ammo critically low. Despite the initial breakthrough as before, Montgomery lost some 200 tanks at the day's end due to heavy resistance and mines. The attrition had however reduced Rommel's tanks to less than a 100 and at breaking point. Once the line was broken, despite Hitler's orders of not to retreat, Rommel orders his men to retreat and take up defensive positions 60miles to the rear to counter the break out stage of the Allied 8th Army.

The Sri Lankan theatre:

If General Montgomery had a stretch of 40 miles to manoeuvre his units deceptively or otherwise, the Sri Lankan battleplanners have only a narrow stretch of only 7 miles to successfully manoeuvre its units. With no available flank - at least on ground - they have to meet the Tamil Tigers head on. The narrow stretch also makes it far more easier for the Tamil Tigers to coordinate their fire support.

With the Tamil Tigers having more than 5 years to perfect their defences along the 7 miles stretch spanning from KILALY to NAGARKOVIL, this front provides the most fortified line in the current Sri Lankan conflict. Like Rommel the Tamil Tigers have tried their best to increase their force ratio using minefields, trenches, camouflaged boobytraps, highly mobile artillery and mortar units which have littered the coastline spanning from KILALY to POONERYN. They have used the minefields successfully as a combined arms weapons, channelising the armour units of the 53 and 55 Divisions to take the path through pre-planned kill zones. The largely open flat area of no man's land means, any troop movement is easily spotted by the Tamil Tigers. On these kill zones the Tamil Tigers on previous occasions were known to employ the box barrage where the artillery/mortar would rain on 3 or 4 barrages forming a box thus trapping troops within. Such a barrage can only be conducted on pre-registered locations and was successfully conducted to trap 1GR and 5VIR during the April 08 offensive. This is the Sri Lankan Devil's Garden.

As my previous briefs have mentioned, the biggest challenge the Sri Lankan forces face in this sector is the neutralisation of the enemy indirect fire support. One method is to conduct suppressive counterfire at targets identified by their trajectories (ie firefinders). The second method is to use close air support by the SLAF using its superior platforms to target mobile artillery/mortar units and the third is to thin out the enemy's limited resources by conducting a multi axis approach. With the Sri Lankan armed forces moving steadily within the KILINOCHCHI district towards the sectors that houses the artillery/mortar units - POONERYN/PARANTHAN/KILALY axis - the Tamil Tigers may be forced to deploy some of its assets which otherwise could be used to halt an advance in the MUHAMALE sector. The effects of this method is already evident since the Tamil Tiger commander who was based at MUHAMALE was known to be appointed in charge of defending the KILINOCHCHI district from the 57 and 58 divisions.

Emulating the crumbling operations of General Montgomery, the 53 and 55 Divisions have been carrying out successful small scale assaults on the Tamil Tiger FDL on a constant basis. The main aim of such attacks is to destabilize the FDL defences causing the cohesion and morale of the defenders to flood away. Further such a series of crumbling operations allows the Sri Lankan battle planners to master their opening game as well as shore up the morale of its soldiers. In addition they have been conducting daily training exercises, honing their coordination and skills.

Just like General Montgomery successfully used his superiority of the air to enhance his force ratio, the SLAF too needs to be taken into consideration for future battles in this sector since it can significantly increase the force ratio of the Sri Lankan armed forces within this sector. The intention of SLAF air strikes are to cause widespread destruction with the aim of depleting target numbers thus reducing the number of forward targets for the infantry to engage. This is particularly important for areas that are out of SLA's artillery range i.e the deep battle space where ammo dumps, transit camps for reinforcements etc are likely to be located. Further it can also reduce the number of fire support assets the Tamil Tigers may have access to.

Lastly the commanders must be skilled enough to recognise the all important Clausewitz's culminating point - the point at which the force is unable to perform well enough to achieve its objective - as well as be flexible with the overall battleplan. The last thing a commander requires is his strike force to stall or slow in the midst of a Devil's garden as happened during April 08 when 55 were ordered to stall till 53 caught up. The only way this culminating point be recognised early on, is through experience and practice. The War Gaming process is important in this aspect since it allows the battle planners to test their operational plans without committing troops thus allowing the planners to determine high pay-off targets, define critical events, rectify any flaws in planning and coordination, synchronize fire support with other battlefield operating systems and gives a rough estimate of the expected casualties.

Breaking a fortified line was always an option of last resort when sacrificing waves of soldiers was a choice commanders couldn't avoid. In the Southern Wanni the armed forces have been breaking fortified line after line till they met the NACHCHIKUDA-AKKARAYANKULAM line. The fact that differentiates this line from the rest of the lines is the one single fact that this line falls perfectly within the defensive umbrella of the Tamil Tiger artillery/mortar units - the same units that have proved anathema to the combi of 53 and 55 Divisions elsewhere since October 2006.

With territory shrinking thus limiting space for manoeuvrability to shoot and scoot and with superior SLAF platforms dedicated to hunt such units prowling day and night, tougher testing times are ahead for these dedicated Kutti Sri Mortar units of the Tamil Tigers. Only time will tell...

PS: To get a better understanding of the battle from a logistics and general strategy point of view, I would highly recommend reading Mr. Bailey's Racing against the clock: The LTTE's logistical gamble

The mother of all debacles: 8 years since

EPS - Elephant pass, known for its impregnable defences comprising sophisticated chain linked and plexi glass, blended by natural defences fell to the offensive Tamil Tiger ceaseless waves III formations on the 21st of April 2000 exactly 8 years ago.

EPS till 2000 remained as a permanent impregnable cork to the Tamil Tigers allowing SLA maintain supremacy over the thin neck of land. The EPS defences extended from VETTILEIKERNY and IYAKACHCHI in the North to PARANTHAN in the South and was spread well over 70 square kilometres complete with man made satellite bases with well complimented natural obstacles of lagoon and sea fronts forming a tactically sound fortification. It was home to the 54 Division. In addition over two Divisions were deployed for its defence. How formidable and tactically sound these defences were proven by the Tamil Tigers' failed attack on that area in July-August 1991, when it was under siege for nearly two months.

The EPS defences have long been an anathema to the Tamil Tigers for it not only has denied them free access to the populous peninsula but also hindered the line of communication between the Wanni heartland and Jaffna - the focal point of the Eelam ethos.

Even though EPS fell in April 2000, the actual assault began in December 1999 on the back of the successes of Ceaseless Waves II which completely reversed the years worth of 'successful inroads' within a matter of days beginning with ODDUSUDAN. Ceaseless Waves I was the attack on the Mullaitivu defence complex which was home to the 225 brigade.

During the initial stages of the build up to the attack in an apparent prelude the Tamil Tigers commenced regular mortar barrages towards South Western part of the peninsula such as ARIYALAI and TANANKILAPPU. Barrages were also cued towards the Eastern sector of EPS. SFHQ-J COM also spoke of increased infiltration into the peninsula to conduct harassing fire towards convoys and check-posts.

On December 11, 1999 the Tamil Tigers launched Ceaseless Waves III (Oyatha Alaikal) after a brief respite during its Heroes week. With human waves attempting to break through the staunch EPS defences from the South at PARANTHAN town/junction, Sea Tigers made a landing and managed to secure a beach head by the 12th extending from VETTILEIKERNI to KADDAIKADU. Since the fall of MULATIVU, VETTILEIKERNI's radar and surveillance post was the sole point that performed maritime surveillance. In addition supplies to the entire EPS sector were unloaded here. Even though troops managed to hold on, by Friday 19th, they withdrew from the PARANTHAN town, junction and adjoining areas. This was the last Southernmost area under Government control after EPS. The fall of the satellite camps at PARANTHAN ensured that the main EPS complex would come within range of guerrilla artillery and mortars.

This brought about yet another uneasy lull to the fighting. Even though the guns were somewhat silent, the preparations for the next stage were hectic. Tamil Tigers made good use of this period to finalise their main battle plan using sand models, mock beach assaults and grid mapping (see below for example) the entire EPS area highlighting SLA strong points and breach points. Furthermore they were reinforcing the newly captured Eastern coastal belt with new trenches and bunkers supplemented with probing attacks on the Southern (just North of Paranthan Jct) and Northern (IYAKACHCHI FDL) defences.

An example of a field map of the Tamil Tigers encompassing the MUHAMALE-KILALY-NAGARKOVIL axis. This was found in a pocket of the corpse of a self styled 'Lieutenant' during the failed 2006 Jaffna offensive.

After bracing themselves for the inevitable - the final push towards EPS commenced during the early hours of 26th March 2000 when Sea Tiger units made a landing at NAGARKOVIL, thus extending the beach head from NAGARKOVIL to KADDAIKADU. Once this was secured they made a diversionary thrust using one of their companies North and North West towards KODIKAMAM and MANALKADU. While the diversion was taking place, the remaining companies breached the VATHIRAYAN box from the North and the South (cadres led by Theepan who moved North astride the coastal road passing the CHUNDIKULAM sanctuary from VETTILEIKERNI) capturing CHEMPIANPATTU, MULLIYAN, MARUTHANKERNY making troops withdraw further inland. By doing so the Tamil Tigers had created a flank East to the EPS defences.

With the coastal belt from NAGARKOVIL to KADDAIKAU fully secure, 3 more companies amounting over 1200 cadres led by Balraj moved along this coast from South and crossed the narrow lagoon just North of MARUTHANKERNY and began intercepting convoys plying along the A9 MSR. By 6th April Balraj and his men had succeeded their mission objective by capturing and holding onto a 4Km stretch of the A9 from MUHAMALE to PALLAI. They blew up a bridge at KATTIARATAN in the process.

The operations command with this development were made to re-route the MSR along the dirt tracks via KACHCHAI, ALIPALLAI towards CHAVAKACHCHERI. However, this route proved hazardous since the soft sandy earth at some points along this route did not support wheeled vehicles and made them break down on the way. In addition it came under constant mortar bombardment from the cadres stationed along the A9 and from beached units launched from the PARANTHAN coast.

Even though a counter attack by the CLI and Airmobile Brigade succeeded in re-capturing a 1Km stretch of the MSR, Tamil Tigers pressed on Northwards towards ELUTHMADUWAL, MIRUSUVIL and KODIKAMAM. This was despite Balraj's men running the risk of being boxed in at one stage. By doing so the Tamil Tigers ensured that level 1 reinforcement critically needed to reinforce EPS defences will have to deal with Balraj first before getting to EPS. Waiting in the wings, uncommitted, was Karuna and his men said to be over 1000 strong positioned South of EPS at PARANTHAN and MURASUMODDAI.

After a 2 day lull during the festive season, the Tamil Tigers made their final thrust. It originated from the Eastern flank - VATHIRAYAN. The thrust came from 3 prongs. Reinforcements were reduced only to a trickle by this stage and the fighting further North forced troops to move further inland. With the EPS defences fast dissipating Karuna made the final move by committing his reserve troops to overrun the complex. By 21st April 2000 troops were ordered to abandon the base and withdrew deploying itself in delaying positions.

Its been 8 years since this heart breaking debacle where many a dedicated officers and men laid their blood and soul in defence of this all important base. Since then with utmost dedication and patience SLA have turned the tables on the Tamil Tigers and are conducting frequent probing attacks on the very same defences that were breached. This is a portend of events yet to unfold.

Only time will tell...